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January 2012

Innovation and Success:

Qualitative Assessment of the NYC Center
for Economic Opportunity's Transition of
Proven Programs to City Agencies

SUBMITTED TO:
New York City Center for Economic
Opportunity



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Executive Summary

The New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO) leads the city's anti-poverty efforts through the demonstration of collaborative and targeted investments. Since its founding at the end of 2006, CEO has used its innovation funds to develop new initiatives and to measure results. CEO's programs promote education, employment, asset development, and health, targeted to the working poor, young adults aged 16–24, and families with young children.

The CEO strategy includes:

- investing in human capital development;
- giving the working poor the programs and supports that will help them move up the economic ladder and out of poverty;
- offering youth who are out of school and unemployed, and those with a history of incarceration, better chances to gain the skills and work experience they need to succeed;
- intervening early in the lives of children ages 0-5 to break cycles of poverty;
- breaking down silos within government to promote new ways of collaborating, increasing efficiency, and making better use of limited resources;
- using data and evaluation to improve programs and allocate resources based on measurable results; and
- sharing lessons learned and advocating on a national level for strategies shown to make a difference.

Throughout its existence, CEO has closely monitored and evaluated the effectiveness of its demonstration programs. As programs began to amass results, CEO began to plan for the transitioning of these programs to the partner agencies that had been implementing the demonstrations. By the summer of 2010, CEO determined that several CEO programs met the criteria that it had established for program success.

1. Programs must show that they work effectively as an anti-poverty approach by demonstrating significant participant impacts relevant to an appropriate comparison group.
2. The partner agency for the program must show its ongoing commitment to the program by integrating the program and/or similar strategies into other agency activities.
3. The agency must take steps to ensure the program's long-term sustainability by obtaining and dedicating additional government and/or private funding to support the program.



As a result of meeting these criteria, CEO transferred the authority for five initiatives to their partner agencies in July 2010: the City University of New York's Accelerated Study in Associate Program; the Office of Financial Empowerment of the NYC Department of Consumer Affairs; School-based Health Centers of the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; SBS Sector-Focused Career Centers; Advance at Work; and the Child Care Tax Credit.

To understand the effect of this decision, CEO asked Metis Associates to conduct a qualitative study based on interviews with 19 representatives from the partner agencies and mayoral offices. The interviews, which were conducted in April and May of 2011, explored the stakeholders' perspectives on program successes, agency responses to their new program authority, lessons learned, and impacts on each agency as well as on the national field. The interviews also addressed the role of CEO and its effectiveness in implementing its vision.

The above-named initiatives were identified by CEO as meeting the criteria for success listed above. For each initiative, we briefly describe their evidence of success that led to the transitioning decision and findings from the interviews concerning each program's status.

The City University of New York's (CUNY) Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP), is a program that supports students working toward the completion of an Associate's Degree within three years by requiring full-time study in a limited number of majors and providing academic, social, and financial support, such as advisement and tutoring, tuition waivers, free textbooks and Metrocards, and block scheduling.

Evidence of success

- The goal of the ASAP program is for at least 50 percent of the participants to obtain their Associate's Degree within three years of beginning college. As reported by CUNY in June of 2010, the program surpassed its graduation targets, with a rate that was more than three times the national average for community colleges and more than twice the graduation rate for a rigorously-selected local comparison group of similar students.
- Ongoing efforts to secure long-term stability for CUNY ASAP are evidenced by substantial grant awards from the Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust, the Jewish Foundation for the Education of Women, and the Robin Hood Foundation, that support program expansion and rigorous evaluation. CUNY continues to seek funding from philanthropic and government sources.

Findings from this study one year later

- CUNY has designated ASAP an "essential service." As such, CUNY ASAP has been protected from budget cuts and has been exempted from the current university-wide hiring freeze.
- CUNY realized the importance of advisement and block scheduling during students' first year in ASAP. A new community college (scheduled to open in the fall of 2012) will incorporate many of the successful components of CUNY ASAP – notably the requirements for full-time study, the establishment of peer cohorts, and a range of academic and financial supports.



The Office of Financial Empowerment (OFE) of the NYC Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) is the nation's first municipal office designed to educate, empower, and protect low- and moderate-income residents on financial matters.

Evidence of success

- OFE's programs have helped thousands of New Yorkers increase their savings, lower their debts, and become more financially savvy. \$aveNYC results show that individuals with low and very low incomes save when provided with simple and safe banking products. In the three years of the program, approximately 80 percent of the participants saved for a full year, many for the first time. From 2008–10, the \$aveNYC Account program successfully encouraged New Yorkers with low incomes to build savings at tax time. During that time, approximately 2,200 New York City residents with low incomes chose to participate in the \$aveNYC program, saving \$1.4 million in total, with an average savings of \$561. In addition, since Financial Empowerment Centers opened in June 2008, financial counselors have helped more than 10,000 clients pay down nearly \$4.2 million in debt.
- Evidence of DCA's ongoing commitment to OFE includes the naming of the OFE Director as a Deputy Commissioner and member of the DCA senior management team. In addition, financial empowerment has been woven into other divisions of the agency. Significant resources from other divisions, such as Communications, support the financial empowerment work.
- In addition to its complete structural integration within DCA, OFE has been very successful at attracting significant funding from private philanthropies such as the Annie E. Casey Foundation, The Ford Foundation, The F. B. Heron Foundation, Living Cities, The M&T Charitable Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation, and the William J. Clinton Foundation. It has also received funding from corporate sources such as the AIG Literacy Fund, Capital One, CIT/NeighborWorks America, Citi, ConEdison, H&R Block, Morgan Stanley, and New York State Homes and Community Renewal. Additional support has come from Single Stop USA, University of Wisconsin, the U.S. Department of Treasury, and the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED).

Findings from this study one year later

- As a revenue-raising agency, DCA was able to invest in additional revenue generating programs to meet PEG targets, instead of cutting programmatic funding to OFE. .
- DCA learned that there was a greater benefit for consumer protection when it was connected to financial empowerment. OFE pilots and programs have greatly influenced the ongoing implementation of DCA's consumer protection activities. As a result, the traditional DCA targeted watchdog protection practices are now more closely linked to financial education and outreach for low-income families.



School-based Health Centers (SBHCs) of the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) provide comprehensive health services, including reproductive and mental health services, free of charge to students at their school site.

Evidence of success

- SBHC is an evidence-based national model with evaluation results that support its efficacy in reducing pregnancy rates. For example, one study of a school-based reproductive health services program found that program schools experienced substantial declines in pregnancy rates, whereas similarly-situated comparison schools with no pregnancy prevention program showed an increase in pregnancy rates.
- DOHMH received a large three-year grant in 2008 to extend reproductive health care strategies to other school-based health clinics in the city.

Findings from this study one year later

- DOHMH re-allocated funding for their school-based health centers so that there was a more even distribution across the sites that were funded through different sources, while also expanding reproductive health care to all clinics. They also expected to make decisions about de-funding low-performing clinics.
- Through the relationships established through the CEO SBHCs, DOHMH better understood the concerns of school principals and health care providers' perspectives on adolescent health care. The agency also has drawn heavily on its CEO program to expand their work in reproductive health in other agency programs.

Sector-Focused Career Centers is a workforce development strategy of the NYC Department of Small Business Services (SBS) which focuses on a single economic sector. The sector centers include a Transportation Sector Center, a Manufacturing Sector Center, and a Healthcare Sector Center.

Evidence of success

- An analysis of the data for the Transportation Sector Center showed that customers had higher job placement rates, higher hourly wages, and more weekly hours worked than customers served by the traditional Workforce1 Career Center model.
- SBS allocated federal stimulus (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) funding in order to scale up this program and remains committed to funding sector centers as a valued approach to meeting the needs of employers in specific sectors and providing low-income workers with access to jobs in these sectors.

Findings from this study one year later

- Sector centers remain a key strategy of SBS. The success of the sector centers has led SBS to focus the efforts of all of its Workforce1 Career Centers, to some extent, on the targeted industry areas that are applicable to each center's geographic area of service.

Advance at Work is another SBS program to assist low-wage workers to upgrade their skills and advance to higher-wage jobs.

Evidence of success

- An analysis of the data for Advance at Work also showed that customers had higher job placement rates, higher hourly wages, and more weekly hours worked than customers served by the traditional Workforce1 Career Center model.

Findings from this study one year later

- When faced with a budget cut in FY11 the agency eliminated Advance at Work. This allowed the agency to absorb its reduction and maintain the sector centers at full funding levels. Advance at Work was cut because of its high cost per customer. The agency continues to work toward the program's goals of improved advancement services for incumbent workers through the various sector centers.
- The agency's commitment to upgrading the skills of the working poor who had been served through Advance at Work also has continued through its efforts to focus the skills development training it offers on those skills that lead to better jobs and wage increases. In the past, more generic office skills, such as introduction to typing or PowerPoint, had been offered.

The Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC) provides a refundable tax credit to help low- and moderate-income eligible families pay for child care expenses. CEO included the CCTC in the group of initiatives for this study because it went to full scale and became available to all qualifying families upon approval by the Governor in FY07. Hence, it has moved out of the pilot phase, but its path was different than others in this study.

Evidence of success

- In its first year, over 50,000 families claimed the CCTC, resulting in \$30.6 million in credits received. The average credit was \$607, and when combined with other child credits and the Earned Income Tax Credit it represents a significant income boost to low-income working families. Take up of the credit dropped to 40,000 families in the following year (tax year 2008) mirroring a similar pattern for work related tax credits.
- Studies have shown that former welfare recipients with young children are 60 percent more likely to remain employed after two years if they receive help paying for child care. In addition, tax credits for the working poor have led to increased employment.

Findings from this study one year later

- As a tax credit, the administration of CCTC remains unchanged. The number of families receiving the credit for TY09 (the most recent available data) declined again to approximately 31,000 and a total of \$15.9 million in credits.

The agency respondents considered the hallmark of CEO to be its work as an innovation laboratory for programs that are working to address poverty. Among other areas, CEO's effectiveness was discussed in terms of its ability to foster innovation, help broker relationships and make connections, reduce agency silos, and focus on evaluation. One result was increased cooperation and collaboration among city departments, and across the usual boundaries between health and human services, economic development, and education and community development. These CEO programs have been influential outside of New York City, as well.

With a little more than a year since CEO's decision to transfer authority for these programs to their partner agencies, it may be too early to see the full result. Nevertheless, the program models have continued to be supported intact or, where funding constraints prevented this, elements of the program models have been incorporated into agency operations. In either case, the CEO program experience has influenced agency direction, informed program design, helped to develop cross-agency relationships, and led to program replication.



I. Introduction

“CEO has invited a sense of venture, being able to think about what you’d like to do and not be constrained too terribly by the kind of ‘We don’t do it that way here [attitude].’ So, I think to one extent, it has opened up vision, opened up opportunity, opened up daring, if you will, for people.”

- Alan Gartner, Chief of Staff, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Education and Community Development

Created in 2006 by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, the New York City Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO) was designed to implement an anti-poverty strategy in New York City focused on the working poor, young adults, and families with children. From its very beginning, CEO has been monitoring and evaluating each of the programs it funds, seeking to learn what is effective and what needs to be improved or discontinued. By the summer of 2010, CEO had deemed a number of programs to be successful based on the following criteria:¹

1. The program must show that it works effectively as an anti-poverty approach by demonstrating significant participant impacts relevant to an appropriate comparison group.
2. The partner agency for the program must show its ongoing commitment to the program by integrating the program and/or similar strategies into other agency activities.
3. The agency must take steps to ensure the program’s long-term sustainability by obtaining and dedicating additional government and/or private funding to support the program.

In July 2010, at the beginning of the City’s fiscal year, CEO officially transferred authority for those pilot programs it had deemed successful to the partner agencies that were responsible for program implementation.² With CEO’s declaration of the programs’ success came the transfer of authority to each sponsoring agency. The agencies assumed responsibility for decisions regarding the continuation of their programs, programmatic changes, and funding levels.

To better understand the results of its decision to transition these programs and to learn about how each agency has responded to this opportunity, CEO asked Metis to conduct a

¹ New York City Center for Economic Opportunity. *Center for Economic Opportunity: Replicating Our Results*. p 3.

² In the city’s budget terminology, this transfer is called “baselining.”

qualitative study. This report presents the results of this study, which was based on interviews with 19 key agency and mayoral office stakeholders conducted in April and May, 2011.

The interviews explored the respondents' perspectives on program successes, the agency's commitment, and decisions regarding program status. Lessons learned and the impacts on the agencies and on the field in which they operate, opportunities and challenges, and the role and effectiveness of CEO were other topics of the study.

One additional initiative, the Child Care Tax Credit (CCTC), was also considered to be successful although it could not meet the same criteria set by CEO. As a tax credit established through a mayoral executive order, with State approval, the CCTC never had a pilot phase like the other CEO initiatives and upon implementation went to full

scale serving all families eligible to claim the credit. Its effect has been difficult to measure, as there is no comparison group information or information regarding how the extra resources may have influenced family decisions about work or child care. In planning for the credit the City estimated 49,000 families would be eligible for the credit based on tax data and take up of similar federal and state credits. In the first year, take up was in line with this estimate, suggesting good planning, outreach, and design that made it easy for families and tax preparers to claim. The Department of Finance provides CEO with annual tax data. Information about the CCTC initiative is included in this report, as appropriate, and is based on responses from CEO and other mayoral office representatives.

Metis Associates and its partner Westat have conducted a number of program reviews and evaluations of CEO programs since 2008. About a year and a half ago, Metis conducted a qualitative assessment of the impact of CEO on New York City's agencies and provider organizations.³ The findings from this earlier assessment, namely that the CEO programs had resulted in changes in organizational culture, replication of practices within the organizations, and changes in operational systems, as well as increased cross-agency collaboration and replication of programs or strategies outside of NYC, have important implications for the current study.

CEO Identified Successful Programs

- CUNY Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP), City University of New York
- Office of Financial Empowerment, Department of Consumer Affairs
- School-Based Health Centers, Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
- Sector-Focused Career Centers, Department of Small Business Services
- Advance at Work, Department of Small Business Services

³ Metis Associates (2009). *Evidence of Organizational Change: Qualitative Assessment of the NYC Center for Economic Opportunity's Impact on New York City Agencies and Provider Organizations*.



II. Study Design

The study design was developed by Metis in collaboration with CEO staff. CEO described the criteria they had used to deem a program successful, identified those programs, and provided background information about them. Metis also reviewed reports and information about the programs, including the program review reports and other evaluations that had been prepared previously by Metis and Westat, CEO's annual reports, agency Web sites, and other program documentation.

Two interview protocols were developed—one for agency representatives and one for representatives from the Mayor's office. The protocol for agency representatives addressed their specific program, while the protocol for mayoral office representatives had a broader perspective. The evaluation design, including the protocols and participant consent forms (see Appendix) was reviewed and approved by both Metis's and Westat's Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) before the study began.

CEO provided a list of respondents for the study that included key stakeholders from each partner agency as well as several mayoral office representatives. After initial outreach by CEO to alert the respondents to the study, Metis scheduled the interviews and shared the protocol in advance. Signed consent forms,⁴ were obtained for all participants. After conducting the agency interviews, Metis interviewed several CEO staff to obtain their perspectives and clarify any remaining questions.

In-person interviews were conducted with 19 individuals in April and May, 2011. Some of the partner agency interviews were conducted with a single respondent, while others were conducted with a group of respondents from the same agency. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed for Metis's internal use. A list of the names, titles, and agency affiliations of the interviewees, and a list of acronyms, are included in the Appendix.

⁴ Consent forms specified that responses would not be confidential or anonymous, but could be attributed to individual respondents or to their agency.

III. Description, Success, and Status of the Programs

The CEO programs studied for this report were part of the first wave of programs funded by CEO beginning in FY07. With the exception of the CCTC, which as a tax-credit is not part of the City's expense budget, the programs continued to be funded by CEO through FY10. Information on the amount of CEO funding to these programs FY07 through FY11 is presented in the Appendix.

A. Program Descriptions

The CUNY ASAP programs, serving low- and moderate-income community college students, assists students in earning an Associate's Degree within three years. Supports include advisement and tutoring, tuition waivers, free textbooks and Metrocards for travel to and from campus. In addition, the program offers block-scheduling to accommodate student work schedules and career advisors to help students with job placement and career development. The program is offered at all six City University of New York (CUNY) community colleges and serves over 1,000 students each year. The goal of the program is that at least 50 percent of the participants will obtain their Associate's Degree within three years of beginning college.

After just the program's second year, the first cohort reported an encouraging 30.1 percent two-year graduation rate, while a comparison group of similar students had a two-year graduation rate of only 11.4 percent.⁵ As reported by CUNY in June of 2010, the program surpassed its graduation targets, with 55 percent of the students receiving degrees in three years or less—a rate that is more than three times the national average for community colleges. The three-year graduation rate for a rigorously-selected local comparison group of similar students was 24 percent.⁶

Evidence of CUNY's commitment to the goals of this program is embodied in the establishment of a new community college (scheduled to open in the fall of 2012) that will incorporate many of the successful components of CUNY ASAP—notably the requirements for full-time study, the establishment of peer cohorts (i.e., a “learning community”), and a range of academic and financial supports.

Ongoing efforts to secure long-term stability for CUNY ASAP are evidenced by substantial grant awards from the Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust, for program

⁵ Linderman, Donna (November 2009). *Early Outcomes Report for the City University of New York (CUNY) Accelerated Study in Associate Programs (ASAP)*.

⁶ New York City Center for Economic Opportunity. *Center for Economic Opportunity: Replicating Our Results*.

expansion, transfer scholarships, and a rigorous randomized control trial evaluation (RCT), and the Jewish Foundation for the Education of Women, for transfer scholarships. Significant funds provided by the Robin Hood Foundation also are being used to support the RCT evaluation that is being conducted on a new cohort of ASAP students by MDRC, as well as program expansion.

The Office of Financial Empowerment (OFE), a major unit within the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA), is the nation's first municipal office whose central mission is to educate, empower, and protect City residents with low to moderate incomes, enabling them to build assets and make the most of their financial resources. OFE's strategies include: increasing access to high quality financial education and counseling, improving access to income-boosting tax credits, connecting low-income households to safe and affordable banking and asset-building products and services, and enforcing and improving protections in the financial services marketplace. OFE has managed multiple programs including financial empowerment centers (which offer free, one-on-one financial education and counseling to low-income NYC residents); Tax Prep Plus (which offers quick and easy tax preparation at a dramatically reduced rate to ensure working New Yorkers receive the tax credits they deserve); and \$aveNYC (accounts that offer a unique opportunity to eligible low-income tax filers to use a portion of their Earned Income Tax Credit refund to build savings).

OFE's programs have helped thousands of New Yorkers to increase their savings, lower their debts, and become more financially savvy. \$aveNYC results show that individuals with low and very low incomes save when provided with simple and safe banking products. In the three years of the program, approximately 80 percent of the participants saved for a full year, many for the first time.⁷ From 2008–10, \$aveNYC successfully encouraged New Yorkers with low incomes to build savings at tax time. During that time, approximately 2,200 New York City residents with low incomes chose to participate in the \$aveNYC program, saving \$1.4 million in total, with an average savings of \$561.⁸ Almost one-fourth of these residents did not have a bank account, and 40 percent of them reported having no savings or history of savings when they entered the program. The majority of participants (78%) saved for at least one year and received the match funds. Approximately 70 percent of the participants continued to save even after receiving the match.⁹ In addition, since Financial Empowerment Centers opened in June 2008, financial counselors have helped more than 13,000 clients pay down nearly \$6.5 million in debt.¹⁰

Evidence of DCA's ongoing commitment to OFE includes the naming of the OFE Executive Director as a Deputy Commissioner and member of the DCA senior management team. In addition, financial empowerment has been woven into other divisions of the agency.

⁷ New York City Center for Economic Opportunity. *Center for Economic Opportunity: Replicating Our Results*. p 7.

⁸ New York City Office of Financial Empowerment. *The \$aveNYC Account: Innovation in Asset Building*. Research Update, December 2010.

⁹ New York City Center for Economic Opportunity. *Center for Economic Opportunity: Replicating Our Results*. p 16.

¹⁰OFE Communication, December 2011.

Significant resources from other divisions, such as Communications, support the financial empowerment work.

In addition to its complete structural integration within DCA, OFE has been very successful at attracting significant funding from private philanthropies such as the Annie E. Casey Foundation, The Ford Foundation, The F. B. Heron Foundation, Living Cities, The M&T Charitable Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation, and the William J. Clinton Foundation. OFE also has received funding from corporate sources such as the AIG Literacy Fund, Capital One, CIT/NeighborWorks America, Citi, ConEdison, H&R Block, Morgan Stanley, and New York State Homes and Community Renewal. Additional support has come from Single Stop USA, University of Wisconsin, the U.S. Department of Treasury, and the Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED). OFE/DCA also secured City funding to support its Financial Empowerment Centers beginning in FY12.

School-Based Health Centers (SBHCs) were established on six “high-need” high school campuses. These SBHCs provide a comprehensive range of services including primary care, acute care, health education, vaccinations, and chronic disease management. The centers also offer a non-stigmatized environment for obtaining reproductive and mental health services. SBHCs provide free care to students regardless of their insurance status.

By bringing these services directly to where young people spend their day, research has shown that school-based health clinics can improve access to primary care for underserved youth. The clinics’ primary care services are able to address students’ chronic diseases and mental health needs, which have been shown to result in absenteeism and lead to decreases in school performance. Considered an evidence-based practice, evaluation results of school-based reproductive health services programs showed that after 28 months, program schools experienced a 30.1 percent decline in pregnancy rates, whereas comparison schools, with no pregnancy prevention program, showed a 57.6 percent increase in pregnancy rates.¹¹

Due, in large part, to the success of the SBHCs, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) received a large three-year grant¹² in 2008 to extend reproductive healthcare strategies to other school-based health clinics in the city.

Sector Centers utilize an innovative strategy that focuses workforce development services on a single economic sector. Sector centers meet the needs of specific businesses within the sector as well as provide low-income workers with access to good jobs with career advancement opportunities. Currently, the centers focus on transportation, manufacturing and healthcare. An analysis of data for the Transportation Sector Center showed that these customers had higher job placement rates, higher hourly wages, and more weekly hours worked than customers served by the traditional Workforce1 Career Center model. They also were three times more likely to be

¹¹ Zabin, Laurie S., Marilyn B. Hirsch, Edward A. Smith, Rosalie Streett, Janet B. Hardy (1986). Evaluation of a Pregnancy Prevention program for Urban Teenagers, *Family Planning Perspectives*, 18(3), 119-126.

¹² This is a three-year, anonymously funded grant, for which the DOHMH has received a one-year extension.

placed in jobs than the comparison group, and on average earned \$1.70 more per hour in those jobs.¹³

SBS's allocation of federal funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to the sector centers in FY10 is evidence of the agency's commitment to sustaining the services developed with CEO funding.

Advance at Work (formerly named the Career Advancement Program) develops the skills of low-wage workers to help them advance in the labor market. The program helps participants increase their income and move up the career ladder by offering an array of services including individual advancement coaching, access to training and education programs, enrollment in work supports, income and asset-building information and workshops. Like Transportation Sector Center customers, Advance at Work customers also had higher job placement rates, higher hourly wages, and more weekly hours worked than customers served by the traditional Workforce1 Career Center model. They also were 3.5 times more likely to be placed in jobs than similar participants in the federally funded workforce program.

The Child Care Tax Credit provides low-income eligible families with a refundable tax credit to help pay for child care expenses. When combined with the federal and state child care tax credits, a New York City family can receive over \$6,100 yearly to help offset the cost of child care. New York City is one of only two cities nationwide that offers this local credit.

Studies have shown that former welfare recipients with young children are 60 percent more likely to remain employed after two years if they receive help paying for child care. In addition, tax credits for the working poor have led to increased employment. In the first year, the program slightly exceeded the number of families expected to take up the credit—with 50,000 families earning credits worth a total of \$30 million; in subsequent years the number of families and amount of credits has declined, but the Department of Finance (DOF) reports that the decline in take-up is comparable to a similar state program.^{14,15}

¹³ Westat (January 2010). Workforce Innovations: Outcome Analysis of Outreach, Career Advancement and Sector-Focused Programs.

¹⁴ New York City Center for Economic Opportunity. *Early Achievements & Lessons Learned*.

¹⁵ Communication from NYC CEO.



B. Agency Perceptions of Program Success

The agencies were proud of the successes posted by their programs. In the interviews, they spoke about these successes and their ongoing commitment.

CUNY respondents exuberantly characterize the program as “one of the most successful within the University,” enjoying deep and significant personal commitments from the Chancellor, the Executive Vice Chancellor, and the Senior University Dean for Academic Affairs who is also the Dean of the School of Professional Studies. They pointed to ASAP students having graduated at a rate that is much higher than community college students across the country. “Our (ambitious) goal was to get a 50 percent graduation rate in three years... So we’re delighted with the results. We think it is better than we would have imagined.” (Mogulescu, CUNY). As noted in the previous section, the CUNY ASAP three-year graduation rate is 55 percent, compared to 24 percent for a comparison group of similar students. The initial cohort of ASAP students included only those who completed remediation requirements prior to the program start. To test whether ASAP would be as effective with students with even greater needs, a second cohort of students, all of whom require remediation, were enrolled in the program in 2009 and are part of a random assignment evaluation. The spring and fall 2010 cohorts are part of an RCT evaluation at Kingsborough Community College, Borough of Manhattan Community College, and LaGuardia Community College. Informed by data from their ongoing evaluation of ASAP, CUNY seeks to further refine and improve services to participants by:

- identifying which program elements contribute most and least to student success;
- studying where and how costs may be reduced with minimal threat to program impact; and
- identifying which student groups appear to benefit most and least from program services.

DOHMH respondents also are extremely proud of their SBHC program. They noted that data for the school-based health centers show that large numbers of students are using the services and that, based on the program’s success; they have sought and obtained funding for other programs with a similar focus. In addition to the large anonymous grant already described, DOHMH received a substantial five-year grant from the US Centers for Disease Control to fund a comprehensive community-wide intervention geared to preventing or reducing teen pregnancy in two community districts in the Bronx. Staff at DOHMH also credited the program with contributing to a shift in thinking at the State level. “When the CEO project started, there were those who thought that reproductive health services were not part of primary care for teenagers. I can’t imagine anyone saying that now.” (Platt, DOHMH).

Within DOHMH, the SBHC program is reportedly widely known, and teen pregnancy prevention continues to be a key priority of the agency—one that the school-based health



centers are continuing to work hard to address. Notably, there are currently 123 school-based health centers in NYC, 44 of which are based in high schools, and most of which are funded through the State. However, while agency staff noted that teen pregnancy prevention is a key priority for them, they also indicated that the program accounts for only a small share (about one percent) of the Department of Education (DOE) and DOHMH budgets. In addition to direct services, other effective strategies implemented by the agency include public health messaging, and regulatory and legislative efforts..

SBS informants indicated that the sector centers and the Advance at Work program had exceeded job placement targets and resulted in higher wages for the job seekers who were placed. Regarding the success of the sector centers, an SBS respondent commented, “We had our best year since fall 2008 and I think it’s because of a sector approach...In every recession there are areas that grow and areas that don’t grow. Let’s really understand the data, and go after those areas that grow.” (Kamath, SBS).

SBS used federal stimulus funding to scale-up their CEO programs, including the sector centers and Advance at Work. The agency remained committed to the three existing sector centers (transportation, healthcare, and manufacturing) even after the federal funding ended. “They’re part and parcel of this broader system.” (Neale, SBS). Based on the success of sector centers, SBS also has tried to create a “sector-light” approach within all of its regular Workforce1 Career Centers (WF1CC). SBS respondents reported that the agency’s commitment to obtaining high-wage jobs remained and was demonstrated in the establishment for WF1CCs of a 30 percent target for job placements at or above \$15 per hour.

OFE created a financial counseling model that has assisted an estimated 10,000 people, and early evaluation results show a reduction of about \$4 million in short-term debt for those individuals. Targeted enforcement efforts in low-income neighborhoods, and tightened regulations in debt-collection and process server industries, have also been successful. “We have turned this work into a field, rather than just doing it. We have created a national network of other cities—a national coalition called Cities for Financial Empowerment (CFE). Our tax time initiative [SaveNYC] is being replicated now (at the national level) through the CEO Social Innovation Fund [as SaveUSA].” (Mintz, DCA).

DCA also has woven the work of OFE into multiple divisions of the agency and has retained an entire division for financial empowerment programming and a separate division for financial empowerment research, both of which were started with CEO funding. DCA assigned high-level personnel to lead both of those divisions and the director of OFE is a member of the senior management team. Structurally, OFE has become one of the main pillars of DCA.

C. Program Status

The transfer of authority from CEO was viewed by the agency partners largely as a matter of course, although not all of them had anticipated it, or understood its effect on the relationship with CEO in terms of what CEO expected of them. In practical terms, CEO’s decision to



transfer programmatic authority to the partner agencies as of July 1, 2010 was not fully understood by the agencies. During interviews, when respondents were asked to comment on how CEO's decision changed the way they viewed or operated the program, and about opportunities or challenges, they frequently pointed to decisions or events that had occurred prior to the transfer. This may have been because the transfer was still recent, or because it takes time for changes to be implemented or observed.

In the year following the transfer, the City issued another round of budget cuts—providing a real test of this issue. In these reductions, referred to as PEGs (Program to Eliminate the Gap), there are fairly uniform reduction targets across all City agencies. Since CEO's inception there have been 11 budget reductions—each ranging from about four percent to eight percent of agency budgets. CEO has had the same targets as other agencies and meets its PEG targets across its entire portfolio by eliminating programs that perform poorly, reducing budgets when it would not dramatically affect service levels or other resources were available, and generally protecting the high performers. With these reductions CEO's City-funded budget has declined by approximately 30 percent since FY2008, and it has partially offset these losses through private and federal funding.

The fiscal situations of several agencies enabled them to protect their programs from budget reductions, while another agency with more limited resources cut their CEO programs to meet the budget cuts.¹⁶

“Even if it wasn't sort of a specified expectation that it would be 'baselined' *per se*, I do think from the very outset there was a sense that we needed to quickly figure out how to embed OFE into the work of this agency.”

- Jonathan Mintz, Commissioner, DCA

As an “essential service” CUNY ASAP has been protected from budget cuts and has been exempted from the current university-wide hiring freeze. CUNY remains committed to implementing the program at all of its campuses, as originally designed. CUNY sees ASAP as “very much in the center of the university's mission and focus.” (Linderman,

CUNY).

CUNY has obtained grants for the expansion of ASAP, a new community college, and a scholarship program for transfer students. Additional funding has been obtained to support new students, as well as for a rigorous randomized control trial evaluation of its implementation and impact. CUNY has continued to reach out to a number of foundations, including Lumina, Gates, and the Jewish Foundation for the Education of Women for additional funding.

As part of a revenue-generating agency, OFE faced minor budget cuts relative to other CEO programs.. According to those interviewed, OFE expected that there was about a two-year window to make the case that the office was worthy of continued resources. Having demonstrated success, the transfer of budgetary authority affirmed the importance of the program to agency staff. OFE has partnered with philanthropic organizations and has been very

¹⁶.Revenue-generating agencies are able to invest in revenue-generating programs and use surplus revenue to meet PEG targets..

successful with private fundraising that has been used for new programming or program expansion. Over 20 local and national foundations have contributed funding for OFE programs such as the Financial Empowerment Centers, the \$aveNYC accounts, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) campaign.

DOHMH re-allocated funding among their school-based health centers so that there was a more equal distribution across the sites that were funded through different sources,¹⁷ rather than continuing to support the CEO-funded sites at higher levels than their other sites, while also expanding reproductive health care to all clinics. They also expected to make decisions about defunding low-performing clinics as the agency plans to use its authority to end funding for one of the CEO-funded sites. This SBHC is located in a small school that the DOHMH feels cannot justify the cost given the current funding environment. Furthermore, the agency has not been satisfied with the quality of the provider for this center.

As described earlier, DOHMH's CEO program helped them to develop a comprehensive teen pregnancy reduction program in two community districts in the South Bronx through funding from a grant from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. Components of this grant include implementing an evidence-based program, increasing access and linkages to quality clinical services, increasing advocacy and education of elected officials and key organizational leaders to support policy and systems changes, and utilizing social media to raise awareness among teens and community residents.

Responding to decreases in CEO funding as well as the end of ARRA funds, SBS eliminated the Advance at Work program despite the program's high performance. As a staff- and time-intensive program, with a relatively high cost per customer served, SBS felt the Advance at Work program could not be justified within the context of the overall budget cuts that SBS had experienced. "We're still really committed to 'upskilling' individuals, skill development, access to better jobs, and training, but we did away with the kind of discrete Advance at Work program within our centers...the idea behind that was, we can achieve all of those pieces...without having a separate program with separate staff, with a separate identity, with a separate kind of management focus." (Kamath, SBS). SBS continues to apply for new funding, including for federal discretionary funds. However, the agency noted that local funders were not using their scarce dollars to fill in gaps in government services. The agency's approach to Sector Centers remained unchanged.

By fully integrating the CEO programs, some of the partner agencies realized efficiencies, while also facing challenges.

- While the expiration of ARRA funding and the decrease in CEO funds has resulted in a decrease in the number of businesses and job seekers SBS is able to serve, the success of the Sector Centers and Advance at Work has led SBS to think about how aspects of the agency's services can be improved. "It's making us think about certain things...about where we are best and how we can make things happen." (Walsh, SBS). SBS integrated elements of the

¹⁷ CEO initially provided funds for six sites, while seven other sites were city funded.



Community Partners program (another effective CEO initiative)¹⁸ and Advance at Work into their programs funded by the federal Workforce Investment Act (WIA). In addition, decisions about allocating training funds through its Business Solutions Training Funds program have become more focused on the specific skills of incumbent workers such as updating obsolete skills or performing new or different jobs-- rather than on supporting more general training to businesses' employees. This improved targeting focuses the program on the types of training that result in the largest wage gains for incumbent workers.

- OFE's integration within DCA has moved all of OFE communication activities to the central external affairs division of DCA. In addition, duplication of some contracting and purchasing functions has been eliminated. For instance, prior to baselining, OFE was preparing its own RFPs for technology contracts, such as for the purchase of laptops and software. Now, all of those functions are handled by the DCA purchasing unit. Yet, although the budget is tight and total integration of OFE within DCA has been positive, keeping on top of all the agency-wide financial empowerment pieces was seen as a challenge. A large part of this challenge revolves around the fact that OFE has been transformed from a pilot, focusing on certain neighborhoods, to a citywide program available to anyone.

¹⁸ Recognizing that community-based organizations assist large numbers of jobseekers, but may lack strong employer connections and a clear linkage to the public workforce system, the Community Partners program (formerly Community-Based Organization Outreach) established teams in each of the City's WF1CCs to rapidly connect job-ready clients of community organizations to specific job openings.



IV. Lessons Learned and Program Impacts

The experience of implementing these successful programs allowed the agency respondents to identify some lessons learned. They described how the programs had impacted the work of their own agencies as well as the field in which they worked.

A. Lessons Learned

From their CEO program experiences, the agencies learned the importance of strengthening ties to stakeholders as well as understanding the various aspects of program design. Respondents from DOHMH, SBS, and OFE each described the importance of connections to their respective external stakeholders as one of the lessons learned from their CEO program experiences. For DOHMH, it was gaining an understanding and addressing the concerns of school principals and working to change providers' perceptions of adolescent health care, as well as learning to work effectively with state government. "Many pediatricians don't view themselves as adolescent health doctors. And so, we've had a learning curve for some of the staff of the school-based health centers." (Platt, DOHMH).

For the SBS sector centers, it was the importance of getting to know the sector very well, making decisions based on sector data, and making good connections with the employers in that sector. Further, OFE representatives spoke about the need to invest in the infrastructure in the community, which they did with the financial empowerment centers as places where people could go for information.

From its experience with ASAP, CUNY respondents reported that they understood better the relative importance of the ASAP program elements. CUNY officials stressed the importance of providing advisement and using block scheduling during the students' first year and of resolving students' remedial needs as early and as quickly as possible. They planned to keep the ASAP seminar (a weekly group advisement program addressing topics of importance to ASAP students) in place in subsequent years to retain the students' connection to their cohort group. These mechanisms provide a support system and structure for students to succeed in earning their degree. Other critical elements include full-time attendance and mandatory tutoring, if needed. On the other hand, they found that job counseling, especially for the newer students, was not as important as these other elements. They also learned that a small amount of assistance, for Metrocards for example, can sometimes overcome large hurdles that students face. They believed that the program's administrative placement in the Chancellor's office and the high expectations that had been set at the outset contributed to the program's success.

Having to discontinue the Advance at Work program led SBS to look to other means to successfully support the skills development of the population to whom Advance at Work had been targeted: the working poor. Thus, SBS refined workshop and skill development offerings to

focus on those that were more likely to lead to wage increases or better jobs and eliminated additional offerings that were more general (e.g., Introduction to Typing). Instead, they approached the problem from the perspective of “How do we think about the right interventions to upgrade workers, and how do we think about a different set of interventions to upgrade the general job seekers?” (Kamath, SBS). Taking a sector approach, they found that “if we start with the companies, we start with the demand; we do a lot better at getting people opportunities at higher-paying jobs with that approach, than necessarily focusing on individuals.” (Neale, SBS). SBS’s thinking about sector centers has also led them to realize how important it is for the sector centers to develop a strong connection with community colleges that focus on the same sector, for example, careers in transportation.

For DCA, consumer protection was seen as going further when it is “married” to financial empowerment, and giving a larger purpose to the historical regulatory and enforcement work of consumer protection. OFE pilots and programs have greatly influenced the ongoing implementation of DCA’s consumer protection activities. As a result, the traditional DCA targeted watchdog protection practices are now more closely linked to financial education and outreach for low-income families. For instance, DCA carried out a very significant city-wide marketing campaign around debt relief, trying to steer people away from debt consolidation traps and getting them to attend free financial counseling sessions.

Because of CEO’s emphasis on results and the importance of having to show results, DCA continued to support OFE’s ongoing research and evaluation.

B. Impact on the Partner Agencies

As indicated earlier, the success of the CEO programs has influenced the directions that the agencies have taken and their designs for new programs. According to SBS, for example, the Sector Centers have influenced the direction taken by the regular WIA-funded WF1CCs, as the agency has relied heavily on labor market data and the track records of its providers to connect with local businesses and industries. Thus, all nine WF1CCs (the six original centers and the three sector centers), have taken on targeted economic industry areas of focus. Upper Manhattan, with a large concentration of food service establishments, has focused on business development in that industry. Brooklyn, with a strong retail corridor, as well as accommodations and food services, has focused on that. The predominance of health and human service organizations in the Bronx has led to a focus on human services. Furthermore, no one center focuses on more than three economic sectors in order to build deeper industry knowledge and stronger employer relationships, a strategy that was not used before the CEO Sector Centers. The CEO initiatives also helped SBS to think differently about training, building business relationships, and about metrics for evaluating program performance.

The experience of CUNY ASAP has had a strong influence on the design of a soon-to-open new community college, the seventh one in the city and first to open in 30 years. The new college will incorporate a summer bridge program, “high-touch” advisement, academic support services, grouping by cohorts, and full-time study—all elements of the successful ASAP model.

At OFE, financial empowerment has led to a broader understanding of how to help people. Community-based capacity building and direct services, that go along with OFE’s public education campaigns have become a big part of what the agency does now. These engagements have helped the agency to understand the marketplace better and to create the best possible response to their core consumer protection concern. For instance, findings from serving residents seeking financial counseling at Financial Empowerment Centers have provided consumer protection staff with a better informed, stronger, perspective on needed regulatory activities.

DOHMH has drawn heavily on its CEO program to expand their work in reproductive health across other programs in the agency. For example, the DOHMH’s School Health, Maternal Infant & Reproductive Health, and Bronx District Public Health Offices have been working together and developing programs to prevent teen pregnancy, including the CDC grant described earlier. Also as a result of its CEO work, DOHMH has developed better and deeper working relationships with the DOE and the Department of Youth and Community Development (DYCD).

C. Impact on the Field

Several programs are being replicated in other parts of the country; the agencies have become leaders in their field nationally in part because of the success of the program models and the efforts to disseminate evaluation results.

- Three of these programs—Sector-based Centers, Advance at Work, and \$aveNYC—are being replicated by CEO in other cities, as WorkAdvance and SaveUSA, respectively, with the support of a federal Social Innovation Fund (SIF) grant from the Corporation for National and Community Service. “The goal of the SIF is to build national evidence for programs with the potential for transformative social change defined as demonstrating strong impacts, the potential for broad applicability, and generating cost savings through efficiency gains.”¹⁹ WorkAdvance is a sector-based employment and advancement program; SaveUSA is a tax-time matched savings program. The initial first year of an expected five-year federal SIF grant to CEO and NYC totaled \$5.7 million for the replication of five programs in eight cities. CEO will match the federal grant 3:1 with other funding raised mostly from national and local foundations, and the total five-year project is budgeted at over \$80 million.

¹⁹ New York City Center for Economic Opportunity. *Center for Economic Opportunity: Replicating Our Results*. p 15.

- OFE has developed a coalition of cities doing financial empowerment work, Cities for Financial Empowerment (CFE), “which brings together pioneering municipal governments from across the country that have begun to use their power and positions to advance innovative financial empowerment initiatives.”²⁰ Through this collaboration other cities are looking at OFE for input into their programming or for assistance in replicating some of OFE’s successful programs. OFE also has influenced national policy on financial empowerment in the creation at the federal level of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. OFE also has been approached by the U.S. Treasury Department, the FDIC, and other federal institutions to discuss financial empowerment, financial counseling, and banking access.
- SBS has communicated with other cities about how to scale up sector centers within the context of a WIA workforce system.
- Officials from CUNY, SBS and OFE have participated in national panels, given testimony, and met with representatives from other cities and states. Quite simply, CUNY’s ASAP has provided a new model to community colleges nationwide facing the challenges associated with low graduation rates.
- DOHMH is planning to develop a “replication toolkit” that could be used by SBHCs that are seeking to increase their reproductive health services.

The programs also have had an impact on the work of other NYC agencies.

- The DOHMH Maternal and Infant Reproductive Health program worked closely with DYCD in revising its service learning model to have a more explicit focus on teen pregnancy prevention, as in the evidence-based Teen Outreach Program. Additionally, success with the SBHCs also has led to a change in DOE practice, in which parental consent is no longer needed for a student to access reproductive health services in a high school SBHC.
- SBS participated in a CEO-sponsored forum for local policy makers and practitioners on advancing sector-based centers. “The work that we did with the sector centers really better positioned us to play a leadership role citywide. I think some of these organizations still need to take it a lot further, but I think we’ve definitely started planting some seeds in a way that was really intentional and deliberate.” (Neale, SBS).
- Because of their work with the Transportation Sector Center, which was already working with students from Aviation, Automotive, and Transit Tech High Schools, SBS has come to recognize the important roles played by career and technical education high schools and community colleges in preparing students for jobs in different sectors. As a result, SBS representatives are working to publicize and promote this goal with school principals, the United Federation of Teachers, DOE, and other partner organizations.

²⁰ Retrieved 6 June 2011, from <http://www.cfecoalition.org/cfeAboutCFECoalition.aspx?ID=2>. CFE is co-chaired by the NYC DCA Commissioner.

V. CEO's Role and Impact

A. CEO's Vision and Effectiveness

The single word repeated by each respondent agency to describe CEO was “innovation.” All of the agency partners viewed CEO as an innovation laboratory for programs that are working to address poverty. CEO got people thinking about new things and new ways of doing things to produce change. CEO provided a space to test programs that would never have gotten off the ground if there had to be an immediate decision about whether the programs would be permanent. This view of CEO was confirmed by Deputy Mayor Linda Gibbs and CEO staff, themselves who stated that “our core mission is to pilot and evaluate.”

“We imagined, as much as anything, that it was a real laboratory for learning, experimentation and discovery. And using lessons learned for future action was understood to be a central part of the model.”

- Linda Gibbs, Deputy Mayor

Rather than being responsible for implementing programs, CEO was described as being “one step removed,” a kind of “meta-funder,” that enabled the agencies to think about how to use the funding and work to make the programs happen. CEO brokers relationships with other agencies and makes connections among them, to reduce some of the silos that continue to exist among city departments. The emphasis on evaluation also was cited as part of CEO's vision and effectiveness by the respondents.

According to Deputy Mayor Gibbs, the vision is for CEO to “have clear expectations, measure them, and then have consequences for the results. Are they [the agencies] thinking hard about what's making something work or not work? Have they identified the elements of success? Does it feel like they are on top of why things are happening, or are they clueless about why something came out as well as it did, i.e., were they on top of the levers you need to push in order to make something successful?”

“It was really an opportunity to leverage existing strengths...if you didn't do that, you'd have to build a whole new infrastructure for service delivery. So, you leverage the existing strengths, and then you maximize the chances that some of these programs would be institutionalized, and that there would be other funding sources that would be added to the programs—which is exactly what's happened in our case.”

- Chris Neale, Executive Director, Workforce1 System Improvements, SBS



According to Veronica White, CEO's Executive Director, the long-term ambition for CEO programs was to build a case for national funding and replication. Even when the City's budget position was stronger there was always recognition that federal investment would be required for full scale.

“The City, in a great way, jumpstarted the program and continues to fund us [CEO]. And we were raising philanthropic dollars from the start. But now, the federal government has stepped up to the plate with the Social Innovation Fund. And then, of course, we continue to raise larger amounts of private money... There was always an ambition here to influence the national debate about poverty. And [SIF] created a really incredibly opportune chance to take that lesson and go to other jurisdictions that were interested.”

- Veronica White, Executive Director, CEO

B. CEO's Impact on NYC Government

In addition to the substantial support provided for new programs, CEO was seen as having led to increased cooperation and collaboration among city departments. CEO programs got agencies talking with each other more—which the agencies reported has resulted in better cooperation and more systematic approaches to addressing needs. By cutting across the portfolios of the different deputy mayors and offering funding that was flexible (i.e., not tied to funding stream requirements), CEO encouraged cross-collaboration and innovation.

“CEO has had a tremendous impact on the way a city government can make all of its multitude of programs function more effectively. I think that the silo busting, the connections, the integrating of one [program] with the others—all of that is huge.”

- Jonathan Mintz, Commissioner, DCA

CEO was said to have influenced the creation of a Workforce Cabinet of three Deputy Mayors with responsibility for health and human services, economic development, and education and community development. Organized about a year ago, the Cabinet's role is to develop a citywide strategy for workforce development. The city's first report on *The State of the New York City Workforce System, Fiscal Year 2010*, which presents an analysis of labor market trends and describes the city's initiatives and services, is a result of the Cabinet's work.

CEO's very specific focus on poverty and a more expansive definition of economic development—not just job creation and training but educational programs such as CUNY ASAP—also was considered an important part of the legacy of CEO.

C. CEO's National Impact

CEO is replicating its programs in other cities and building a national body of evidence through the Social Innovation Fund. As already noted, CEO was the only government entity to be awarded a SIF grant. Five CEO SIF programs were funded, including two based on the successful programs highlighted in this report.

- SaveUSA, based on OFE's \$aveNYC, is available to eligible tax filers in New York City; Tulsa, Oklahoma; San Antonio, Texas; and Newark, New Jersey. A random assignment evaluation is being implemented in New York City and Tulsa to test the impact of tax-time savings on long-term saving, total asset holdings, and debt.
- Drawing upon the experiences of the Sector Centers and Advance at Work, WorkAdvance is being implemented in New York City, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Cleveland and Youngstown, Ohio. The program is a sector-focused workforce development model to help unemployed and low-wage working adults increase their employment and earnings. A random assignment evaluation will test whether combining and scaling up features of the two models will result in larger effects on career advancement and economic security.
- Jobs-Plus seeks to raise and sustain the level of employment and earnings among residents of public housing developments. It is based on the CEO Jobs-Plus Program at Jefferson Houses and MDRC's previous national demonstration project. It is being implemented in New York City and San Antonio.
- Project Rise, based on CEO's Young Adult Internship Program and Young Adult Literacy Program, is a 12-month education-conditioned internship program. The program is targeting disconnected young adults ages 18–24 in New York City, Kansas City (MO), and Newark.
- Family Rewards, based on CEO's Opportunity NYC—Family Rewards, provides cash incentives for families for achieving milestones that lead to better health, education, and employment outcomes. The program is being implemented in New York City and Memphis.

VI. Conclusion

This first group of successful programs represents an important evolution for CEO. At the beginning of CEO's work it was not clear how programs would graduate from the pilot phase and what would happen to them when they did. In this phase of work, CEO established its criteria for a program's success—impact, commitment and sustainability.

Programs in CEO's portfolio now have clear criteria and a sense of what is required to earn continued funding. In time, a fuller story of how programs are integrated, expanded, or discontinued in their agencies will emerge. CEO and partner agencies continue to seek out private, City and federal funds to take this successful work to a larger scale.

The City agencies whose programs were deemed successful by CEO identified effects that went far beyond their specific agencies and programs. These have included effects on the field at large—including the national arena—in the areas of workforce development, adolescent health care, consumer protection, and higher education.

In the period of less than a year since the authority for these programs was transferred, the program models have continued to be supported intact or, where funding constraints prevented this, elements of the program models have been incorporated into agency operations. In either case, the CEO program experience has influenced agency direction, informed program design, and helped to develop cross-agency relationships.

CEO was consistently described as an innovative change agent and its role in city government is perceived as essential for testing and supporting anti-poverty programs.



Appendix

List of Respondents

CUNY ASAP, City University of New York

David Crook, University
Dean for Institutional
Research and Assessment

Donna Linderman, University
Executive Director

John Mogulescu, Senior
University Dean for
Academic Affairs and Dean
of the School of Professional
Studies

Office of Financial Empowerment, NYC Department of Consumer Affairs

Mitchell Kent, Director of
Legislative Policy

Cathie Mahon, Deputy
Commissioner

Jonathan Mintz,
Commissioner

School-Based Health Centers, NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

Eve Cagan, Director of
Planning for Health
Promotion and Disease
Prevention

Andrew Goodman, Deputy
Commissioner, Health
Promotion and Disease
Prevention

Roger Platt, Assistant
Commissioner, Office of
School Health

Advance at Work and Sector-focused Career Centers, NYC Department of Small Business Services

Angie Kamath, Deputy
Commissioner

Chris Neale, Executive
Director, Workforce I
System Improvements

Robert Walsh,
Commissioner

Office of the Mayor

Alan Gartner, Chief of Staff,
Office of the Deputy Mayor
for Education and
Community Development

Linda Gibbs, Deputy Mayor
for Health and Human
Services

NYC Center for Economic Opportunity

David S. Berman, Senior
Advisor

Kate Dempsey, Senior
Advisor

Carson Hicks, Deputy
Director of Evaluation

Kristin Morse, Director of
Evaluation

Veronica White, Executive
Director

List of Abbreviations

CEO—New York City Center for Economic Opportunity

CCTC—Child Care Tax Credit

CFE—Cities for Financial Empowerment

CUNY ASAP—The City University of New York's Accelerated Study in Associate Programs

DCA—New York City Department of Consumer Affairs

DOE—New York City Department of Education

DOF—New York City Department of Finance

DOHMH—New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

DYCD—New York City Department of Youth and Community Development

EITC—Earned Income Tax Credit

HRA—New York City Human Resources Administration

OFE—New York City Office of Financial Empowerment

PEG—Program to Eliminate the Gap

SBHCs—School-Based Health Centers

SBS—New York City Department of Small Business Services

SIF—Social Innovation Fund

UFT—United Federation of Teachers

WFICCs—Workforce Career Centers

CEO Funding for Successful Programs, FY07–11

Agency	Initiative	(\$ in millions)				
		FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11 Budget
CUNY	CUNY ASAP	1.00	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.800 Baseline \$6.5m. \$300k for new BMCC ASAP (not baselined).
DCA	Office of Financial Empowerment	1.24	2.48	2.48	2.032	1.832 Baseline \$1.832m. Agency pays PEG.
DOHMH	School Based Reproductive Health Clinics	0.04	0.86	1.36	1.36	1.355 Baseline \$1.258m. Program pays PEG.
SBS	Workforce1 Career Center Sector Strategy	0.09	2.00	4.35	5.10	5.414 Baseline \$5.164m. \$250k rollover comes from FY10 SBS Career Advancement Program & Sector Center (rollover not baselined).
SBS	Career Advancement Program (CAP, renamed Advance at Work)			1.82	1.32	1.040 Baseline. Program pays PEG.
SBS	Internal Management	0.54	1.47	1.02	0.98	0.829 Baseline

Note: Several programs receive funding from other public and private sources.

PEG = Program to Eliminate the Gap

Interview Protocols and Consent Forms

Study of Agency Responses to Successful CEO Programs Interview Protocol (For Agency Commissioners and Key Staff)

Introduction:

CEO has asked Metis and Westat to conduct a study of agency responses to having one or several of its CEO programs declared successful. In your organization, this pertains to *[name of program(s)]*.

CEO has defined the criteria for program success as:

1. Demonstration of significant participant impacts relevant to an appropriate comparison group;
2. Demonstration by the partner agency of an ongoing commitment by integrating the program and/or similar strategies into other agency activities; and
3. A commitment by the partner agency of other government and/or private funding to support the program.

As programs demonstrate success, CEO turns over full control of the program and its funding to the partner City agency.

In this interview, we'd like to learn your perspective on CEO, the program and how it fits into your agency goals. To examine these issues, we're conducting interviews with staff at each agency that experienced this change in the status of their program(s) as well as with representatives of OMB and the Mayor's Office.

We anticipate that this interview will last about one hour. The data collected through the interviews will be written up in a report to CEO. The report or a version of the report will also be available to the public. In order to reflect specific findings and accomplishments we will need to identify respondents or their agencies. We encourage you to be candid during the interview; however, this interview will not be anonymous. As stated in the consent form, we would like permission to tape record.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

I. Overall: defining success

1. CEO declared your program successful based, in part, on the program's impact (*interviewer note: summarize the program and evidence of success*):
 - a. What are your thoughts about this program, about its success and impact on participants, and its place within your agency?
2. CEO also declared your program successful based on your agency's commitment to the program, by integrating it or similar strategies into agency activities and through funding support:
 - a. In your view, how has your agency demonstrated this commitment? Please discuss and provide examples.
3. **[CCTC: skip question 3]** CEO recently provided ongoing funds to the agency to operate the program (also called "baselined" to agency budget):
 - a. This outcome wasn't specified at the outset of CEO. What were your expectations regarding ongoing funding when the CEO program started? How does this shape your view of the CEO structure—for example, is this a good way for the city to test new ideas/programs, and foster accountability?



- b. Does this assurance of ongoing funds and full control over funds and programmatic decisions change how you view or operate the program?
- c. What opportunities does the ongoing program funding present to your agency?
- d. The city has had two budget cuts since CEO funds were transferred to your budget (FY11 and FY12)—has/have the program(s) faced reductions? What portion? How did you make these decisions?
- e. What are the challenges associated with the change in program funding?

II. Program/agency specific questions

Now I'd like to ask you specifically about the status of program(s). *(If more than one program, repeat questions for each program.)*

[Note to interviewer, see program-specific probes on page 4]

A. Current status and funding

[CCTC: skip section A and go to section B]

4. At what level will the program be funded in FY12?
 - a. Have you received funding from any other sources for this program? From which sources, and at what level? What were these funds used for?
 - b. Are you continuing or now pursuing funding from other sources? Which sources? What would these funds be used for?
5. (If program was/is discontinued) when and why was the program discontinued?
 - a. Did you try to pursue other funding sources for the program?
 - b. (If no) why not?
6. Did the fact that the funding was transferred to your agency have an effect on the way you have used other funding streams in your agency? For example, did it allow your agency to shift costs to other parts of the agency, or draw down other funds? Please explain.

B. Agency commitment to the program

7. In your view, how central to the core mission of your organization is this program? Would you say it is "very central," "somewhat central," or "not very central"? Please explain your response.
8. What efforts, if any, has your agency made/did your agency make to promote and publicize the program within the agency? Please describe.
 - a. What was the outcome of these efforts?
9. What efforts, if any, has your agency made/did your agency make to promote and publicize the program outside the agency? Please describe.
 - a. What was the outcome of these efforts?

C. Application of program-related learnings and future plans

10. What would you say your agency has learned from having implemented the *[name of program]*?
11. Have lessons learned from this program been applied to practices or programs within your agency? If so, please describe what was learned and how this knowledge has been applied.
12. Were any aspects or elements of the program incorporated or integrated into any of your agency's other programs or practices? Which aspects, and where?



13. (If program has continued to operate) are you planning any changes to this program? What kind of changes?
14. Are you planning to implement any programs that are similar to this one? Which programs? In what ways are they similar or different?

D. Overall impact

15. Has/have the *[name of program]* had any impact, in your view, on the broader field in which it has operated, either locally or nationally?
16. What impact, if any, do you think CEO has had on the field?
17. What impact, if any, do you think CEO has had on NYC government?

III. Wrap-up

18. What question(s) did we *not* ask you that we should have? Is there anything else you would like to tell us?

Thank you for taking the time today to share your views on these topics.

Study of Agency Responses to Successful CEO Programs Consent Notice for Agency Commissioners and Staff

New York City's Center for Economic Opportunity, or CEO, funded approximately 40 initiatives aimed at reducing the number of people living in poverty in New York City (NYC). Metis and Westat are research firms selected by CEO to evaluate many of CEO's programs.

In FY 11, CEO transferred budgetary control of the programs that were deemed successful to their partner agency. As a result, CEO is interested in your views, including perspectives on CEO and the program. In order to examine these issues, Metis is conducting interviews with key staff at each of these agencies as well as with some additional key city government representatives.

We appreciate your willingness to participate in an interview for this study. Participation is voluntary, and the interview will last approximately one hour. You may skip any question that you do not want to answer. You may terminate the interview at any time. To assist us with our notes, we would like permission to tape record; the tapes will not be shared outside of Metis staff.

The data collected through the interviews will be written up in a report to CEO. The report or a version of the report will also be available to the public. In order to reflect specific findings, Metis will need to identify respondents, their agency and program, in our reporting to CEO. Thus, this interview will not be anonymous.

If you have questions about us or the project you may contact:

Stan Schneider, Metis Associates
(212) 425-8833
sschneider@metisassoc.com

Please print and sign your name below to indicate your consent for this interview.

(Print name)

(Sign name)

(Date)

Please print and sign your name below to indicate your consent to tape record this interview.

(Print name)

(Signature)



Study of Agency Responses to Successful CEO Programs Interview Protocol (For OMB and Mayor's Office Representatives)

Introduction:

CEO has asked Metis and Westat to conduct a study of agency responses to having one or several of its CEO programs declared successful. CEO has defined the criteria for program success as:

1. Demonstration of significant participant impacts relevant to an appropriate comparison group;
2. Demonstration by the partner agency of an ongoing commitment by integrating the program and/or similar strategies into other agency activities; and
3. A commitment by the partner agency of other government and/or private funding to support the program.

As programs demonstrate success, CEO turns over full control of the program and its funding to the partner City agency. This decision affected the following agencies and programs:

- Department of Small Business Services: Advance at Work, Workforce1 Career Center Sector Strategy, and Internal Management
- CUNY: CUNY ASAP
- Department of Health: School-based Health Clinics
- Department of Consumer Affairs: Office of Financial Empowerment
- Department of Finance/OMB: Child Care Tax Credit

To examine these issues, we're conducting interviews with staff at each agency that experienced this change in the status of their program(s) as well as with representatives of OMB and the Mayor's Office. In this interview, we'd like to learn your perspective on CEO and the programs.

We anticipate that this interview will last about one hour. The data collected through the interviews will be written up in a report to CEO. The report or a version of the report will also be available to the public. In order to reflect specific findings and accomplishments we will need to identify respondents or their agencies. We encourage you to be candid during the interview; however, this interview will not be anonymous. As stated in the consent form, we would like permission to tape record.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

I. Vision and effectiveness of CEO

1. First of all, at the time the office was created in 2006, what would you say was the vision for CEO in terms of its ongoing role in general, in relation to its programs, and what happens with successful or proven initiatives?
2. Now, more than four years later, what is your vision for CEO?
3. In your view, how effective has CEO been?
4. In your view, has/have the *[name of program(s)]* had any impact on the broader field in which it has operated, either locally or nationally?
5. What impact, if any, do you think CEO has had on the field?
6. What impact, if any, do you think CEO has had on NYC government?
7. What impact, if any, do you think CEO and its innovation fund have had on the federal government?



II. Successful programs

I'd like to ask some questions about each of the programs that were declared successful and your assessment of how they fit into the context and overall goals of their agency.

A. Let's start with the Department of Consumer Affairs' **Office of Financial Empowerment**.

OFE is a major unit with the Department of Consumer Affairs. Headed by Cathie Mahon, a staff of nearly 20 lead policy and research efforts, develop pilot projects, coordinate the city's tax campaign and financial literacy programs, chair a multi-city coalition, and are part well-respected part of the national consumer protection/asset development movement. Several evaluations supported OFE's work. It's a priority of the DCA Commissioner and it has raised extensive private funding.

8. What do you think of the program and its role in DCA?
9. Do you think the program has changed agency practices? If so, in what way?
10. What do you think of the role of the program within NYC government? Does it matter to other agencies? Does it contribute to the field or national policy?

B. Switching to **SBS**, I'd like to ask the same set of questions.

Advance at Work serves employed adults who earn less than \$14 per hour and are motivated to advance in their careers. The program is service-intense and provides participants with career advancement services, facilitated access to benefits and work supports, training and education, and financial literacy and asset-building activities. Sector Centers target low-income individuals who are interested in accessing higher-wage occupations with career advancement potential within specific industry sectors, and were developed for transportation, health care, and manufacturing. They provide job placement, job training, education, career advancement, and support services. An analysis of data for Advance at Work and the Transportation Center participants showed that they had higher job placement rates, higher hourly wages, and more weekly hours worked than customers served by the traditional Workforce1 Career Center model. Preliminary cost-benefit analyses also showed very strong returns on the City's investment. CEO funds for internal management also were transferred to SBS.

11. What do you think of the programs and their role at SBS?
12. Do you think the programs have changed agency practices? If so, in what way?
13. What do you think of the role of the programs within NYC government? Do they matter to other agencies? Do they contribute to the field or national policy?

C. Let's talk about **CUNY and CUNY ASAP**.

The CUNY ASAP program, serving low- and moderate-income community college students, assists students in earning an Associate's Degree within three years. Students are grouped in cohorts, attend classes in a block schedule, and receive dedicated tutorial support and academic advisement. The goal of the program is that at least 50% of the participants will obtain their Associate's Degree within three years of beginning college. After the program's second year, the first cohort reported a 30.1 percent 2-year graduation rate, while a comparison group of similar students had a 2-year graduation rate of only 11.4 percent. As reported by CUNY in June of 2010, the program surpassed its graduation targets, with 53 percent of the students receiving degrees in less than three years—a rate that is more than three times the national average for urban community colleges.

14. What do you think of the program and its role at CUNY?
15. Do you think the program has changed agency practices? If so, in what way?
16. What do you think of the role of the program within NYC government? Does it matter to other agencies? Does it contribute to the field or national policy?

D. What about the Department of Health’s School-based Health Clinics?

School-based Health Clinics were established in six selected "high-need" high school sites, providing comprehensive primary care services, including reproductive and mental health services. Because all students enrolled at these high schools are eligible to receive services, and because primary care services are available, receipt of the specialized services do not present any stigma. By bringing these services directly to where youth spend their day, research has shown that school-based health clinics can improve access to primary care for underserved youth. The clinics’ primary care services are able to address students’ chronic diseases and mental health needs, which have been shown to result in absenteeism and lead to decreases in school performance. Considered an evidence-based practice, results of one school-based reproductive health services program evaluation showed that after 28 months, program schools experienced a 30.1% decline in pregnancy rates, whereas comparison schools, with no pregnancy prevention programs, showed a 57.6% increase in pregnancy rates.

17. What do you think of the program and its role at DOHMH?
18. Do you think the program has changed agency practices? If so, in what way?
19. What do you think of the role of the program within NYC government? Does it matter to other agencies? Does it contribute to the field or national policy?

E. The last program is the Child Care Tax Credit.

This program is a bit different in that, by establishing the credit, the program immediately went to scale and was less of a pilot than most of the CEO programs. In the first year, the program slightly exceeded the number of families expected to take up the credit—with 50,000 families earning credits worth a total of \$30 million; in subsequent years the number of families and amount of credits has declined. The program is measured based on tax data and CEO has not conducted further evaluations. The Department of Finance reports that the decline in take-up is in line with a similar state program.

20. The Child Care Tax Credit was established by a mayoral executive order and operates under state legislation. In your view, what opportunities has it provided to the city and what challenges did it present?
21. What were you expecting or hoping would happen when it was adopted and implemented? Were your expectations borne out? If not, why not?

III. Wrap-up

22. Is there anything you would like to add to what we’ve discussed about the role of CEO, or about the effect of the successful programs and granting ongoing funding to the agencies and programs?
23. What do you see as the role of CEO, or an office like CEO, within city government in the future?
24. Is there anything else you would like to tell us?

Thank you for taking the time today to share your views on these topics

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