

Interim Report of the New York City Campaign Finance Board on "Doing Business" Contributions

June 19, 2006

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Pursuant to New York City Administrative Code § 3-713, the Board reviews the results of each election and submits a report to the Mayor and the City Council in September of the year following the election, and "at such times as the Board deems appropriate." A separate mandate of the Board, under New York City Charter § 1052 (a) (12), is to consider rules regulating campaign contributions from those "doing business" with the City. The New York City Campaign Finance Board is issuing this interim report pursuant to these mandates and in anticipation of its September 2006 Post-Election Report to make public the first-ever attempt to quantify "doing business contributions" in New York City. The Board commissioned a team of graduate students in the Master's of Public Administration program at New York University's Wagner School of Public Service, participants in the school's Capstone Program, to analyze available databases and, to the extent possible, to quantify contributions to New York City candidates from those who "do business" with the City of New York. This report presents a comparison of the information available in the City's new on-line VENDEX and lobbyist databases with the information maintained in the CFB's Searchable Campaign Finance Database. The Board is in the process of independently reviewing the data. If necessary, any updates will be included in the Board's Post-Election Report published in September.

Among the initial findings of this study is the significant role that "doing business" contributors played in both the 2001 and 2005 election cycles. Specifically, the study preliminarily indicates that individuals or entities "doing business" with the City accounted for some 27.5 percent of donations in the 2001 election cycle (\$15.6 million out of \$56.8 million donated) and 22.3 percent of donations in the 2005 election cycle (\$9.4 million out of \$42.3 million donated).

History of the "Doing Business" Issue and the New York City Campaign Finance Program

The Board has been engaged in this subject since a 1998 amendment to the Charter Commission required the Board to propose "rules as it deems necessary" to regulate campaign contributions from those "doing business" with the City. In its consideration of possible rules, the Board, as directed by the Charter, balanced factors including "(1) the effectiveness of the voluntary system of campaign finance reform, (2) the costs of such system, [and] (3) the maintenance of a reasonable balance between the burdens of such system and the incentives to candidates to participate in such system."

The Board conducted an extensive study of the issue and issued three alternative versions of "doing business" rules for public comment in the hopes of identifying an effective way to regulate this area. The Board, however, received very limited responses and no consensus on an approach. Board staff then met both with the Mayor's Office of Contracts and with the City Clerk's Office to determine the extent to which the information maintained by those agencies, as examples, could assist the

Board in the enforcement of such a rule. Unfortunately, the information collected by both these agencies was inadequate for the purposes of regulation. The Board concluded in November of 2000 that it had met its Charter obligations as of that time and that it would be useless to proceed further to consider promulgating rules without the means to enforce them effectively.

More recently, the current Administration has developed two public databases—one of VENDEX, containing information about who has contracts with the City, and one for lobbyists registered with the City Clerk's office. These databases were made available on-line in April and June of 2005 respectively, but they were not originally designed for the purposes of public disclosure or regulating "doing business" contributions. The Board has been and will continue to be assisting the Administration in the further development of these and other "doing business" databases to make them reliable, searchable, available to the general public, and, ultimately, compatible with the Board's searchable database. This effort will ultimately permit disclosure and possibly other restrictions on contributions from those doing business with the City. By itself, the development of these databases will be a major achievement and the Board hopes that further progress can be made by collaborative efforts among the Administration, the Council, the Board, and concerned citizens.

In April of this year, the Board held its 4th and final public hearing on the subject of campaign contributions from those who "do business" with the City. The hearing continued the Board's general examination of "doing business" contributions, while focusing on the issues of land use, franchises, concessions, revocable consents, and licenses. The testimony heard at this and previous hearings, as well as the findings of the Capstone Report and the Board's independent study of the issue, will inform the Board's future rule-makings and recommendations on the regulation of "doing business" contributions. The Board remains convinced that the best way to regulate these contributions is by legislation, rather than rule-making. Legislation can regulate, with a targeted approach, those who "do business" rather than addressing the candidates or contributors generally. This targeted approach was adopted by the SEC and has been implemented successfully in the instance of municipal board professionals, and it is also the approach adopted in New Jersey and Connecticut.

Issues for Consideration

While the work and analysis that went into this report are an important beginning, certain constraints will require continued examination and comment:

- 1. The labor-intensiveness of the analysis due to the incompatibility of the VENDEX and lobbyist databases with the searchable Campaign Finance database, as well as the lack of quality assurance of the VENDEX and lobbyist data themselves, which are entirely self-reported, makes duplicating or expanding upon the exercise extremely difficult. Thus, any figures discussed in the report may be somewhat unreliable.
- 2. The analysis is drawn from a sample of available data and thus, while the numerical values are stated as absolute, they are actually subject to a range of variations, which is not reflected.

- 3. Although it appears that a significant amount of total contributions came from "doing business" contributors, the quantitative analysis makes no attempt to identify how many "doing business contributions" were claimed as matchable. It is thus unclear how much in public matching funds may have been claimed or awarded based upon these contributions.
- 4. The report indicates that contributions under \$2,000 make up 95 percent of all contributions to municipal offices and that 75 percent of all contributors give contributions of \$250 or less. Therefore, lowering contribution limits for all offices is a possible alternative that might more quickly and efficiently address perceived problems of undue influence through campaign contributions.
- 5. Contributions from those who "do business" with the City account for a large portion of campaign funds. Diminishing the value of these contributions—including invalidating public matching funds for them—may seriously diminish candidates' resources. Solutions to the perceived problem may then require examination of other adjustments to account for potential losses in resources for candidates.

* * *

This interim report anticipates the Board's mandated post-election report, which will be submitted to the Mayor and City Council in September of 2006. This report is intended to make public important initial data analysis, which may be useful to other interested parties as they study ways in which to address this challenging subject.

Municipal Campaign Finance and "Pay-to-Play" An Analysis of *Doing Business* Contributors in New York City



PREPARED FOR The New York City Campaign Finance Board

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Our Capstone team submits the enclosed final report to the New York City Campaign Finance Board. Our study speaks to the mandate of the 1998 City Charter revision that the CFB propose regulation of those entities and individuals who *do business* with the City. The following analysis builds upon the interim report submitted to the Board in January 2006. Our research addresses two main questions:

- 1. How can *doing business* with the City of New York be defined?
- 2. Is there a relationship between those entities making campaign contributions and those *doing business* with the City?

We have organized our study into two main parts: Part I focuses on our quantitative analysis, built around a working definition of *doing business* with the City. Part II uses a more qualitative approach to propose a broader definition for *doing business*.

Part I: Quantitative Analysis

Section 1 of Part I describes the working definition of *doing business* that reflects the scope of our quantitative analysis. Section 2 explains the methodology used for our statistical study, along with descriptive statistics of all campaign contributions from the 2001 and 2005 election cycles. Using our working definition of *doing business*, we analyzed the 2001 and 2005 election cycles by drawing a random sample from the CFB's database of donors and looking at the giving trends among those *doing business* with the City – as captured in the VENDEX and New York City Lobbyist Search databases.

Section 3 lays out our findings. Our primary finding from the quantitative analysis is that *doing business* contributors played a significant role in both the 2001 and 2005 election cycles. Specifically, we found that individuals or entities *doing business* with the City accounted for:

- 27.5% of donations in the 2001 election cycle (\$15.6 million out of \$56.8 million donated); and,
- 22.3% of donations in the 2005 election cycle (\$9.4 million out of \$42.3 million donated).

Section 4 describes the limitations and technical constraints of the study's data sources.

Part II: Qualitative Analysis

In Section 1 of Part II, we establish our proposed definition of *doing business*, which encompasses a broader range of *doing business* activities. To explore the issues and implications raised by this more comprehensive definition, we provide several subgroup analyses in Section 2. We first present a "Micro-Sample Analysis," probing a segment of the donors we studied in our larger sample. Here we attempted to capture those donors who *do business* with the City under our expanded definition with research in various sources outside the VENDEX and NYC Lobbyist Search databases, focusing on the 2005 mayoral and City Council campaigns, as well as intermediaries for the 2005 election cycle.

This exercise yielded a fairly marked disparity between our proposed definition and the working definition used in the random sample analysis:

- Under the working definition, we found that 5.4% of contributors to mayoral campaigns were *doing business* donors; under our proposed definition, we found that 14.0% of contributors to mayoral campaigns were *doing business* with the City.
- Under the working definition, we found that 4.0% of contributors to City Council were doing business donors; under our proposed definition, we found that 11.7% of contributors to City Council campaigns were doing business with the City.
- Under the working definition, we found that 23.1% of intermediaries were *doing business* with the City; under the proposed definition, we found that 41.2% of intermediaries were *doing business*.

We continue this more intensive analysis with three case studies, to help further illuminate the limits of the working definition used in our quantitative analysis. The studies also highlight some of the complexities and trade-offs that must be considered as part of any discussion of a broader *doing business* definition. Our first case study focuses on a company that holds a concession to sell pretzels via pushcarts in City parks. Our section on land use presents a pair of case studies, putting a spotlight on the campaign contributions of a large Manhattan development firm and an LLC formed to redevelop an abandoned industrial site in Brooklyn. Lastly, we look at the not-for-profit sector, which holds a significant number of large City contracts, examining the campaign contributions of not-for-profit board members and employees.

The information contained in this report does not in any way demonstrate a causal relationship between *doing business* and making campaign contributions, though our analysis shows an overlap between the two activities indeed exists. In addition, our findings cannot demonstrate a causal relationship between making campaign contributions and receiving benefits from any particular City decision. There is nothing in our data that allows us to conclude that contributions have influenced the awarding (or refusal) of any contract or other benefit.

As such, our data do not provide direct evidence of a "pay-to-play" culture in New York City, much less define its scope. Nevertheless, there are still citizens and businesspeople who believe that special interest donors wield undue influence over government officials, and that "pay-toplay" is the dominant *modus operandi*. We believe this perception is corrosive in and of itself. While stricter rules on giving can close off potential loopholes and preempt wrongdoing, any *doing business* regulation we propose is meant, in large part, to help reverse those perceptions and restore the electorate's confidence in City government.

We must also note the limitations posed by data constraints. The records in VENDEX are not regularly audited or quality-assured, and some necessary information is incomplete, outdated or simply not collected. This may have resulted in an underestimate of the overlap between *doing business* entities and campaign contributors.

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INTRODUCTION

As charged by the Campaign Finance Board in the fall of 2005, our Capstone team has attempted to define what it means to *do business* with the City of New York. We have applied our definitions to existing data to highlight the relationship between those *doing business* with the City and those making political donations in City campaigns. This is more than a purely theoretical exercise. We hope the study informs future efforts to regulate campaign contributions from *doing business* donors.

The New York City Campaign Finance Board and the Campaign Finance Program were created in the mid-1980s as a response to corruption scandals in City government. Since then, City voters have supported charter revisions that strengthened the ability of the CFB to limit the influence of large donations from private sources. The 1998 Charter Revision mandated the CFB specifically to propose rules to "regulate the acceptance by candidates...of campaign contributions from individuals and entities doing business with the city."¹ This charge provides the rationale for our study.

¹ New York City Charter, §1052(11)(a).

PART I: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Working Definition

For the purpose of quantifying the frequency of *doing business* contributions in citywide elections, our working definition of *doing business* includes:

- Firms or individuals who are principals of firms who have contracts with the City valued at \$100,000 or more; and/or
- Registered lobbyists and lobbyist clients.

For the quantitative analysis, our working definition was guided wholly by two factors: the availability of data from the VENDEX and NYC Lobbyist Search databases, and the lack of any other similarly comprehensive data source on individuals' business dealings with the City. This practical, working definition provides a good start from which to examine the relationship between campaign contributors and those *doing business* with the City. A firm with a City contract is clearly involved in a business relationship with New York City government, and for practical purposes, lobbyists and their clients represent a broad cross-section of interests seeking influence over policy decisions.

A report prepared in 2000 by the New York Public Interest Research Group (NYPIRG) on the City's top lobbying interests notes:

"Most people associate lobbying with pending legislation and budgetary decisions... However, our review shows that it is real estate and land use concerns which dominate the agenda of these big spenders... A careful review of lobbyist disclosure forms reveals a good deal. Topics and issues lobbied ranged from the Commercial Rent Tax, sound stages for Kaufman Astoria Studios, housing developments in Brighton Beach and the JFK Airport rail link."²

A similar analysis of expenditures on lobbyists over the past few years would find a comparable range of issues, from large retail firms seeking approval to develop a site for a new store to non-profit hospitals seeking capital funding. There is some currency to the position that a regulation on lobbyist contributions would make a significant contribution towards lessening the influence of campaign money from "business-doers" who are not City contractors.

City policymakers share a concern for diminishing the influence of lobbyists on the policy process. In February, Mayor Bloomberg and City Council Speaker Christine Quinn introduced a set of reforms to New York City's lobbying laws, including a prohibition on matching funds for campaign contributions from lobbyists.³ With the VENDEX and NYC Lobbyist databases in place, enforcement is all the more feasible. In terms of viability, this limited working definition is the most logical basis for an immediate, if preliminary, assessment of *doing business* regulation.

² NYPIRG, "The Big Apple's Big Spenders: The City's Top Lobby Interests."

http://www.nypirg.org/spenders/default.html

³ This bill was unanimously passed into law by the City Council on May 24, 2006.

SECTION 2: METHODOLOGY

Overview

Our team conducted a statistical analysis of New York City campaign contributions from the 2001 and 2005 election cycles.⁴ Using a database of information on donations and donors provided to us by the Campaign Finance Board, in conjunction with publicly available data on contributors' business dealings contained in the City's VENDEX and NYC Lobbyist Search databases, our analysis examines the magnitude of the "pay-to-play" phenomenon. Given the constraints of these two data sources (which are described in detail in Section 4) the prevalence of "pay-to-play" may be considerably understated by our study. A detailed description of each data source is available in Appendix A.

In conducting this analysis, our primary research question was: is there a relationship between individuals and entities that make municipal campaign contributions and entities that *do business* with the City? More specifically, our study aimed to answer the following questions:

- What is the nature of that relationship and how strong is it?
- What proportion of campaign contributors do business with the City?
- Are certain municipal offices more likely to attract contributions from those who *do business* with the City than others?
- Are donors who contribute above a certain dollar amount more likely to be *doing business* with the City than smaller contributors?

In order to answer these questions, we designed and applied a random sampling methodology to analyze the 2001 and 2005 New York City election cycle campaign contributions. Our examination of contributions involved redefining the unit of analysis and performing three distinct analyses.⁵

Unit of Analysis: Contribution vs. Contributor

In its database, the CFB keeps individual records for each individual campaign contribution. For example, if one individual gives one contribution each to three City Council candidates, the CFB database lists each of these transactions separately, for a total of three records. To better answer our research question, we aggregated these individual records so that only one record exists for each individual contributor who donated to candidates for each of the five levels of municipal office (Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Borough President and City Council).

The rationale for aggregating from individual contribution to individual contributor to municipal office is based largely on our research team's questions regarding the nature of the "pay-to-play" phenomenon. Because we are examining the relationship between campaign contributors and those who *do business* with the City, we focused on the individual contributor, not the individual contribution. In their original format, the data fail to capture the overall impact of an individual's campaign contributions. For example, suppose that Mary Martinez made four contributions of \$1,000 each to three mayoral candidates during the 2001 election cycle. If we analyzed the campaign contribution data without aggregating them, our analysis would yield 12 individual contributions of \$1,000 each. By aggregating the records to the level of individual

⁴ The 2001 election cycle includes contributions given between January 12, 1998 and January 11, 2002. The 2005 election cycle includes contributions given between January 12, 2002 and January 11, 2006.

⁵Additional subgroup analyses, more qualitative in nature, were also conducted to explore in more detail the campaign contributions of certain entities that were not fully or partially observable in the VENDEX or Lobbyist databases. These analyses are described in the Subgroup Analyses section of this report.

contributor to municipal office, however, our analysis focused on Mary Martinez and the \$12,000 she contributed to mayoral candidates. Aggregating the data as such provides a more accurate picture of an individual contributor's giving behavior than the disaggregated data.

Furthermore, because we assumed that no individual contributor can truly know the outcome of an election before it takes place, we focused on the individual's total contributions to all candidates for a municipal office, rather than an individual's total contributions to a specific candidate. Not only did this allow our research team to examine differences in contribution trends among the five municipal offices, it further centered the analysis on the individual contributor (rather than on individual candidates). To return to the example of Mary Martinez, looking at three contributions of \$4,000 to three individual mayoral candidates tells us less about her potential desire to gain influence than the fact that she donated a total of \$12,000 to all mayoral candidates in the 2001 election cycle.

Finally, the aggregation process allowed our team to segregate donors by their total contribution amount. It was important to be able to provide solid data on the number of contributors who are giving at various levels to the five municipal offices. Specific details on how this aggregation was performed are available in Appendix B.

Statistical Analyses

1. Population of 2001 and 2005 Election Cycle Contributors

In order to get a more complete sense of the universe of campaign contributors, we first conducted an analysis of the entire pool of 2001 and 2005 election cycle campaign contributors. Using our aggregated data, we segmented the 123,234 and 84,857 contributors from the 2001 and 2005 election cycles by the five municipal offices (Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Borough President and City Council). We then further segmented these data into three contribution categories. Those contributors who gave a total of \$250 or less to a given municipal office in an election cycle were grouped into the low contribution category. Those who gave between \$251 and \$1,999 to a given municipal office in an election cycle were grouped into the medium contribution category, while those who gave \$2,000 or more were grouped into the high contribution category.

This comprehensive quantitative analysis allowed our research team to get a better sense of the characteristics of campaign contributors and provided the lens through which we would examine the "pay-to-play" phenomenon.

2. Doing Business Sample of Contributors

Although the aggregation process described in the unit of analysis discussion above significantly reduced the number of individual records in the population, the number of 2001 and 2005 election cycle contributors to municipal office (208,091) was still too large to be able to analyze each individually. For this reason, we conducted our analysis of *doing business* campaign contributors using a stratified random sample of 2001 and 2005 election cycle campaign contributors. Samples of 50 were drawn from each giving category (low, medium and high) within each municipal office for both election cycles. Intermediary contributors, discussed in detail below, were excluded from this analysis and examined separately.

Drawing and cleaning the samples gave us a total random sample of 758 contributors for the 2001 election cycle and 760 contributors for the 2005 election cycle. We then searched the VENDEX and NYC Lobbyist Search databases to determine which of these randomly selected

contributors *do business* with the City.⁶ For the purposes of this analysis, our definition of *doing business* – the "working definition" – was limited to the data available in the aforementioned sources. A contributor must therefore fulfill one of the following two conditions in order to be deemed as *doing business* with the City. They must be:

- 1) listed in the VENDEX database; or
- 2) listed as a lobbyist or client in NYC Lobbyist Search.

Given the paucity of publicly available data on individuals' and entities' business dealings with the City, this working definition is the most reasonable definition of *doing business* for the broad quantitative analysis.

3. Doing Business Sample of Intermediaries

According to the CFB's New York City Campaign Finance Handbook, intermediaries "are people who, or organizations that, solicit, collect, and deliver contributions to a campaign from other people or organizations."⁷ Also called 'bundlers,' these contributors are subject to special reporting requirements by the CFB because of their potential to influence candidates. For this reason, we focused our statistical analysis on this group of donors as well.

To examine the extent to which intermediaries *do business* with the City, we performed a separate statistical analysis of intermediated contributions. For this study, all contributions that had a value in the "intermediary name" field of the CFB database were extracted and aggregated as described above. After aggregation only a small number of records remained (1,313 and 356 for the 2001 and 2005 cycles, respectively), and therefore a representative random sample was drawn for each election cycle from the entire aggregated population.⁸ These records were then cleaned and researched in the VENDEX and Lobbyist databases using the same methods employed for the large sample.

Population Statistics

The deletion and aggregation processes significantly reduced the number of individual records in the CFB 2001 and 2005 election cycle datasets (from 186,067 to 123,234 records for 2001, and from 122,205 to 84,857 records for 2005). The 123,234 contributors from the 2001 election cycle and the 84,857 contributors from the 2005 election cycle constituted the populations from which our research team conducted its comprehensive analysis of campaign contributions.

A total of 123,234 donors gave \$47,368,202 to 299 candidates in the 2001 election cycle, and 84,857 donors contributed \$40,212,516 to 192 candidates in the 2005 election cycle (see Tables 1 and 2). For purposes of this analysis, we excluded Mayor Michael Bloomberg's donations to his own campaign for the 2001 and 2005 election cycles, which totaled \$73,000,000 and \$78,655,868, respectively. Including these significant outliers in our sample would have skewed our population statistics.

The total dollar amount of contributions decreased slightly in the 2005 election cycle, while the number of candidates receiving those contributions dropped from 299 in the 2001 election cycle to 193 in the 2005 election cycle. When term limits took effect in 2001, many municipal office seats that had been held for years became vacant, giving rise to a competitive election

⁶ Given the limitations of the data, it cannot be guaranteed that an entity or individual selected for the sample would be found in the VENDEX or Lobbyist databases. The processes used to clean the sample and determine if those individuals and entities randomly selected into the sample were in the VENDEX and/or the NYC Lobbyist Search databases are described in detail in Appendix D and C, respectively.

⁷ New York City Campaign Finance Board, New York City Campaign Finance Handbook, New York, 2005, pp. 2-14.

⁸ This method differed from that used for the large sample where entities and individuals were grouped by contribution category and office before sampling was performed.

that saw several challengers running for these open seats. In the 2005 election cycle, there were many more incumbents on the ballot, narrowing the number of challengers, the number of total candidates, the number of individual campaign contributors, and the total amount of money spent.

TABLE 1 Number of Individual Contributors to Municipal Campaigns, by Office: New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycles

	2001 Elec	tion Cycle	2005 Election Cycle		
Municipal Office	Number of Contributors	% of Total Contributors	Number of Contributors	% of Total Contributors	
Mayor	24,803	20.1	18,662	22.0	
Public Advocate	10,308	8.4	6,054	7.1	
Comptroller	5,239	4.3	3,227	3.8	
Borough President	19,449	15.8	18,078	21.3	
City Council	63,434	51.5	38,302	45.1	
Undeclared	1	0.0	534	0.6	
Total	123,234	100.0	84,857	100.0	

TABLE 2
Contribution Dollar Totals, by Office:
New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycles

	2001 Electio	n Cycle	2005 Election Cycle		
Municipal Office	Total Contribution Amount in Dollars	% of Total Contribution Amount	Total Contribution Amount in Dollars	% of Total Contribution Amount	
Mayor	22,688,457	47.9	14,064,916	35.0	
Public Advocate	4,472,960	9.4	2,324,483	5.8	
Comptroller	3,117,100	6.7	4,004,761	10.0	
Borough President	5,443,505	11.5	8,111,852	20.2	
City Council	11,645,680	24.6	11,567,046	28.7	
Undeclared	500	0.0	139,458	0.3	
Total	47,368,202	100.0	40,212,516	100.0	

Candidates for City Council (259 in 2001 and 153 in 2005) attracted the greatest number of contributors in both election cycles. However, in total dollar amount of contributions, they trailed candidates for Mayor by significant margins in both elections.

The vast majority of contributors still gave "small" donations in both election cycles. Approximately three-quarters of all contributors gave less than \$250 to a municipal office in 2001 and 2005, and approximately 95% of all contributors gave less than \$2,000 to a municipal office. Only the top 5% of contributors in both election cycles gave more than \$2,000 to a municipal office in the 2001 and 2005 election cycles.

TABLE 3 % Distribution of Contributors, by Contribution Category and Office: New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycles

			2001 El	ection Cycle		
Contribution Category	Mayor	Public Advocate	Comptroller	Borough President	City Council	% of All Contributors
\$0 - \$250	11.7	6.3	2.8	12.6	45.2	78.8
\$251 - \$1,999	5.4	1.5	1.0	2.7	5.6	16.3
\$2,000 and greater	3.1	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.7	5.0
% of All Contributors	20.1	8.4	4.3	15.8	51.5	100.0

			2005 Ele	ction Cycle		
Contribution Category	Mayor	Public Advocate	Comptroller	Borough President	City Council	% of All Contributors
\$0 - \$250	14.0	5.8	1.5	15.4	37.2	74.0
\$251 - \$1,999	5.4	1.0	1.4	4.6	6.5	19.0
\$2,000 and greater	2.7	0.4	0.9	1.4	1.7	7.0
% of All Contributors	22.1	7.2	3.8	21.4	45.4	100.0

As would be expected, in terms of absolute dollar amounts, the largest donors (those giving \$2,000 or more) account for a much greater share of the total dollars going to candidates for office than those giving up to \$2,000. More than half of the total dollars contributed to municipal offices in the 2001 and 2005 election cycles came from donors giving \$2,000 or more.

In three of the five municipal offices, the proportion of campaign dollars coming from the largest contributors increased dramatically between the 2001 and 2005 election cycles. Only 28.8% of all campaign dollars for the office of Borough President were contributed by those giving more than \$2,000 in the 2001 election cycle. In the 2005 election cycle, that figure increased to 48.6%. Similar trends were recorded for the offices of Comptroller and City Council. Not only were there more donors giving in this largest contribution category, but they contributed a much greater proportion of the total dollar amounts going to municipal campaigns.

	20	001 Election Cy	cle	20	005 Election Cy	cle
Municipal Office	\$0 - \$250	\$251 - \$1,999	\$2,000 and greater	\$0 - \$250	\$251 - \$1,999	\$2,000 and greater
Mayor	7.6	22.5	69.9	10.6	24.2	65.2
Public Advocate	19.6	29.4	51.0	24.7	25.9	49.4
Comptroller	16.8	31.0	52.1	5.3	23.6	71.1
Borough President	32.1	39.7	28.1	17.9	33.5	48.6
City Council	41.1	34.5	24.4	24.4	31.8	43.9
All Offices	20.4	28.6	51.0	16.3	28.3	55.4

TABLE 4 % Distribution of Contribution Totals, by Contribution Category and Office: New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycles*

*Contributions to "Undeclared" are excluded from this analysis: \$500 in the 2001 election cycle and \$139,458 in the 2005 election cycle

The number of intermediary contributors decreased dramatically (by more than 72%) in the 2005 election cycle. This decrease was coupled with a drop in the total dollars funneled to municipal candidates through intermediaries (see Tables 5 and 6).

TABLE 5
Number of Intermediary Contributors to Municipal Campaigns, by Office:
New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycles

	2001 Elec	tion Cycle	2005 Election Cycle		
Municipal Office	Number of Intermediaries	% of Intermediaries	Number of Intermediaries	% of Intermediaries	
Mayor	666	50.7	111	31.2	
Public Advocate	100	7.6	12	3.4	
Comptroller	84	6.4	10	2.8	
Borough President	95	7.2	110	30.9	
City Council	368	28.0	103	28.9	
Undeclared	0	0.0	10	2.8	
Total	1,313	100.0	356	100.0	

	2001 Election	2005 Election Cycle		
Municipal Office	Intermediary Contribution Amount in Dollars	% of Total Intermediary Contribution Amount	Intermediary Contribution Amount in Dollars	% of Total Intermediary Contribution Amount
Mayor	7,719,822	81.6	1,446,038	62.6
Public Advocate	437,550	4.6	41,835	1.8
Comptroller	659,827	7.0	53,425	2.3
Borough President	313,557	3.3	412,983	17.9
City Council	326,133	3.4	324,288	14.0
Undeclared	0	0.0	32,750	1.4
Total	9,456,889	100.0	2,311,319	100.0

TABLE 6
Intermediary Contribution Dollar Totals, by Office:
New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycles

SECTION 3: FINDINGS

Under our working definition, individuals and entities that appear either in VENDEX or NYC Lobbyist Search are considered to be *doing business* with the City of New York. Based upon our analysis of the random sample of donors drawn from the entire population of donors described above, it is clear that *doing business* contributors played a significant role in both the 2001 and 2005 election cycles.

According to the results of our analysis:

- Of the \$56,824,591⁹ contributed in the 2001 election cycle, 27.5% or \$15,647,574 was donated by individuals or entities deemed to be *doing business* with the City of New York.
- Of the \$42,384,377¹⁰ contributed in the 2005 election cycle, 22.3% or \$9,433,261 was donated by individuals or entities deemed to be *doing business* with the City of New York.

These numbers reflect the total contributions of all *doing business* donors, both intermediaries and non-intermediated contributors (hereafter referred to as *contributors*). In order to glean more information on the giving trends of these two classes of donors, we examined them separately. Findings from these analyses are discussed in detail below.

Analysis of 2001 and 2005 Election Cycle Contributors

The results of our statistical analysis of contributors show that while *doing business* subjects made up a relatively small percentage of the total number of contributors in both election cycles, they gave a disproportionately large percentage of the total dollars donated to candidates.

In the 2001 election cycle:


- **3.8%** of all contributors to office were *doing business* with the City;
- **25.2%** of the total dollars contributed were from *doing business* donors; and
- Of the \$47,367,702 in contributions, **\$11,931,017** was from *doing business* donors.

In the 2005 election cycle:

- **5.3%** of all contributors to office were *doing business* with the City;
- **21.5%** of the total contributions were from *doing business* donors; and
- Of the \$40,073,058 in contributions, **\$8,626,611** was from *doing business* donors.

⁹ Our analysis of the 2001 election cycle campaign contributions excluded Mayor Michael Bloomberg's \$73,000,000 contribution to his own campaign, as an outlier, as well as \$500 designated as "undeclared."

¹⁰ Our analysis of the 2005 election cycle campaign contributions excluded Mayor Michael Bloomberg's \$78,655,868 contribution to his own campaign, as an outlier, as well as \$139,458 designated as "undeclared."



In other words, 3.8% of contributors to office donated 25.2% of the money to candidates in the 2001 election cycle, while 5.3% of contributors to office donated 21.5% of the money to candidates in the 2005 election cycle. Doing business donors, though few in number, served as significant sources of money for candidates in both election cycles.

This trend holds across municipal office. For all offices, while doing business contributors represented a relatively small percentage of contributors, they contributed a disproportionately large percentage of the money to municipal campaigns. Perhaps nowhere is this trend more evident than in races for Borough President in the 2001 election cycle. Although only 8.0% of contributors to Borough President candidates were determined to be *doing business* with the City of New York, they contributed more than 81% of the money to campaigns for the office (see Chart 2a).






Chart 2a: % of Contributors Doing Business and Their Share of Total Dollars Contributed:

While the Borough President race in the 2001 election cycle is certainly exceptional, it follows the trend among offices across election cycles. In the 2005 election cycle races for City Council, for example, *doing business* contributors represented only 4.0% of total contributors to the office. However, these *doing business* donors gave 33.9% of the total dollars contributed to the race (see Chart 2b). This differential, consistent across all offices and across both election cycles, indicates that *doing business* contributors are an important source of campaign funds for all offices.



Given the differential between the small number of contributors and the significant amount of money they contribute, it is not surprising that among the three different contribution categories used in this analysis, the highest contribution categories in both election cycles contained the greatest number of *doing business* donors. While only 1.6% of donors in the lowest contribution category were *doing business* with the City of New York, a full 20.8% of donors in the high contribution category were found to be *doing business* in the 2001 election cycle.

Chart 3a:



The difference between the number of *doing business* contributors in low and high contribution categories decreased slightly in the 2005 election cycle. Of the total dollars given by those donors in the highest contribution category, *doing business* contributors donated 26.1% and 19.5% of high contribution category campaign dollars in the 2001 and 2005 election cycles, respectively.





Chart 3b: % of Total Contributions from *Doing Business* Donors, by Contribution Category: New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycles

The large majority of *doing business* contributors represented contractors with the City of New York. In both election cycles, approximately 70% of all *doing business* contributors were listed in VENDEX (see Chart 4a). In the 2001 election cycle, 25.1% of *doing business* contributors could be found in NYC Lobbyist Search, either as registered lobbyists or as clients of lobbyists. This number decreased slightly in the 2005 election cycle as more *doing business* donors (9.8% in 2005 as opposed to 5.8% in 2001) could be found in both VENDEX and NYC Lobbyist Search.



Whether *doing business* contributors were in VENDEX or NYC Lobbyist Search, the relative amount of money they contributed to campaigns was consistent with the respective number of contributors in the *doing business* category. For example, the 70.6% of *doing business*

contributors who were in VENDEX in the 2005 election cycle contributed 71.2% of the total *doing business* dollars, while the 19.6% of *doing business* contributors found in NYC Lobbyist Search for the same election cycle contributed 20.5% of total *doing business* dollars.




Chart 4b: % Distribution of Total *Doing Business* Dollars, by Type of *Doing Business* : New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycle

Analysis of 2001 and 2005 Election Cycle Intermediaries

Among the intermediaries in our random sample, there was a much greater number of *doing business* donors than among non-intermediated contributors.


In the 2001 election cycle:

- 29.1% of intermediary contributors were *doing business* with the City (as compared to 3.8% of non-intermediated contributors).
- 39.3% of total intermediary contributions were made through *doing business* intermediaries; of the \$9,456,889 donated through intermediaries, \$3,716,557 came from *doing business* intermediaries.

In the 2005 election cycle:

- **23.1%** of intermediary contributors were *doing business* with the City (as compared to 5.3% of non-intermediated contributors).
- 34.9% of total intermediary contributions were made through *doing business* intermediaries; of the \$2,311,319 donated through intermediaries, \$806,650 came from *doing business* intermediaries.

Our examination of intermediaries reveals a clear trend that developed between the 2001 and 2005 election cycles: lobbyists took a much more active role as intermediaries during the 2005 election cycle. While lobbyists represented only 28.1% of intermediary *doing business* donors in the 2001 election cycle, by 2005 they made up almost half of all *doing business* contributors (48.0%).



The explosion in the proportion of intermediary contributors listed in NYC Lobbyist Search in the 2005 election cycle was also reflected in the amount of money contributed by these intermediaries. For the 2001 election cycle, lobbyists comprised 28.1% of the *doing business* intermediaries, and contributed only 24.1% of the total intermediary *doing business* dollars. However, in the 2005 election cycle, lobbyists represented 48% of the *doing business* intermediaries, and bundled almost 70% of the intermediated *doing business* dollars, a remarkable increase.




Chart 5b: % Distribution of Intermediary *Doing Business* Dollars, by Type of *Doing Business* : New York City, 2001 and 2005 Election Cycles

SECTION 4: TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The goal of this analysis was to quantify the extent to which campaign contributors *do business* with the City of New York, insofar as it could be determined from the data contained in our three primary sources. Reliance on these databases for our analysis posed a number of difficulties because the data were limited, difficult to access and not fully representative of all the possible transactions that constitute *doing business*.

Some technical constraints and concerns are set forth below. To be implemented, each recommendation would require a different level of commitment and resources from various City agencies to address the constraints. Clearly, additional research would need to be conducted to determine the true feasibility and priority of implementing any recommendation. Any changes should aim to effectively and efficiently increase the CFB's ability to more accurately and comprehensively determine–and monitor–those who *do business*.

1. Difficulty Accessing and Searching VENDEX Database

A limitation our team faced was an inability to perform broad-based searches. We were unable to obtain back-end VENDEX data (i.e. database tables) from the New York City Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (DOITT), which limited the means available for matching data to the online access page. The online system, although inclusive of all data, allows searches by last name or entity name only. The online search is cumbersome because it allows only one name or entity to be researched at a time, and requires that names be searched using last name only. Some practical implications of this constraint are:

- You must enter the name of an entity exactly as it is recorded in the databases. For instance, if you enter "Salvation Army," but the record is stored as "The Salvation Army," no data will be returned. Therefore, each entity/individual selected in the sample must be entered individually in a variety of manners to ensure that, if it is in the databases, it is discovered.
- Because you cannot enter a first name, common last names return multiple pages of records. For example if you enter Smith, 23 pages of records are returned that must be sorted through manually in order to find the record you are aiming to retrieve.

2. Difficulty Accessing and Searching Lobbyist Database

Our team was also unable to obtain back-end Lobbyist data from DOITT. However, unlike VENDEX, any part of an individual or entity's name may be entered to receive results in NYC Lobbyist Search. Despite this capability, the Lobbyist database is flawed because many pages of material wholly unrelated to the name entered are often returned.

3. Inability to Reconcile Data in Multiple Databases

Data are stored differently in each of the three databases used in our study. Therefore, performing a review of all contributors is extremely difficult because running queries between the CFB database and the VENDEX or Lobbyist databases is not currently possible. For example, running a query between the CFB and VENDEX databases based on matching names would yield many incorrect results, because entity and individual names may be common or spelled in a variety of manners. The CFB noted this concern in an April 2005 press release:

"The new VENDEX system – until it is 'cleaned up' – will yield both materially overinclusive and materially under-inclusive results for those looking at overlaps between the information VENDEX contains and the information in the Board's comprehensive, searchable database of campaign contributions. As a result, use of this system at this stage would create a high risk of error and potential embarrassment. Most important for the Board's purposes, the VENDEX system is not at this stage compatible with the Board's searchable database."

4. Limited Data Sources

Our review of the relationship between campaign contributors and *doing business* with the City was based upon a limited amount of publicly available data. For instance, the VENDEX and Lobbyist databases do not capture all land use activities deemed *doing business* transactions. Similarly, if land use transactions are determined to constitute *doing business*, information from applications to land use boards will have to be compiled and stored in a database. This clearinghouse of information could be referenced by campaigns, regulators, or the public to determine if a particular contributor *does business* with the City.

5. Validity and Comprehensiveness of Data Entered in City Databases

The process by which data are received and entered into the VENDEX and Lobbyist databases varies across agencies. Because a wide variety of City agencies award contracts, it is difficult to determine if information is cleanly and comprehensively entered into VENDEX. These concerns created some uncertainty about our ability to accurately capture all matches when searching the selected contributors in these databases.

Among unresolved questions are:

- Who is responsible for entering data?
- What, if any, protocol is followed to ensure these data are entered accurately?
- How often are entries made?
- How complete are the data that currently reside on the site?
- Could additional information be added to the databases?
- Does the information found in a sample of current paper contracts match the information stored in VENDEX?

Armed with this information, appropriate steps can be taken to strengthen data collection, entry and storage, which will in turn enhance capacity to recognize contributors that *do business* and enforce regulation.

6. Comprehensiveness and Accuracy of VENDEX Principal Listings

With regard to our analysis, the listing of principals is flawed in three manners. First, principals are not assigned to specific contracts, so it is not possible to determine whether the principal is associated with the listed contract. For example, when conducting a search using an individual's name in VENDEX yields one company with five contracts, it is not possible to determine if that individual is involved in those contracts. You may search for "John Doe," which returns one company name with a list of 20 other principals and 100 accompanying contracts. From this list, you cannot determine if any of the 100 contracts are associated with the principal in question. Second, it is not required that all managers complete a VENDEX questionnaire. ¹¹ Therefore, an individual who is a primary City contact for obtaining the contract and delivering the services may

¹¹ The principal questionnaire requires that all of the submitting vendor's principal owners and the three officers who exercise the most substantial degree of control over the submitting vendor submit a questionnaire. The City defines a principal as: An individual, partnership, joint venture or corporation that holds a ten (10) percent or greater ownership interest in a submitting vendor or subcontractor. An officer is defined as: Any individual who serves as or performs the functions of chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or chief operating officer of the submitting vendor, without regard to such individual's title, e.g., president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, board chairperson, trustee, (individual or entity who administers a trust) or their equivalents.

not be present in the system. Finally, retired principals or persons no longer employed by the company may be listed in VENDEX, even if they are not associated with any contracts from the election cycle under study.

7. Small Contracts Unrecorded

Currently, VENDEX only captures contracts from companies that have \$100,000 or more in business contracts. It does not capture awards for smaller figures, which may be more likely to be granted through discretionary processes and could represent a large proportion of total revenue, especially for smaller companies. This limitation prevents the study of any of these entities that may be *doing business* with the City.

PART II: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

SECTION 1: PROPOSED DEFINITION OF DOING BUSINESS

For the purpose of assessing the true nature of *doing business* in the City in its broadest possible sense, with the idea of discussing areas for future regulation, our proposed *doing business* definition is as follows:

a) Contractors and prospective contractors

- Firms (including not-for-profits) that have contracts with a City agency totaling \$100,000 or more in any given year;
- Firms that have submitted a bid for such a contract;
- Firms that have entered into a franchise or concession agreement with a City agency;
- Subsidiaries of such a firm, or subcontractors named in a qualified proposal whose portion of such contract is valued at \$100,000 or more;
- Individuals who are chief executives, officers, owners of a ten percent share of such a firm, or any other individual who is authorized to represent the prospective contractor before the City;
- Political action committees formed by a regulated firm or individual;

b) Parties to land use decisions

- Firms who submit an application to the City Planning Commission subject to the Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP), to the Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA), or the Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC);
- Individuals who are chief executives, officers, owners of a ten percent share of such a firm;
- Professionals who are authorized to represent an applicant before these boards and commissions;
- Subsidiaries of or entities owned wholly by such a firm;

c) Lobbyists

- Individuals registered as lobbyists with the City Clerk's office;
- Firms that hire a lobbyist.

It is self-evident to most any observer of government that influence-seeking is not limited to current City contractors and lobbyists. However, if there is any hope of enforcing a regime that will reduce influence-seeking donations from other sources, it is necessary to define these other sources with some precision.

We weighed several factors when considering whether a particular entity should be subject to a *doing business* regulation that restricts its ability to make campaign contributions:

- Would the donor receive financial benefit from a particular decision by a City board, commission or agency?
- Did the donor affirmatively participate in the decision-making process?
- Is it possible to easily and clearly identify the donor's participation in this decisionmaking process? (Is there a "paper trail"?)
- Is it possible to create an enforcement mechanism that would give campaigns an ability to identify those donors who are targeted by this regulation?
- Are 'false positives' likely? That is, how likely is it that this donor is not seeking influence, but is donating for partisan, personal or other reasons?
- Would restrictions on this donor place an unfair burden on the way he conducts his business?
- Would restrictions on this donor represent an undue limit on his right to participate in the political process?

Is it likely this donor is giving to circumvent a regulation placed on another donor?

Discussion

Classes of Potential Donors Subject to Proposed Definition

Contractors

Individuals or firms who are party to a contract with the City are the easiest to include in our definition, for contracts clearly represent a financial benefit. Because the specifications of an RFP can be drawn to exclude or target particular firms, it is important that the definition include competitively bid as well as no-bid contracts. Regulation should be triggered by contracts totaling \$100,000 because the identification mechanism, through VENDEX, is part of the way to being complete.

Bidders

Bidders are seeking the financial benefit of a contract. With the submission of a bid, their participation can be clearly identified. This may present challenges with RFPs that call for sealed bidding, but a requirement that prospective vendors complete a VENDEX form to respond to an RFP, or be included on an agency's Bidders List, could help establish a more complete bidders database to inform a regulation that would be triggered with the submission of a bid. We are inclined to follow the lead of other governments and release the losing bidders from *doing business* restrictions after a contract is awarded to another firm.

Franchises and concessions

Franchises and concessions are both types of agreements with the City for the use of City land for which the City receives fees. Franchises are grants by the City of the right to occupy City property to provide a public service such as bus transportation or cable television. Concessions are grants by the City for the private use of City-owned property, such as the use of a City park for a restaurant. Some franchises and concessions are subject to the ULURP process, while others are not. All should be subject to a *doing business* regulation. [Note: Section 3 provides a case study and further discussion of concessions.]

Subcontractors, subsidiaries, LLCs and PACs

Insofar as subcontractors are identified in a firm's response to an RFP, they should be covered by a *doing business* regulation, as should any subsidiary of a regulated firm, including limited liability corporations owned by a firm's principals, or political action committees associated with a firm. Potentially, a firm or donor could employ these as "end-around" methods to circumvent restrictions.

Officers, owners and executives

The definition includes chief executives, officers, owners (of a minimum ten percent stake, to match current VENDEX requirements), or any other individual who is authorized to represent the contractor before the City. That is, any individual who deals with City officials on behalf of his employer, in effect, acts as a lobbyist for that firm. To facilitate enforcement, this information should be required through VENDEX.

Land use

Applicants in most land use decisions are asking the City to grant them the ability to maximize the financial return on their investment. When developers ask for special dispensation to employ a piece of land in what they see as its most profitable use, we should take interest. The limited results of our "micro-sample" study (see Section 2) echo the conventional wisdom that land-use actors do regularly seek to influence the political process. For this reason, the definition focuses on applications subject to the Uniform Land Use and Review Process (ULURP), which includes zoning changes, street modifications, sales of City land, designations of urban renewal projects; applications to the Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA), for zoning variances; and applications to the Landmarks and Preservation Commission (LPC), for permission to renovate or modify a landmark-designated building. These are decisions triggered by a landowner's application. One difficulty is the lack of a central, searchable database (like VENDEX) for land use applicants. While each keeps its own records, these boards and commissions must improve their accessibility if they are to participate in a *doing business* enforcement regime.

The focus on ULURP and on BSA and LPC is meant to draw a line between decisions that are discretionary, rather than ministerial (that is, subject to approval based solely on meeting certain conditions set by law), and on decisions whose impacts are individual, rather than diffuse. Nevertheless, these lines can be easily blurred, for example, in rezoning matters. Some rezonings are proposed by particular developers, while others are submitted by the City Planning Commission (CPC). While a CPC-sponsored plan may benefit a particular developer, it will likely be difficult to establish a paper trail that connects the developer to any request for that rezoning. A regulation that limits donations from all landowners within a particular rezoned area would be too broad, would present significant enforcement challenges, and likely create a problem of "false positives." For any reasonable enforcement regime, the decisive factor must be that an applicant asks for a particular decision and goes through the acts of supporting its case. [*Note: Section 3 provides case studies and a further discussion of land use issues.*]

Not-for-profits

Not-for-profits (NFPs) hold some of the largest City contracts, many of which provide essential social services. They participate in the same bidding processes as other for-profit firms when competing for City business. As such, they should be equally regulated. While paid staff members and executives of a not-for-profit should be subject to the same treatment as those of for-profit firms, questions arise about possible exceptions for members of non-profit boards – both because the City may not wish to place a burden on people who choose to serve on the board of a not-for-profit, and because those who do serve often serve on more than one board, making it difficult to disentangle any relationship between a donor and a particular decision.¹² [*Note: Section 3 provides a case study and further discussion of not-for-profits.*]

Lobbyists

Lobbyists are in business to influence City decisions on behalf of their clients. They are already registered with the City Clerk's office, which keeps a database online. Firms or individuals who hire lobbyists are also likely to be seeking business with the City, and they are similarly identified in the City Clerk's database. In this way, the NYC Lobbyist Search database captures influence-seeking activities that may not otherwise leave a paper trail. At the same time, many lobbyists are hired to influence policy decisions that are unrelated to contracting or land use matters. These might range from issues that are closely related to a specific firm's business interests (a company that makes cigars hiring a lobbyist to organize opposition to the smoking ban) to those that are more clearly in the public interest (a not-for-profit group hiring a lobbyist to advocate for better conditions for bicycle riders on City streets). Though issue advocacy is beyond the scope of this study, there is a compelling City interest in ensuring policy decisions are based on good policy, not on the influence money may have on the political process.

Classes of Donors Excluded from Proposed Definition

For purposes of this study, spouses and dependents and unions were excluded from the proposed definition.

¹² It should be noted that this broader definition also does not include members of a board of directors of a for-profit enterprise.


SECTION 2: QUALITATIVE "MICRO-SAMPLE" ANALYSIS


Our research shows that *doing business* donors are a significant source of funding for City political campaigns. Still, the working definition that informs our quantitative analysis limits our findings, providing a narrow view of the extent of the "pay-to-play" phenomenon. While no readily-available data source aggregates data about the various classes of donors identified by our proposed definition, anecdotal research employing a variety of sources reveals that the proportion of campaign donors who *do business* with the City under a broader definition is considerably larger than our quantitative research suggests.

To illuminate the distance between the working definition and our proposed definition, we performed a richer, more intensive analysis of *doing business* on a smaller, selected sample. In doing so, we re-examined our random sample of contributors from the 2005 election cycle races for Mayor and City Council across all categories of giving. We also re-examined the sample of intermediaries for the 2005 cycle. Our analysis reveals how many more current donors might be identified as *doing business* contributors under our more comprehensive definition.

Findings

When the findings from the micro-sample analysis are weighted to reflect the same proportions as those used for the random sample, the data show that a considerably larger proportion of donors are captured by the proposed definition of *doing business* (see Chart 6).





Mayor: Under the **working definition** used in the random sample analysis, **5.4**% of contributors to Mayor were *doing business* with the City. With the **proposed definition**, the qualitative analysis found that **14.0**% of contributors to Mayor were *doing business* donors.

City Council: Under the **working definition** used in the random sample analysis, **4.0%** of contributors to City Council were *doing business* with the City. With the **proposed definition**,

the qualitative analysis found that **11.7%** of contributors to City Council were *doing business* donors.

Intermediaries: Under the **working definition** used in the random sample analysis, **23.1%** of intermediaries were *doing business* with the City. With the **proposed definition**, the qualitative analysis found that **41.2%** of intermediaries were *doing business* with the City of New York.

Additionally, donors who were *doing business* gave more, on average, than those who were not (see Chart 7):




Chart 7: Average Donations of Doing Business Contributors vs. Regular Contributors: New York City, 2005 Election Cycle

Mayor: Among the largest (\$2,000 and over) donors in our random sample, those who were *doing business* donated an average of \$4,967, while those who were not made an average donation of \$3,407.

City Council: Among the largest (\$2,000 and over) donors, those who were *doing business* donated an average of **\$4,974**, while those who were not made an average donation of **\$3,357**.

Intermediaries: Intermediaries who were *doing business* bundled an average of **\$9,116** in donations, while those who were not bundled an average of **\$4,576**.

Discussion

We researched each of the names in these samples (152 mayoral donors, 157 City Council donors, and 109 intermediaries) to find links between donors and/or employers and City business (as defined in our proposed definition) using Google, Lexis-Nexis, and CityAdmin,¹³ among other sources. Our research was supplemented by consultation with Peri Horowitz, Chief of Compliance and Investigations at the CFB, to help us identify and target donors in these samples who might be *doing business* with the City.

¹³ CityAdmin is an online library of decisions made by New York City agencies maintained by the Center for New York City Law.

Without the same methodological rigor or reliability of the original analysis, it is unadvisable to rely on these numbers as the true proportion of donors who are *doing business* with the City. Indeed, there are several ways in which these numbers might still underestimate the true extent of the issue. A firm might be applying to land use boards under the name of an LLC, while its principals donate to political campaigns, or vice versa. Some donors may have familial connections to individuals who are *doing business* that were not identified in our Internet research. More exhaustive research of public records may have uncovered links we were unable to identify. Still, these numbers give a general indication of how our primary quantitative analysis of donors likely underestimates the true extent of *doing business* contributions, and by what general magnitude.

SECTION 3: CASE STUDIES

We continue our qualitative research with three case studies, looking more closely at classes of potential donors included in our more expansive proposed definition. The first case study examines the giving patterns of concessionaire brothers George and Thomas Makkos, known as "The Pretzel Kings" for their dominion over the pretzel pushcart business in City parks. This case study provides a look at how *doing business* can intersect with campaign contributions in New York City. Particularly, it highlights some of the inadequacies of VENDEX in its current form.

Next, we put the spotlight on land use with a pair of case studies. Unlike concessions, which are already recorded in VENDEX, land use represents a range of City dealings that may elude a *doing business* definition based solely on existing datasets. We look at two New York City real estate development firms, The Witkoff Group and 160 Imlay Street LLC, both of which have achieved favorable decisions from City land use boards. These case studies illustrate the difficulty of including land use in a *doing business* regulation.

And finally, we examine the scope of the City's partnership with the not-for-profit sector. A study of the City's top not-for-profit contractors compels us to grapple with the delicate issue of regulating donations from wealthy and influential board members of these entities without discouraging philanthropic activity.

Each of these studies takes a different view of "pay-to-play" in New York City and helps build the case for the adoption of a more comprehensive definition of *doing business* that captures the spectrum of business activity beyond VENDEX and the NYC Lobbyist Search database. Along with our micro-sample analysis, these case studies help bridge the gap between our working and proposed definitions of *doing business*, and move us toward a more accurate reflection of the City's manifold business dealings. They also help demonstrate the tensions between curbing possible "pay-to-play" activity and preserving free speech rights, as well as the potential for broad regulations on campaign donations to chill contributions and desirable philanthropic activity.

Case Study: Concessions

"Pay-to-Play" and the Pretzel Kings: The Makkos Brothers

The New York City Charter defines concessions as "grant[s] made by an agency for the private use of city owned property," and treats them as types of contracts. According to Chapter 14, Section 375 of the Charter, when registering with the Comptroller, "the terms 'vendor' and 'contractor' shall be deemed to apply to the holders of...concessions." But unlike other city contracts, in which the city pays entities for goods and services, concessions represent money flowing *into* city coffers.

All concessions are reviewed by the Franchise and Concession Review Committee (FCRC), as empowered by the City Charter. The Committee consists of the Mayor, the City Comptroller, the Corporation Counsel, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Borough President of each borough impacted by the decision, and an additional mayoral appointee. All concessions, except "major concessions,"¹⁴ must be approved by the FCRC. Major concessions are subject to the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) instead.

This case study focuses on concessionaire brothers George and Thomas Makkos, whose business holdings include M&T Pretzel, Inc. (a pushcart company which sells pretzels baked by Makkos of Brooklyn, also owned by the brothers), Terrace on the Park in Flushing Meadows, Battery Wave in Battery Park, and the Central Park Carousel.¹⁵ Through this case study, we intend to illustrate some of the inadequacies of VENDEX in its current form and to provide additional justification for the inclusion of concessionaires in our broader *doing business* definition.

Records of the brothers' business with the City appear in VENDEX, but these records are incomplete. For example, information about M&T Pretzel's pushcart contracts includes mostly contracts that have an "end date" of 1995, and thus appear to have expired. Indeed, based on the information available in VENDEX, it appears that M&T Pretzel's only active pushcart concession is valued at \$1,005. Yet numerous media accounts indicate that the dollar value of M&T Pretzel's business with the City far exceeds the VENDEX figures, some estimating the total at \$3 million per year.¹⁶ The brothers own 60% of the carts in Central Park,¹⁷ as well as the pushcarts in the coveted spot outside The Metropolitan Museum of Art – for which they paid a reported \$536,100 in 2004.¹⁸

Campaign Contributions & Lobbyist Activity

In the 2001 election cycle, Thomas gave \$2,500, George gave \$7,500 and his wife, Antonia a self-identified "homemaker"—gave \$2,500. George also intermediated \$4,350 in contributions, bringing their combined total campaign contributions to \$16,850. Of that, \$15,850 was directed toward mayoral candidates, while the rest went to candidates for Borough President. By comparison, the Makkos brothers gave a *combined* \$1,150 in the 2005 election cycle.

¹⁴ The Charter defines major concession as "a concession that has significant land use impacts and implications, as determined by the [city planning] commission, or for which the preparation of an environmental impact statement is required by law."

 ¹⁵ "Brothers to Buy Long Island, N.Y., Waterfront Restaurant," by Alan J. Wax, *Newsday*, August 24. 2004.
 ¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ "Pushcart Vendors Gain Victory in a Labor Deal," by Steven Greenhouse, *The New York Times*, November 23, 2004.

¹⁸ "Riches a la Cart," by Dan Kadison, *New York Post*, April 5, 2004.

We also examined the lobbying activity of the Makkos brothers. The concessionaires hired lobbying firm Bolton St. Johns, Inc. in 1999 and Greenberg Traurig in 2002, paying the firms \$32,000 and \$32,331.50 respectively. Their target in 1999 was the Parks Department, as well as a City Councilmember, in matters relating to M&T Pretzel, Inc. The NYC Lobbyist database does not list the target of the Makkos' lobbying in 2002. (M&T Pretzel, Inc. also employed Greenberg Traurig in 2003, but details of their transactions are not provided in the database.) None of the brothers' businesses is listed thereafter as a lobbyist client.

Principals

We also investigated the principals of The Crystal Ball Group, which operates Terrace on the Park in Flushing Meadows. The principals listed in VENDEX (besides the Makkos brothers) are Charles, Vasilios and Konstantinos Marangoudakis, also owners of Marangos Construction Corporation. According to CFB records, the three gave a combined \$53,315 and \$24,300 in the 2001 and 2005 election cycles, respectively. (Included in the 2005 total is \$250 contributed by Vasilios's wife, Athena, another self-identified "homemaker.")

Sixty-three percent of the two-cycle total was donated through intermediaries. While we cannot establish with certainty what aspect of their business the Marangoudakis family was seeking to influence, its extensive gifts are worth noting when discussing their business partners, the Makkos brothers.

Spouses

Antonia Makkos gave \$2,500 (or 14.8% of the Makkos' 2001 contributions), and Athena Marangoudakis gave \$250 (or 1% of the Marangoudakis' 2005 contributions). Making a contribution through a spouse with the same last name is one potential way to circumvent donation limits while guaranteeing the contribution is associated with the family name. Because of the variability in their giving amounts, however, it would be impossible to ascertain the wives' true intentions. The danger of "false positives" suggests that the inclusion of spouses in a *doing business* definition may unfairly impinge on their First Amendment rights.

Analysis

This case study provides further justification for including concessionaires, their business principals and lobbyists in a *doing business* definition. It also raises the question of whether spouses ought to be included, offering justification for inclusion in an ideal definition, but advising against inclusion in a more practical one. Finally, this study demonstrates the inadequacies of VENDEX, and the system's failure to capture some contracts worth upwards of \$100,000.

Case Study: Land Use

Ethics enforcement for the process that assigns City contracts is a public policy imperative because there are so many contracts to go around. New York City's budget is larger than that of any other American city *and* 48 of the 50 states. At the same time, land use decisions in New York City may be even more important because of the scarcity of land. The City must constantly make decisions about how to re-use already-developed land in order to ensure it is occupied by its highest and best use. As CFB Chairman Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. wrote in his account of the proceedings of the 1989 Charter Revision Commission, which he chaired, "Through City decisions about land use, communities can be created, fortunes can be made or lost, and the power of various political offices or agencies can wax or wane."¹⁹

With such concerns at stake, it comes as no surprise that the parties interested in land use decisions would be active in the political process. The brief findings in this study are typical of previous observations about political activity by real estate entrepreneurs; developers have long been among the most generous sources of campaign donations to candidates for City office. This is not a phenomenon unique to New York City. Indeed, most major candidates in local elections receive their largest contributions from property entrepreneurs.²⁰

In a 1985 study of contributors to members of the Board of Estimate between 1981 and 1985, former State Senator Franz Leichter found that 16 of the top 25 donors had some matter of business pending before City government. He cited ten specific instances where donors increased their political giving when they had decisions before the Board of Estimate; these included beneficiaries of variances, zoning changes, City leases, and the sale of City land.²¹

In a subsequent study, released in 1986, Leichter estimated that 60 percent of the 200 largest donors did some sort of business with the City. Of the top 20 givers, 12 were "real estate giants whose projects frequently require Board of Estimate approval."²²

When the 1989 Charter Revision Commission abolished the Board of Estimate, its power to decide certain land use decisions was spread among several actors. To preserve a political voice in the land use process, the City Council was granted the power to review decisions as part of the Uniform Land Use Review Process (ULURP).

While contract decisions affect all New Yorkers generally, through the services the City provides and the taxes levied to pay for them, land use decisions can impact particular New Yorkers where they live, in their homes and neighborhoods. While that is a compelling rationale for allowing a political review, allowing politics into the process has the potential to invite the influence of money as well.

The appointed City Planning Commission (CPC) is the gatekeeper for many land use decisions, certifying applications before they pass through ULURP. Amendments to the zoning resolution, which places limits on the size and use of buildings, must go through ULURP, as do certain

¹⁹ Schwarz, Jr., Frederick A.O. and Eric Lane. "The Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story of New York City's 1989 Charter." *The New York Law School Review*. Vol 42, 1998.

 ²⁰ Logan, John. Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place. University of California Press, 1987.
 p. 231.

²¹ Kraus, Jeffrey. 2006. "Campaign Finance Reform Reconsidered: New York City's Public Finance Program After Fifteen Years", *The Forum*: Vol. 3: No. 4, Article 6.

http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/iss4/art6

²² Connelly, Mary and Carlyle C. Douglas. "City Vendors and Campaign Giving." *The New York Times*, December 28, 1986.

special permits, site selection for capital projects, urban renewal designations, and many other projects. After applications are certified as complete by CPC, they pass first to the local community board and the Borough President for recommendations, then to the CPC, which approves or disapproves the application, and finally to the Council, which automatically reviews some decisions and can elect to review any decision.

Two other appointed boards make individual, discretionary decisions about what owners can do with their land. The Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA) can grant individual variances to the zoning codes. The Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC) designates buildings or historic districts; owners must apply to the LPC to approve any modifications to a landmark building. [See Appendix F for a breakdown of land use boards and commissions, and the decisions they are responsible for.]

To be sure, there are several ways developers can exercise influence over the land use processes. Many members of boards are appointed because of a background or particular expertise in some aspect of the real estate industry, and may therefore be more sympathetic to developers. Some may desire jobs in the industry upon completing their service. And to the extent that major developers or their representatives have "repeat business" before the land use boards, they may develop personal relationships with their members that can influence their judgment.²³

The following two case studies help illuminate the issues and difficulties with regulating donations from entities or individuals with pending land use decisions.

The Witkoff Group

Steven C. Witkoff and his firm, The Witkoff Group, are among the most prominent real estate developers in the city. The group's current New York City holdings include a 398-foot, 37-floor mixed-use high rise at 6th Avenue and 26th Street, the Cipriani Club Residences, a 9-floor, 109-unit luxury condo complex on Wall Street, and the iconic Woolworth Building at 233 Broadway in downtown Manhattan.

Donations

For the 2001 and 2005 campaign cycles, campaign donations to candidates for City office from Steven Witkoff, his immediate family, officers of the Witkoff Group, and Witkoff's LLCs totaled \$93,675.

The amount of Witkoff-related donations was relatively consistent across cycles – \$49,750 for 2001, and \$43,925 for 2005 (there are no listed contributions for Witkoff dated earlier than 2001 in the CFB database). In the 2001 election cycle, Witkoff focused its giving entirely on mayoral candidates, putting together nine contributions for the maximum $$4,500^{24}$ to Mark Green, and two \$4,500 contributions to Alan Hevesi.²⁵

In the 2005 election cycle, Witkoff donated \$22,425 to Council Speaker Gifford Miller's mayoral campaign, and \$21,500 to candidates for City Council. Of those, \$7,000 was given directly from Steven Witkoff and Witkoff Group LLCs to three members of the Land Use Committee. Councilmember Christine Quinn, who represents the West Village, was widely discussed prior to the 2005 election as a leading candidate for Council Speaker. Her campaign

²³ Ellickson, Robert and Vicki Been. Land Use Controls, third ed. Aspen Publishers, 2005. p. 306

²⁴ The maximum donation to mayoral candidates was raised to \$4,950 for the 2005 election cycle.

²⁵ The remaining \$250 was a donation by Witkoff principal Jeffrey Goldberger to an exploratory committee formed by Giuliani aide Fran Reiter, who was considering a run for mayor.

received maximum \$2,750 donations from Witkoff, his wife, and two Witkoff executives, for a total of \$11,000.

The Witkoff Group seems to have focused its political expenditures on campaign donations rather than lobbying; the Group's expenditures for lobbying total only \$14,637.50 between 2000 and 2005. (The firm does not seem to have hired lobbyists through one of the LLCs they own.)

Decisions

In the course of their work, Witkoff and his partners must bring business before many of the City's land use boards and commissions. These are a selection:

Woolworth Building: After purchasing the Woolworth Building in 1998 through an LLC, 233 Broadway, Witkoff planned renovations and modifications, turning 27 floors atop what was once the world's tallest building into condos, building two glass-walled penthouses on the 29th floor, restoring ground-floor storefronts to their original condition, and adding a 100-car garage.²⁶ Since the building has landmark status, the modifications required approval by the Landmarks Preservation Commission. The plan was controversial. Though the community boards have no role in the landmark process, the local board voted unanimously to oppose the project, which they called "grotesquely inappropriate."²⁷ After a long review period, the LPC granted a Certificate of Appropriateness for the Witkoff plan on December 30, 2002. According to *Crain's*, the Witkoff Group sought access to tax-free Liberty Bond financing from the City for the project.²⁸

1129-1133 York Avenue: In April 2005, under the name of Witkoff York LLC (incorporated in Delaware), Witkoff applied to the CPC for a zoning map amendment that would allow them to build a 26-story, mixed residential/retail tower at 1129-1133 York Avenue, and a special permit that would allow a 100-space public parking garage on the site. The applications were certified as complete by CPC on April 11, 2005 and referred to Manhattan Community Board 8, which approved both the zoning change and the special permit June 8. The Borough President's office gave its sanction July 12, the CPC on August 24, and the City Council voted its approvals on September 28.

866 Third Avenue: On March 16, 2004, the 866 3rd Next Generation Hotel LLC, another Witkoff-owned entity, applied to the BSA for a zoning variance to waive a rear yard-space requirement for a building that encompasses a Courtyard Marriott Hotel, retail establishments and a Memorial Sloan Kettering outpatient center. Attorney Jay Segal of Greenberg Traurig represented Witkoff before the BSA. Segal represents many clients with real estate interests; many of them are listed as his clients in the City Clerk's lobbyist database, though Witkoff does not claim Segal as a lobbyist.²⁹ Witkoff was granted its request on July 13.

West Village down-zoning: The Greenwich Village Society for Historic Preservation (GVSHP) led an 18-month-long battle to rezone parts of the West Village and restrict density, which culminated in a CPC rezoning proposal that was certified to begin its passage through the ULURP process on July 11, 2005. The plan drawn by the CPC included "carve-out" exemptions for two sites: the Superior Ink Factory site at West Street and W. 12th, and the Whitehall Storage warehouse site at 303 W. 10th Street, at the corner of Charles Street, owned by the Witkoff Group. While the buildings around the site would be limited to 70 or 80 feet, the plan allowed a 200-foot tall tower at the Whitehall site.³⁰

On July 21, Community Board 2 approved the plan, with a request to reconsider including the two sites in the down-zoning plan. Borough President approval came August 29, echoing the comments of the Community Board. The plan, which nevertheless remained unchanged, was approved after a public hearing by the CPC September 26, and approved by the City Council on October 11.

²⁶ Dunlap, David W. "Condos to Top Vaunted Tower of Woolworth." *The New York Times*, November 2, 2000.

 ²⁷ Dunlap, David W. "Change the Woolworth? No Way, a Board Says." *The New York Times*, October 18, 2000.
 ²⁸ "New Projects Seek Liberty Bonds," *Crain's New York Business*, June 2, 2003.

²⁹ Segal's campaign donations between 2000-2005 total \$6,505; of those, \$4,400 were split between Miller, Quinn, and Land Use Committee chair Melinda Katz.

³⁰ Richels, Heather. "Rezoning Plan for Greenwich Village Waterfront Advances." *The New York Sun*, July 14, 2005. p. 10.

160 Imlay Street LLC

Along the Red Hook waterfront, overlooking the marine terminal, is a six-story concrete industrial building at 160 Imlay Street. It had previously been a warehouse, and before its purchase by Industry City Associates in 2000, the building was used primarily for book storage. After trying to find industrial tenants, Industry City and its principal Bruce Federman entered into a partnership with residential developer Bruce Batkin and his partners under the corporate name of 160 Imlay Street LLC.³¹

Donations

Developers Batkin and Federman, both as individuals and through the 160 Imlay Street LLC, made \$10,500 in campaign contributions during the 2005 campaign cycle. Of those, \$8,000 was given to candidates more than two years before the election, including two \$2,500 donations to Council Speaker Gifford Miller's campaign for Mayor and a \$2,750 donation to the re-election campaign of City Councilmember Melinda Katz, chair of the Council's Land Use Committee. All these contributions were made during the two months preceding a crucial BSA decision in December 2003.³²

Before initiating their partnership to redevelop the 160 Imlay Street site, neither Batkin nor Federman were significant campaign donors. Prior to the 2005 cycle, the CFB database lists only two contributions between them: a \$1,000 donation by Federman in 2001 to Mark Green's mayoral campaign; and a \$250 donation from Batkin to Rudy Giuliani's 1993 mayoral campaign.

The 160 Imlay Street LLC incurred more than \$170,000 in lobbying expenses between 2002 and 2005, employing three separate firms – George Arzt Communications, LoCicero & Tan, and the Law Offices of Howard Goldman, the firm that represented the project before the BSA.

Decision

Their proposal for a renovation to offer two floors of retail and four floors of luxury condominiums required a variance from the area's industrial-only zoning. The project was opposed by Brooklyn's Community Board 6, which is committed to preserving industrial uses on the waterfront, and by the Red Hook-Gowanus Chamber of Commerce, which feared the condos would "kill local business."³³

160 Imlay Street applied to BSA for its zoning variance September 18, 2002. After an exceptionally long deliberation including two hearings and a site visit, on December 23, 2003 BSA voted 3-1 to grant the variance for the retail/residential renovation. Though opponents filed a lawsuit to prevent the 160 Imlay renovation, the court gave the developers a go-ahead last spring, and the renovation is proceeding.

Analysis

It is true of the Witkoff Group – and of all large-scale developers – that it relies on City decisions to conduct its business and generate profits.

Looking at Witkoff's development activities, it is clear that in the interest of transparency, any regulation that includes a limit on donations related to land-use decisions should limit donations

³¹ Vitullo-Martin, Julia. "Thinking about the Brooklyn Waterfront." The Manhattan Institute, December 2004.

³² After the decision was granted, Batkin and Federman gave \$1,000 more between them to Miller's mayoral campaign in 2004, as well as \$750 to Brooklyn borough president Marty Markowitz, \$500 to Councilman Eric Gioia, a member of the Land Use Committee, and \$250 through their LLC to Comptroller William Thompson, Jr.

³³ Kolben, Deborah. "Red Hook Green Light." New York Daily News, May 13, 2005.

from all LLCs, or ban them altogether.³⁴ Though none of the LLCs Witkoff employed in these transactions were used to fund campaign contributions, several were made under The Witkoff Group LLC. These entities can be used to circumvent a restriction on a particular individual, or to mask the source of a contribution.

Included in the New York City Administrative Code definition of lobbying is: "the attempt to influence... [any] determination by elected officials, city planning commission, borough board, or community board concerning zoning or development or improvement of real property subject to city regulation." However, the example of attorney Segal's failure to report Witkoff as a client suggests that if the Code does not require professionals who represent developers before such boards to register as lobbyists, any *doing business* regulation should include these advocates as well.

Decisions without an easily identifiable paper trail – like Witkoff's request for Liberty Bonds – represent a quandary for any regulation. Interactions with quasi-governmental entities that lack transparency, like the NYC Economic Development Corporation, present a similar dilemma. Still, the scope of Witkoff's activities suggests that these larger developers are likely also to have identifiable projects pending that will trigger regulation.

Of particular interest to our study is the case of the West Village downzoning, which exposes a gap in our definition. We cannot say with certainty that the Witkoff Group even requested its "carve-out" from the CPC proposal; there is simply no paper trail to inform that theory. Coalco, another development firm, purchased two buildings at 389-391 W. 12th Street, and planned a "modern, glass cluster of townhouses" for the site. Then came the re-zoning plan:

The managing partner of Coalco, Edward Baquero, said that the impending downzoning, which will limit building height to 80 feet, will lower property value by one-third and make development unfeasible. "We paid up. Suddenly, we lost a third of our rights," Mr. Baquero told The New York Sun. "You say, 'Wait a minute, that doesn't happen in this country...'

'I do feel some sympathy for the Coalco folks,' [Andrew] Berman [of the GVSHP] said. 'Clearly they are not getting the same accommodation from the city as Related and Witkoff are getting.'"³⁵

Coalco made no contributions to any candidates for City office. They did spend \$10,050 on lobbyists, hiring Greenberg Traurig only after the rezoning plan was introduced by the CPC. While the policy rationale behind the zoning "carve-out" is unknown, the *perception* that campaign donations can influence the land use process undermines public confidence in City government and fosters the notion that developers must indeed "pay to play" to be successful.

As the BSA comprises members appointed by the Mayor, there is no direct link between a BSA decision and donations to members of the City Council. Still, given the Council's role in the land use process, there is no utility to be gained by drawing distinctions between candidates for different offices, or between decisions reviewed by the Council and those that are not.

A generous contribution puts a donor in the position to open a line of dialogue with a public official, or ask for a favor. However indirect this influence may be on any particular policy

³⁴ Though LLCs clearly owned by a regulated entity would be subject to restrictions on subsidiary entities, there is often no available information about LLCs or their ownership. To ban LLCs from campaign giving, however, may require changes in State law.

³⁵ Lombino, David. "Developer seeks to Ease Restrictions in Far West Village." *The New York Sun*, September 19, 2005. p. 2.

decision, it is in the public interest to limit donations from these sources – and to end the expenditure of public funds that amplify their impact. This suggests the necessity of an expansive regulation of donations from parties with pending land use decisions.

Case Study: Not-For-Profit Organizations

"Pay-to-Play" and Philanthropy: How to Regulate the Not-for-profit Sector

In 2004, 18 of the 50 largest City contracts were held by 16 not-for-profit organizations.³⁶ These contracts (some of them for multiple years of service) totaled nearly \$1.2 billion, and were mainly social service contracts for foster care services and homeless shelters. (A large exception was the New York Public Library, which is discussed further below.) Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code bars not-for-profit organizations from giving directly to political campaigns.³⁷ However, individual officers, directors, and board members do not face such prohibitions. Theoretically, then, a not-for-profit entity seeking to *do business* with the City could curry favor with a particular candidate through donations from these individuals.

But precisely which individuals associated with a not-for-profit should be regulated? Ideally, we would regulate donations from senior managers and decision-makers. To illuminate the sources of not-for-profit political gifts, we researched IRS 990 forms from 2004 for those 16 agencies to find the names of their highest paid employees, board members and trustees.³⁸ Along with these names, the 990 form requests that agencies detail the "compensation of the five highest-paid employees other than officers, directors, and trustees." These data helped us identify the most influential figures in the agencies regardless of title. We checked lists of board members against agency websites. Through this research, we identified 576 executives and persons of interest, and checked these names against the CFB database to examine their political giving.³⁹

2001: Of the officers, directors, trustees and highest-paid employees at those 16 agencies, we found that **139** individuals, or nearly **24%**, donated to a City political campaign in the 2001 election cycle. (Only 2.8% of all contributors for the 2001 cycle were *doing business* by our working definition.) The donations totaled **\$314,926**, for an average of \$2,298 per donor.

2005: Of the officers, directors, trustees and highest-paid employees at those 16 agencies, we found that **84** individuals, or **15%**, donated to a City political campaign in the 2005 election cycle.⁴⁰ (Only 4.3% of contributors in the 2005 cycle were *doing business* by our working definition.) The donations totaled **\$201,545** for an average of \$2,399 per donor.

Though 990 forms list independent contractors as well, we did not analyze their political donations; a relationship with a contractor is most likely too tenuous to garner influence for a particular not-for-profit agency. IRS Code supports this decision, excluding independent contractors from consideration as key decision-makers in a not-for-profit.⁴¹

We considered contribution data from both the 2001 and 2005 election cycles. This period captures the period leading up to and immediately following the award for all of the contracts in this analysis (most started in 2003 and run through 2006). According to VENDEX, all of these agencies appear to have held contracts prior to 2004.

Given that the total amount of donations in an election year ranges in the tens of millions, the totals we found may appear negligible. However, from a relatively small group of individuals,

³⁶ City Law, November/December 2004.

³⁷ NFPs can engage in issue advocacy and can support political candidates or parties through associated PACs, however.

³⁸ One agency was missing its 990 form for 2004, so we used 2003 IRS data.

³⁹ Given the qualitative nature of this study, we advise that these figures be treated as approximations.

⁴⁰ We had to discard six names because we could not make a positive match in the CFB database for them.

⁴¹ IRS Code Section 4958 (1996).

this sum shows a concerted effort to take part in political campaigns. We might be concerned that certain organizations are targeting specific candidates to gain influence. Our data do not permit us to draw such firm conclusions, but we can describe particular cases.

There are some trends among the top not-for-profit contracts that give pause. For example, we find that the Board President, Chair of the Executive Committee and three Board Members from the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services made donations to mayoral candidates totaling \$13,350 in the 2005 cycle. The organization had a contract totaling over \$81 million in 2004.

To consider another case: as noted above, the New York Public Library is among the City's top 50 contractors, with a contract in excess of \$38 million. This organization's top employees and board members show substantial donor participation in City campaigns. Of the Library's 66 employees and board members, 25 (38%) made donations totaling \$130,890 in the 2001 election cycle, while 22 (33%) made donations amounting to \$99,287 in the 2005 cycle. In the 2005 cycle, 21 of the 22 made aggregated donations of at least \$250, and 15 made aggregated donations in excess of \$1,000. (The giving pattern was similar for the 2001 election cycle).

Meanwhile, the Chair of the New York Public Library's board wrote in the Library's 2004 Annual Report:

At the end of fiscal year 2003, finalized agreements between the Mayor's office and the City Council resulted in a nearly complete restoration of proposed cuts for this year...We are pleased that the FY 2005 City budget did not include the proposed \$5.4 million cut to the Library. In addition, \$4.427 million was provided for the Branch and Research Libraries. We are deeply appreciative of the support given to us by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Speaker A. Gifford Miller, and the members of the City Council. And we are especially grateful to everyone who served as extraordinary advocates for the Library, particularly our Trustees...

Analysis

We are careful not to draw overly broad conclusions from this information. To take just one example, one of the largest campaign donors on the Library's board is Dorothy Cullman, who gave \$11,150 to various campaigns during the 2005 cycle, and \$18,000 during the 2001 cycle. Ms. Cullman is a major philanthropist who serves on several other not-for-profit boards (including Human Rights Watch, Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts and others) and runs a foundation with her husband, Lewis. It is impossible to say which of her affiliations she wished to highlight during her interactions with City officeholders—or if she wished to garner influence at all. Of course, it is part of board members' duties to raise funds and advocate for their organization, so we should not necessarily attribute pernicious motivations to political contributions.

Admittedly, board members could make contributions to gain undue influence for their preferred charity.⁴² It could be argued that board members often have longer tenures with an agency – and perhaps greater loyalty – than some senior staff, who often work for (relatively) lower pay than their for-profit counterparts, and may frequently move to other agencies for better salary.

The question arises whether there is a risk of false positives too great to warrant the regulation of board members and trustees. Many individuals who are asked to serve on boards are likely

⁴² The term "board members" also refers to trustees serving as unpaid volunteers on a board of trustees. In addition, the term "director" is used similarly by some not-for-profits.

to be both wealthy and community-minded, and may be likely to offer financial support to political candidates regardless of their not-for-profit activities. Further, such individuals might sit on several boards, may own a business, or may work with another firm involved in City business, so it may be difficult to discern which "hat" they wear when they make a contribution.

Similarly, a question arises whether undue burdens may be imposed on charities attempting to recruit individuals to serve on their boards. Such service is typically unpaid and can be valuable to the community, and therefore should not be discouraged. It is worthwhile to note here that unpaid board members, unlike for-profit boards, cannot take benefits privately from an agency's activities.

CONCLUSION

Our quantitative analysis of campaign donations from the 2001 and 2005 election cycles showed convincing evidence that *doing business* contributors—as defined by the available data on contractors, lobbyists, and lobbyist clients—play a substantial role in financing campaigns for public office in New York City, accounting for more than one out of five dollars raised. It is likely these findings understate the true proportion of donors who are *doing business* with the City.

Our qualitative research showed that a broader definition, encompassing a more comprehensive range of *doing business* activities, could be warranted. Employing our proposed definition, qualitative research with a smaller sample of donors identified a considerably larger proportion as *doing business* donors. Case studies helped illuminate some of the issues we considered as we created our proposed definition, as well as some of the challenges of enforcing any potential regulation.

Nothing in this report can show conclusively that any particular campaign donor has sought to influence City contracting or land use policy. Still, a skeptical public may believe differently. We hope the report has shown that a regulation limiting contributions from *doing business* donors would help restore public confidence in City government and the way it does business.

PART III: APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES

To conduct this analysis, we relied on a variety of data sources, including the CFB's Searchable Campaign Finance Database, the New York City VENDEX online database, and the New York City Lobbyist Search online database. The CFB's Searchable Campaign Finance Database served as the primary source of information for all municipal campaign contributions. VENDEX and NYC Lobbyist Search provided information on business dealings that individuals and entities may have with the City of New York.

The CFB Searchable Campaign Finance Database: The primary dataset used in all analyses was the CFB's Searchable Campaign Finance Database. The CFB's database contains records of all contributions to candidates for the offices of Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller, Borough President and City Council who participate in the campaign finance program. The data presented in the Searchable Campaign Finance Database were provided to the CFB as reported by campaign committees, and were subject to change as a result of ongoing audits or additional amendments to filings.

For the purposes of this analysis, data from the 2001 and 2005 citywide election cycles were used. The 2001 election cycle data contain records of 186,067 individual campaign contributions made to 299 candidates between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2001. The 2005 election cycle data contain records of 122,025 individual campaign contributions made to 193 candidates between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2005.

The data on 2001 and 2005 election cycle contributions were provided to our research team by the CFB in a *.dbf* file. Each record contains information on the contributor's name and address, the contributor's employer and address, the contribution amount, the amount matched by public funds, the candidate who received the contribution, as well as other information.

- **VENDEX**: The information presented in the New York City Vendor Search is derived from a subset of data from the City's Vendor Information Exchange System (VENDEX) system, which is maintained by the Mayor's Office of Contract Services (MOCS). The information available in this database is either self-reported by vendors through questionnaires that are submitted to MOCS or is captured by the City's financial management system. The questionnaires are not routinely independently verified by MOCS. VENDEX stores information for New York City franchises, concessions, and for many, but not all, contracts and subcontracts held by vendors who do over \$100,000 in annual business with the City.⁴³
- NYC Lobbyist Search: The information presented through the NYC Lobbyist Search is derived from the export of the lobbyist database maintained by the Office of the City Clerk. The information available in this database is self-reported by lobbyists and their clients through initial annual registration forms and quarterly reports that are submitted to the Office of the City Clerk. The reports are checked for accuracy by the Office of the City Clerk, but are not independently verified or certified by a third party. Although all attempts have been made to ensure the accuracy of these data, neither the City of New York nor the Office of the City Clerk assumes any liability resulting from any inaccuracies herein. In the event of any variance between these data and any printed compilation of lobbyist data published by the Office of the City Clerk since 2002, such

⁴³ Taken from the VENDEX website available at: <u>http://slnx-prd-web.nyc.gov/cfb/cfbSearch.nyc?method = search</u>

printed data will be controlling. Some data may have been subsequently amended, which may not be reflected in the database.⁴⁴


⁴⁴ Taken from the Lobbyist Search website available at: <u>http://www.nyc.gov/lobbyistsearch/index.jsp</u>

APPENDIX B: AGGREGATION PROCESS


For the 2001 and 2005 election cycles, the total number of contribution records in the data files provided to our research team by the CFB was 186,067 and 122,025, respectively. Steps were taken using Microsoft Access to format the data found in the CFB 2001 and 2005 election cycle *Cont.dbf* files. The purpose of these processes was to construct as accurate a population of campaign contributors as possible. Graphical representations of this process can be found below in Figures 1 and 2. Please note that all of these steps, excluding step 2, were also performed to aggregate the intermediary data.

- Deletion of Refund Records. Under some circumstances, donations are refunded to donors. The CFB codes these donations as Schedule M. Because these records are coded as positive amounts and do not represent actual donations, these funds were deleted. In this step a total of 2,587 and 1,697 records were deleted from the 2001 and 2005 election cycle data, respectively.
- 2. Separation of Donations Made Through Intermediaries. Intermediaries were examined as part of a separate analysis. Therefore, these records were deleted from the data by running a query which eliminated any record where the intermediary name field was not null. The total number of records deleted in this step was 15,370 for 2001 election cycle and 4,600 for 2005 election cycle.
- 3. **Deletion of Donations from the CFB.** Through the matching funds program, the CFB distributes public matching funds to candidates. For the 2001 election cycle only, three records were deleted from the donation file that showed reimbursement of public funds by the CFB. This was completed by searching the donor name field for words such as the CFB, campaign, finance and board.
- 4. Grouping of Records by Donor to Office and Summed Donation Amount. To aggregate the data to the unit of analysis described in the section above, a group-by query was performed. This query grouped together all people with the same name contributing to the same office, as signified by the office code [Mayor (1), Public Advocate (2), Comptroller (3), Borough President (4), and City Council member (5), or undeclared (6)]. The query also summed the contributions amounts by each individual to each office.

APPENDIX B, FIGURE 1: 2001 Election Cycle



APPENDIX B, FIGURE 2: 2005 Election Cycle



APPENDIX C: PROCESS FOR SEARCHING VENDEX AND LOBBYIST DATABASES

Steps for VENDEX Look-up

- Go to the VENDEX web page: <u>http://slnx-prd-</u> web.nyc.gov/cfb/cfbSearch.nyc?method = search
- 2. Look up the name or entity
 - a. For individuals: In the box on the left labeled "Search by Principal" enter the last name of the person in the white box and click search
 - b. For entities: In the box on the right labeled "Search by Entity" enter the last name of the entity in white box and click search
 - i. If data are returned proceed to step 4
 - ii. If no data are returned proceed to step 5
- 3. Determine if the match that was found is accurate
 - a. To determine if the match found is accurate must answer yes to the following questions:
 - i. For Individuals:
 - 1. Does the last name match the name in VENDEX?
 - 2. Does the first name match the name in VENDEX?
 - a. Note: When scanning the names in VENDEX examine common nicknames versions. For example, if the individual is named Jim search for James or if the individual is named Sue search for Susan.
 - b. Note: Slight variations in names are considered a match if answers to questions 1 and 3 are also yes.
 - 3. Does the employer listed in the excel file match the employer in VENDEX?
 - a. Answered yes to all three questions?
 - i. Proceed to step 5
 - b. Answered no to one or more questions?
 - i. Proceed to step 4
 - ii. For Entities:
 - Does the entity name match the name in VENDEX? (Note: slight variations in names are considered a match if answers to questions 2 is also yes)
 - 2. Does the entity's address match the address in VENDEX?
 - a. Answered yes to both questions?
 - i. Proceed to step 5
 - b. Answered no to either question?
 - i. Proceed to step 4
- 4. Initial match not found
 - a. Try to enter the name/entity differently for example by adding or dropping the word "the" or "A"
 - i. If match found return to step 3 to determine accuracy
 - ii. If no match is found enter "0" in the spreadsheet columns listed below and then return to step 1 for the next name on the spreadsheet

VENDEX: DOES	VENDEX:	VENDEX:
BUSINESS WITH	CONTRACT	CONTRACT
NYC (N=0, Y=1)	1/97 OR LATER	1/01 OR LATER
	(N=0, Y=1)	(N=0, Y=1)

- 5. Initial match is found
 - a. Click on business name (Note: for entity search this step is not required)
 - b. What is the answer under the heading "Business with NYC?"
 - i. Yes:
 - 1. Enter "1" on Excel spreadsheet under "Does Business with NYC?"
 - 2. Click on "View Info"
 - 3. Review dates under "Registration/Approval Date" column
 - a. Any date listed of 1/1/1997 or later?
 - i. Yes
 - 1. Enter "1" on Excel spreadsheet under "VENDEX contract from 1/97 or later"
 - ii. No
 - 1. Enter "0" on Excel spreadsheet under "VENDEX contract from 1/97 or later"
 - b. Any date listed 1/1/2001 or later?
 - i. Yes
 - 1. Enter "1" on Excel spreadsheet under "VENDEX contract from 1/01 or later"
 - 2. Begin at step 1 for next name on spreadsheet
 - ii. No
 - 1. Enter "0" on Excel spreadsheet under " VENDEX contract from 1/01 or later"
 - 2. Begin at step 1 for next name on spreadsheet

- ii. No
 - 1. Enter "0" on Excel spreadsheet under:

I	VENDEX: DOES	VENDEX:	VENDEX:
	BUSINESS WITH	CONTRACT	CONTRACT
	NYC (N=0, Y=1)	1/97 OR LATER	1/01 OR LATER
		(N=0, Y=1)	(N=0, Y=1)

2. Begin at step 1 for next name on spreadsheet


Steps for Lobbyist Look-up

- 1. Copy the last name or entity name from the excel file that lists those in the sample
- 2. Go to the lobbyist web page: http://www.nyc.gov/lobbyistsearch/index.jsp
- 3. Look up the name or entity
 - a. In the white box on the left labeled "Search by Name" enter the last name of the person, or the full entity name and click search.
- 4. Determine if match is found
 - a. To determine if a match is present must answer yes to the following questions:
 - i. Does the individual/entity name match the name in the Lobbyist database? (note: slight variations in names are considered a match if answers to question 2 is also yes)
 - ii. Does the lobbyist address listed in the Lobbyist database match either the employer or home address listed in the excel file?
 - b. Matching name or entity returned?

- 1. If, yes for a Lobbyist
 - a. Enter "1" on Excel spreadsheet under "Listed as a lobbyist"
 - b. Begin at step 1 for next name on spreadsheet
- 2. If, yes for a Client
 - a. Enter "1" on Excel spreadsheet under "Listed as a lobbyist client"
 - b. Begin at step 1 for next name on spreadsheet
- 3. If, no
 - a. Enter "O" on Excel spreadsheet under "Listed as a lobbyist"
 - b. Begin at step 1 for next name on spreadsheet

APPENDIX D: DATA CLEANING PROCESS

- 1. Open database "Data Cleanse" which contains queries to check original donor and intermediary data
- 2. Copy the last name and first initial or entity name from the excel file that lists those in the sample. (Note: you will use this copied information in later in step 5 or 6)
- 3. Click on the appropriate query.
 - a. To check individual name select appropriate query from this list:
 - i. 2001 Donor Query for Individuals
 - ii. 2005 Donor Query for Individuals
 - iii. 2001 Intermediary Query for Individuals
 - iv. 2005 Intermediary Query for Individuals
 - b. To check entity name select appropriate query from this list:
 - i. 2001 Donor Query for Entities
 - ii. 2005 Donor Query for Entities
 - iii. 2001 Intermediary Query for Entities
 - iv. 2005 Intermediary Query for Entities
- 4. After you select one of these options the following box will appear. In this box enter the identifying office code the race you are searching.



- a. For Mayor enter "1"
- b. For Public Advocate enter "2"
- c. For Comptroller enter "3"
- d. For Borough President enter "4"
- e. For City Council enter "5"
 - i. Click "OK"
- 5. For any of the individual name queries the following box will appear

Enter Parameter Value 🔀		
al	Last Name Comma Space First Initial	
ncel	OK Canc	
ncel	OK Canc	

- a. In this box enter the last name of the person you are search followed by a comma and a space and their first initial. Click "OK"
 - i. For example, to search for Steven Fisher. Enter "Fisher, S"
- b. Proceed to step 7

6. For any of the entity name queries the following box will appear

Enter	Paramete	r Value 🔀
Enter most unique part of entity name		
ļ		
	OK	Cancel

- a. In this box enter the most unique part of the entity name you are searching for. Click "OK"
 - i. Examples:
 - 1. If the name is West L.L.C. enter "West"
 - 2. If the name is The Salvation Army enter "Salvation"
 - 3. If the name presented is abbreviated such as "Benev Assoc" do two searches one for "Benev" and another for "Benevolent"
- b. Proceed to step 7

NOTE: These searches are NOT case sensitive. Therefore the results when entering Fisher, S will be the same as fisher, s.

- 7. Are there multiple names listed for the entity/individual you are searching for?
 - a. No: In the excel file in the column "Data Checked?" enter "1". Begin at step one for the next name on the spreadsheet
 - b. Yes: Use ONLY the address to determine if the aggregation was performed correctly.
 - i. Examples
 - If three records for Steven Fisher are present and they have the same address the aggregation was performed correctly. Proceed to step 7a
 - 2. If three records have different addresses note the correct donation amount for the Steven Fisher on the Excel spreadsheet under the heading "New Amount" and under the heading "Corrected Amount?" enter "1" In this case the record will be removed from the sample and a new record will be randomly selected to take its place. This record will then be reviewed in the same fashion

APPENDIX E: DEFINITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Would the donor receive financial benefit from a particular decision by a City board, commission or agency?
- Did the donor affirmatively participate in the decision-making process?
- Is it possible to easily and clearly identify the donor's participation in this decisionmaking process?
- Is it possible to create an enforcement mechanism that would give campaigns an ability to identify those donors who are targeted by this regulation?
- Are 'false positives' likely? That is, how likely is it that this donor is not seeking influence, but is donating for partisan, personal or other reasons?
- Would restrictions on this donor place an unfair burden on the way he conducts his business?
- Would restrictions on this donor represent an undue limit on his right to participate in the political process?
- Is it likely this donor is giving to circumvent a regulation placed on another donor?

CONTRACTORS

Financial benefit?	YES; proceeds of contract.
Affirmative participation?	YES; party to contract.
Clear identification possible?	YES ; firms are identified through VENDEX. Identification of principals/officers not currently uniform, but could be standardized through regulation.
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES; through VENDEX.
False positives?	NO; very unlikely.
Unfair burden on business?	NO . Firms or individuals receive benefit for burden of disclosure or paperwork.
Limit on right to participate?	NO . Firms or individuals receive benefit from City for giving up full right to donate.
Used to circumvent regulation?	NO

BIDDERS

Financial benefit?	YES. Firms are seeking proceeds of contract.
Affirmative participation?	YES ; submission of bid, response to RFP or request to be added to bidders list.
Clear identification possible?	YES. Bidding firms are not currently identified through VENDEX; however, new regulation would be required for enforcement.
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES; through VENDEX.
False positives?	NO; very unlikely.
Unfair burden?	NO . Firms or individuals receive benefit for burden of disclosure or paperwork.
Limit on right to participate?	NO . Firms or individuals give up the right to participate fully in pursuit of a benefit. If benefit is not procured (i.e. if bid is unsuccessful) then right to participate should be restored.
Used to circumvent regulation?	NO

FRANCHISES / CONCESSIONS

Financial benefit?	YES . Concessionaires receive right to make money on city land; franchisees receive direct financial benefit from City.
Affirmative participation?	YES; both enter into a contract with City.
Clear identification possible?	YES. Concessionaires and franchisees should be listed in VENDEX, though there may be some that escape disclosure.
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES; through VENDEX.
False positives?	NO; very unlikely.
Unfair burden?	NO . Firms or individuals receive benefit for burden of disclosure or paperwork.
Limit on right to participate?	NO . Firms or individuals receive benefit in exchange for giving up full right to donate.
Used to circumvent regulation?	NO

SUBCONTRACTORS/SUBSIDIARIES

Financial benefit?	YES; firms receive some proceeds of contract.
Affirmative participation?	YES , to extent that subcontractors or subsidiaries are involved response to RFP.
Clear identification possible?	YES . Subcontractors currently must be identified in response to RFP; subsidiaries can be covered with additional regulation.
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES; through VENDEX.
False positives?	MAYBE. Levels of coordination between parent firms and subsidiaries may vary.
Unfair burden?	NO; burden of disclosure falls on parent firm.
Limit on right to participate?	NO . Firms or individuals receive benefit in exchange for giving up full right to donate.
Used to circumvent regulation?	МАУВЕ

EMPLOYEES / OFFICERS / EXECUTIVES / PRINCIPALS

Financial benefit?	MAYBE. For principal owners or chief executives, the benefit is clear. For lower-level employees, there may be no direct benefit from a City contract.
Affirmative participation?	MAYBE. Again, the distinction is between principal owners, chief executives, and officers on one side and lower-level employees on the other.
Clear identification possible?	YES , if complete information on principal owners, executives and officers is collected through VENDEX.
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES, through VENDEX.
False positives?	NO; unlikely.
Unfair burden?	NO. Burden of disclosure or paperwork is a condition of receiving benefit.
Limit on right to participate?	NO. For owners, officers or executives seeking City benefit, restriction on right to donate is a reasonable condition.
Used to circumvent regulation?	MAYBE. If executives or officers are restricted from donating in large amounts, lower-level employees could be encouraged to donate as a way to compensate.

DEVELOPERS WITH AN INTEREST IN LAND USE DECISIONS

Financial benefit?	YES. Applicants are looking for a decision that will affect the value of their land.
Affirmative participation?	MAYBE. For many decisions, such as map amendments, variances or special permits, a landowner must apply to appropriate board or commission. For others, such as larger-scale re-zonings, the action may originate with the Planning Commission. A landowner may not have officially requested the particular action, even if he stands to benefit. For yet others, such as DOB permitting decisions, a builder has no discretion about whether or not to seek approval.
Clear identification possible?	MAYBE. Currently, CPC and BSA documents do not systematically identify the landowner affected by a particular decision. While every piece of land has an owner attached to it, much development is done in the name of shell companies or LLCs meant to obscure the principals behind a particular transaction.
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES. No infrastructure currently exists, however. Enforcement would require additional collection of data on landowners (and principals of development firms) from such applicants before relevant boards and commissions, as well as a database where information can be aggregated and examined by campaigns, the CFB and the public.
False positives?	MAYBE. The risk of false positives can be minimized by focusing on those decisions that are both discretionary (that is, a special permit as opposed to a building permit) and individual (that is, a zoning variance as opposed to a rezoning) in nature.
Unfair burden?	NO. Enforcement would not require much in the way of additional paperwork; added burden of data collection and organization would fall primarily on boards and commissions.
Limit on right to participate?	NO. Entities would agree to limits on right to donate as a condition of asking for a particular benefit.
Used to circumvent regulation?	MAYBE. There is a potential LLCs can be used to obscure identities and protect the ability of principals to donate up to the full limits.

NOT-FOR-PROFITS

Financial benefit?	YES. While the financial imperative may not be as strong as it is in a for-profit enterprise, contracts with the City to provide social services – which in many cases are quite lucrative – provide a boost to an organization's bottom line, and enable them to grow.
Affirmative participation?	YES. Non-profits who receive contracts participate in the same competitive bidding processes as for-profit firms.
Clear identification possible?	YES , through VENDEX. Identification of principals is not uniform – board members do not have to be identified, for instance – but can be addressed through regulation.
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES, through VENDEX.
False positives?	MAYBE. People who serve on not-for-profit boards often serve more than one not-for-profit. These individuals are likely the sort of well-off, civic-minded people who would participate by giving campaign donations regardless of their board service.
Unfair burden?	MAYBE. Not-for-profits may find it harder to attract people to serve on boards if their campaign donations are restricted.
Limit on right to participate?	NO. For directors or managerial decision-makers, limits on donations are a reasonable condition of gaining business.
Used to circumvent regulation?	NO.

LOBBYISTS

Financial benefit?	YES . Lobbyists earn fees from clients to access City officials or influence City decisions.
Affirmative participation?	YES.
Clear identification possible?	YES . Lobbyists must register with City Clerk's office, which maintains database that is published online.
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES; through NYC Lobbyist database.
False positives?	NO; very unlikely.
Unfair burden?	NO . Lobbyists must already register; enforcement should provide no additional burden.
Limit on right to participate?	NO . Accepting limits on right to donate to campaigns should be acceptable price of access to lobbying profession.
Used to circumvent regulation?	NO

LOBBYIST CLIENTS

Financial benefit?	MAYBE. Many clients of lobbyists have financial interests before the city, while others are interested only in policy. Further study might illuminate what proportion of lobbyist clients are business-based or issue-based.	
Affirmative participation?	YES.	
Clear identification possible?	YES . Lobbyists must list their clients for the City Clerk's database.	
Enforcement mechanism possible?	YES; through NYC Lobbyist database.	
False positives?	YES, to the extent that it captures clients who have no financial interest in the policy decision they hope to affect. Crafting language to separate <i>doing business</i> clients from issue-advocacy clients would prove difficult.	
Unfair burden?	NO. Enforcement should provide no additional burden.	
Limit on right to participate?	MAYBE. The question of whether a particular firm or individual should be forced to give up his full right to participate financially when he hires a lobbyist may warrant further consideration.	
Used to circumvent regulation?	NO.	

APPENDIX F: GOVERNMENT ACTORS IN LAND USE DECISIONS

ULURP	 Community Boards Borough Presidents 	Applications subject to ULURP include: changes to the City Map; maps of subdivisions and the platting of land into streets, avenues, etc.; zoning changes*; certain special permits under the jurisdiction of CPC; site selection for City capital projects; revocable consents, solicitations for franchises and major concessions; improvements in real property, the costs of which are payable other than by the City; housing and urban renewal plans and projects*; sanitary or waterfront landfills; disposition of city-owned real property*; acquisition of real property by the City (except office leases); certain other matters. * = automatically reviewed by City Council	Appointed by Borough Presidents, half on recommendations from City Council members Elected
	3. City Planning Commission (CPC)		13 members: 7 appointed by Mayor, 1 appointed by each Borough President, 1 by Public Advocate
	4. City Council		Elected; Land Use Committee (which acts before full Council on land use matters) has 21 members.
Other land use decisions	Board of Standards and Appeals (BSA)	Grants special permits and variances; can modify or revoke certificates of occupancy.	Five members, appointed by Mayor
	Landmarks Preservation Commission	Designates buildings as a landmark or historic district; can prohibit work on landmark building or in historic district.	11 members, appointed by Mayor
	Loft Board	Resolves regulation issues surrounding loft buildings converted to residential use; settles landlord- tenant disputes; enforces residential legalization deadlines set forth in the Loft Law; enforces maintenance standards.	Nine members, appointed by Mayor
	Department of Buildings	Reviews construction and demolition plans and issues building permits; inspects buildings to ensure compliance with laws; licenses various construction trades; investigates complaints.	Commissioner appointed by Mayor

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