

# 2020 Use of Force Report



**NYPD**  
New York City Police Department



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A photograph of a man in a dark suit and a police officer in a white uniform standing on a basketball court. Both are wearing white face masks. The man in the suit is on the left, and the police officer is on the right. They appear to be in conversation. In the background, there is a basketball hoop, a chain-link fence, and trees. The text "Use of Force Report 2020" is overlaid in a large, bold, dark blue font across the center of the image.

# Use of Force Report 2020





# Police Commissioner's Message

In 2016, the New York City Police Department introduced its Use of Force Report, a comprehensive accounting of the department's use of force and a reinforcement of its commitment to increased transparency and accountability. The report details all aspects of the use of force as defined by policy – including firearms discharges, less-lethal force options, and general uses of force in which police subdued subjects. The report also details force used against NYPD members who, despite challenges faced in the moment, remained committed to the safety and well-being of the people they serve.

During the last five years, the NYPD has utilized its Neighborhood Policing crime-fighting philosophy and a highly successful precision policing strategy to intently focus on reducing violence while simultaneously building trust and strengthening relationships in every New York City neighborhood. The success of these efforts, largely attributed to dedicated personnel, innovative programs, enhanced training, improved resources, and technological advances, is built upon a foundation established five decades ago when the NYPD, seeking to improve public safety, began to track police firearms discharges. That was 1971 – and, although policing in New York City was a vastly different experience than it is today, the tracking and analysis of those police firearms discharges altered the department's use of force, both in procedure and in practice. The impact of this data continues to be influential today, as evidenced by evolving and well-defined force policies that, in 2020, accounted for the second-fewest firearms discharge incidents by members

of this department ever on record – and a 94 percent decrease in firearms discharge incidents since tracking began.

The remarkable progress by members of the NYPD to reduce the amount of firearms discharges is confirmation of the department's profound commitment to improving the safety and welfare of everyone who lives in, works in, and visits New York City. It builds upon the strength of effective policies, the significance of innovative training, the necessity of tactical preparedness, and the value of personnel dedicated to the department's mission. Moreover, it is an affirmation of the highest standards of professionalism, restraint, and respect for life. While use of force – including the use of deadly physical force – is sometimes necessary, it remains clear that members of the NYPD seldom use force, and that they exercise substantial restraint if, and when, they do use force.

For New York City and the world alike, 2020 was a challenging and unprecedented time. The global health pandemic, the large-scale civil unrest, and the impact of critical reforms to the criminal justice system – combined with a massive reduction in funding and resources – continues to reshape the manner in which the NYPD provides public safety. Despite these and other challenges, the NYPD maintains an unwavering commitment to smart, effective, and fair policing, and continually strives to bolster and expand collaboration and partnerships that undoubtedly reduce the impact of crime and violence citywide.

# Executive Summary

*Since the first issuance of this report in 2016, the NYPD has continuously worked to improve and evolve its force policies and reporting practices. The enactment of significant reforms regarding use of force along with the department's conscientious compliance towards evolving policies at both the city and state level, affirms the NYPD's commitment to enhanced transparency, building trust, and policing New York City in collaboration with the community it serves.*

This text is the New York City Police Department's fifth annual Use of Force Report. Since its inception, this report has reflected the department's ongoing commitment to enhanced transparency and accountability with respect to reporting and investigating force. In 2020, the New York City Police Department (NYPD), for the second straight year, recorded the second lowest number of police firearms discharges since discharge recordkeeping began in 1971.

While a challenging year on many fronts, 2020 also continued the downward trend in the department's overall use of less-lethal force. With an increase in weapons calls amidst a decrease in calls for service, the department experienced a decrease in numerous categories of force including: the use of less-lethal conducted electrical weapons (CEWs), impact weapons, oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, mesh restraining blankets, and canine bites. This report contains a detailed accounting of the use of force by members of the service, from the lowest level of physical force up to and including the intentional discharge of a firearm in adversarial conflicts.

Long at the forefront in reporting and investigating deadly force and firearms discharges, the NYPD accounts for every shot fired by members of the service, whether intentionally or unintentionally, except for discharges during firearms training. In 2007, the NYPD began to publicly release the Annual Firearms Discharge Report, fully cataloging all shooting incidents, including the number of subjects killed and

wounded, the number of innocent bystanders killed and wounded, animal shootings, unintentional accidental discharges, unauthorized uses of department firearms, and police suicides with firearms. The collection, analysis, and assessment of firearms discharge data is an essential component of the department's committed effort to continuously evaluate and enhance NYPD policies and practices.

In 2016, an overhaul of the NYPD's force policies and incident reporting structure enabled the introduction of the Use of Force Report, created to replace the Annual Firearms Discharge Report. This annual report expanded beyond the data captured by the firearms discharge reports to include an accounting of all other reportable uses of force by members of the service, allowing for a deeper analysis of use of force in the NYPD. Documenting how, when, where, and why NYPD personnel use force provides a useful context, keeping both the department and the public informed through enhanced transparency, while also proving to be an invaluable tool towards minimizing force incidents and injuries in those situations where force is unavoidable.

The department's use of force policies and procedures are found in the Department Manual. The manual, along with the NYPD Force Dashboard, are publicly available on-line at the NYPD web page, [www.nyc.gov/nypd](http://www.nyc.gov/nypd). The dashboard, a dynamic consolidation of the department's use of force data, is highly transparent, interactive, and user-friendly, providing users with data visualizations to explore the

characteristics of force incidents. This includes, but is not limited to, data regarding members of the service, subjects, types of force, locations, the basis for an encounter, and injuries. Additionally, the dashboard includes legal context, insight on data collection, and details on department policy.

During the first four years of this report, (2016-2019) the types of force utilized by NYPD personnel were separated into three levels. As of October 2019, however, the department added a fourth category, making this report the first to fully integrate the current four-level use of force policy structure. Level 1 consists of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible take-downs, discharging OC spray, discharging CEWs in cartridge mode, and using mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects. Level 2 includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (including a baton, other equipment, etc.), police canine bites, or using CEWs in "drive-stun" mode. Level 3 consists of the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges. Level 4 consists of any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 classification, though added to policy in October 2019, was not included in the 2019 Use of Force Report in order to organize the data coherently for public consumption. Any Level 4 incident in 2019 was presented under the previous designation from the three levels of force classification system formerly in place. Going forward, this modification to both policy and

data collection will alter the manner in which the department makes comparisons of certain historical force data.

Comprehensive oversight and investigation are built into the NYPD force policy. Department policy requires all levels of force to be documented on Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Reports. Level 1 force incidents, the lowest level of force, are investigated by the member's immediate supervisor. Level 2 incidents are investigated by department executives in the rank of captain or above. Level 3 incidents, where physical force capable of causing death or serious physical injury was used but the subject's injuries are not life-threatening, fall under the investigative lead of the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). Level 4 incidents, cases that involve police firearms discharges, and cases in which a subject dies or is seriously injured and likely to die, are investigated by the Force Investigation Division (FID). This type of occurrence (Level 4), prior to the October 2019 policy modifications, fell within the Level 3 classification. An incident involving the use of force may be, and often is, a complex event involving multiple members of the service and subjects. The highest level of force used by a member of the service or the most severe injury sustained by a subject determines the level classification of the incident as a whole and, as a result, the appropriate reporting and investigative requirements.

Since the first issuance of this report in 2016, the NYPD has continuously worked to improve and evolve its force policies and reporting practices. The enactment of significant reforms regarding use of force along with the department's conscientious compliance towards evolving policies at both the city and state level, affirms the NYPD's commitment to enhanced transparency, building trust, and policing New York City in collaboration with the community it serves.

### ***Firearms Discharges***

The data from 2020 continues to show a consistent decrease in firearms discharges dating back to when the department's official recording of discharges began. In 1971, there

were: 810 firearms discharge incidents; 221 subjects shot and injured; 93 subjects shot and killed; and 2,113 total rounds fired. For 2020, the NYPD recorded the second lowest number ever of firearms discharge incidents at 43.

The 43 firearms discharge incidents in 2020, a 17% decrease compared to the 52 firearms discharge incidents recorded in 2019, represents the second lowest number of police discharges recorded by the department in a calendar year. Twenty-five discharge incidents were intentional discharges by members of the service in the course of adversarial conflicts with criminal subjects. Twelve subjects were struck by police gunfire in 2020; eight sustained fatal injuries and four sustained non-fatal injuries. In nine incidents, subjects fired shots directly at members of the service. In 2020, while no members of the service were killed by gunfire, six members were shot and injured by subjects during adversarial conflict-intentional discharge incidents.

Two intentional firearms discharge incidents in 2020 were animal attacks, down from six in 2019. There were ten unintentional discharges in 2020, an increase from eight 2019. There were six unauthorized uses of NYPD firearms in 2020, one of which resulted in the death of a subject and three that were member suicides.

### ***Conducted Electrical Weapons***

There were 1,073 CEW discharge incidents in 2020, a decrease from the 1,271 incidents in 2019. Of these 1,073 CEW discharge incidents, 1,018 were intentional discharges including 431 that occurred during crime in progress situations and 395 deployments when members were seeking to control an emotionally disturbed person. There were no fatalities connected with the use of CEWs. The remaining discharges occurred in such situations as vehicle stops, suspicious person stops, wanted subjects, and past crime investigations. The CEWs were deemed effective in 703, or 69%, of the 1,018 intentional CEW discharge incidents. The ineffective discharges were attributed to various causes including probes failing to make adequate contact with the subject, a subject

fighting through the pain, or probes falling out after making contact.


### ***Observations in NYPD Uses of Force***

There were 6,158 total reportable force incidents in 2020 — 95.1% were classified as Level 1, 3.1% as Level 2, 1.2% as Level 3, and 0.6% as Level 4. Of the 6,158 reportable force incidents, 4,821 incidents — 78.2% of the total — involved the minimal amount of reportable force (e.g., hand strikes, foot strikes, and forcible takedowns of subjects). Uses of force also included 134 uses of OC spray, 81 uses of impact weapons, 5 uses of mesh restraining blankets, 43 fire-arms discharges, and 2 canine bites. The 6,158 total reportable force incidents represent a 28.3% decrease from the 8,595 total reportable force incidents in 2019.

In 2020, NYPD personnel used force in approximately 0.9% of all encounters with emotionally disturbed persons — 1,489 uses of force among 161,278 radio runs concerning emotionally disturbed persons. Crimes in progress were the most commonly recorded type of incident in which members used force, encounters that often resulted in arrest; however, arrests where force was used represent only 2.9% of the total number of arrests effected by members of the NYPD. Situations involving emotionally disturbed persons were the second most commonly recorded type of force encounter.

Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital. There was a total of 7,858 individuals subjected to police use of force in 2020. Of those subjects, 97.2% sustained no injuries or minor injuries. 103 subjects, or 1.3%, were substantially injured, and 119, or 1.5%, were seriously injured. A total of 3,378, or 18.9%, of the members of the service involved in 2020's force incidents were injured. Of that number, 259, or 7.6%, NYPD personnel involved in 2020's force incidents were substantially or seriously injured.

# Use of Force Policy



# NYPD Use of Force Policy

*The primary duty of every member of the NYPD is to protect human life, including the lives of individuals being placed in police custody. Members of the service are responsible and accountable for the proper use of force, the application of which must be consistent with both existing law and department policy.*

## LEGAL STANDARDS

Police officers, both in New York State and across the country, are authorized to use reasonable force when encountering specific circumstances. Federal and state law define the standards of these circumstances and determine the amount of reasonable force.

The constitutional standards for police use of force were established as a result of two U.S. Supreme Court cases, *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). *Garner* set forth the standard governing the use of deadly force, namely that officers may use deadly physical force when there is probable cause to believe that the subject poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury. *Graham* established that the review of an officer's use of force must be conducted with an objective reasonableness standard. The Court wrote that "the 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 hindsight."

"Reasonableness" as a standard is also seen at the state level where it was central to the case of *People v. Benjamin*, 51 NY2d 267 (1980). Here, the New York State Court of Appeals observed that "it would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety." *Benjamin*, similar to *Graham*, acknowledges the strain under which officers make life or death use of force decisions when determining the appropriateness of an officer's use of force.

Further guidance on the use of force comes from New York State Penal Law §35.30. This article allows that police officers may use force when they "reasonably believe such to be necessary" to protect life and property, to effect arrests, and to prevent escapes. Private persons, except in certain limited circumstances, may only use force in self-defense or in the defense of others, and must exhaust all attempts at retreat before using deadly physical force, except in their own dwellings. In contrast, police officers are obligated to take action, and are required to pursue fleeing perpetrators and use force, if necessary, to stop the flight.



## NYPD POLICY

NYPD policy emphasizes the value of human life, the utilization of reasonable force, and the employment of less lethal alternatives. It places a priority, whenever possible, on de-escalation. While use of force is thoroughly defined and regulated by both federal and state statute, NYPD policy is even more restrictive and holds members of the service to a higher level of restraint. New York State law, for example, allows the use of deadly physical force to protect property, but department policy does not.

Under NYPD policy, deadly force may only be used against a person to “protect members of the service and/or the public from imminent serious physical injury or death” (Patrol Guide 221- 01). Thus, there may be uses of force permissible under New York State and/or federal law, that still violate department policy.

NYPD policy states “force may be used when it is reasonable to ensure the safety of a member of the service or a third person, or otherwise protect life, or when it is reasonable to place a person in custody or to prevent escape from custody” (Patrol Guide 221-01). In accordance with this standard of reasonableness, any application of force that is judged to be “unreasonable under the circumstances...will be deemed excessive and in violation of department policy” (Patrol Guide 221-01). Use of force, in this context, is broadly defined to encompass a wide range of force options that may be employed to gain compliance or to ensure the control of a subject.

In the vast majority of encounters, police achieve compliance by merely utilizing verbal commands. When those commands, however, are insufficient and a subject chooses to ignore instructions or resist, officers may use an array of force options in order to compel a subject to submit to lawful authority. NYPD policy states that “when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, members of the service will use de-escalation techniques to gain voluntary compliance from a subject to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. In

situations in which this is not safe and/or appropriate, members of the service will use only the reasonable force necessary to gain control or custody of a subject” (Patrol Guide 221-01). Force options include physical force, less-lethal options (e.g., OC spray, conducted electrical weapons (CEW), or impact weapons), to deadly physical force, when justified by the threat of violence. It is not required that officers move sequentially from one level of force to the next and, as such, officers may, for instance, escalate from verbal commands to pointing a CEW or de-escalate from a threatened use of force or the actual use of force to verbal commands as situations evolve.


Over nearly five decades, a number of strategies that include comprehensive semi-annual firearms training, enhanced oversight, and the clear definition of what constitutes an authorized discharge have positively impacted the development of the department’s firearms policy. By 2020, these strategies had translated into an increasingly restrained NYPD, as the number of firearm discharge incidents totaled 43, a decrease of more than 17% from the 52 incidents in 2019.

These 43 firearms discharge incidents also represent the second lowest number ever recorded since department tracking began in 1971. At that time, there were 810 discharge incidents, 314 subjects shot by police, 93 of which were killed, and a total of 2,113 rounds discharged. By comparison, in 2020, there were 12 subjects shot by police, of which eight were killed, and there was a total of 294 rounds discharged. This represents a 95% decrease in discharge incidents, a 96% decline in subjects shot by police, a 91% decline in subjects killed, and an 86% decrease in rounds discharged.

In 2016, the NYPD instituted policy to document force used by, and against, police officers. The policy established three levels of force – up to, and including, deadly physical force – and defined the type of reporting or investigation that must take place after uses of force at

each level.

In October 2019, the department modified its force reporting structure and policies in an effort to improve user interface and accuracy. Policy modifications also led to the bifurcation of the existing Level 3 category, creating of a fourth level of force comprising any discharge of a firearm by a member of service, a discharge from a firearm belonging to a member of service, or any death or serious injury with a likelihood of death to a subject or bystander. Previously, these actions and injuries shared the Level 3 designation, with other actions that were likely to cause serious physical injury or death. The year 2020 will be the first full year to utilize this updated policy structure and it should be noted that these modifications may impact the way historical force data is compared.



## LEVELS OF FORCE

### **Level 1 (Physical Force/Less-Lethal Device)**

Level 1 includes the use of hand strikes, foot strikes, forcible takedowns, wrestling/grappling, the discharge of oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, the discharge of a CEW in “cartridge mode,” and the use of mesh restraining blankets to secure subjects.

### **Level 2 (Use of Impact Weapon/Canine/Less-Lethal Device)**

Level 2 includes the intentional striking of a person with any object (including batons and other blunt instruments), a police canine bite, and the discharge of a CEW in “drive stun” mode.

### **Level 3 (Use of Deadly Physical Force, except Firearm)**

Level 3 includes the use of physical force that is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, except for firearms discharges.

### **Level 4 (Firearm Discharge)**


Level 4 includes any discharge of a firearm by a member of the service or from a firearm belonging to a member of the service. Level 4 was not included in the reporting data from the previous year.

Actions that are not reportable uses of force include: ordering a person to lie on the ground; guiding them to the ground in a controlled manner; or the mere use of equipment such as Velcro straps or polycarbonate shields to restrain subjects, unless an injury is sustained.

## USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS

PERCENTAGE OF REPORTS BY LEVEL

**LEVEL 1** 95.1%  
**LEVEL 2** 3.1%  
**LEVEL 3** 1.2%  
**LEVEL 4** 0.6%




## INJURIES AND FORCE CATEGORIES

The degree of injury to a subject or a bystander can elevate the categorization of an incident and whether it is reported/investigated as a Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, or Level 4 use of force.

Physical injuries to subjects such as minor swelling, contusions, lacerations, abrasions, and complaints of substantial pain are categorized as Level 1 force incidents.

Physical injuries that are consistent with the application of Level 2 force (e.g. unconsciousness, the loss of a tooth, lacerations requiring stitches or staples) will elevate an incident to Level 2. An allegation or suspicion of excessive force with no injury, the attempted suicide of a prisoner resulting in no injury or a minor physical injury, or the use of any prohibited act, other than the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or prohibited method of restraint, will also result in a Level 2 classification.

Serious physical injuries that result in a Level 3 classification include, but are not limited to: broken/fractured bones, injuries requiring hospital admission, heart attacks, strokes, aneurysms, or other life-threatening/serious illnesses and injuries. Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold or a prohibited method of restraint, alleged or suspected excessive





force accompanied by serious physical injury or attempted suicide of a prisoner that causes a serious injury elevate an incident to a Level 3 classification.

Any death or serious injury with a likelihood of death to a subject or bystander will result in a Level 4 classification.

## **FORCE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW**

In addition to improving data collection, the department's force review process also establishes robust internal oversight processes. The NYPD's use of force oversight and management controls include:

### ***Immediate Supervisor***

The immediate supervisor is an available supervisor, not involved in the incident, assigned to the same command as the member of the service involved in a force incident. The immediate supervisor must be at least one rank higher than all involved members. In the event that a supervisor in an appropriate rank is not available, the duty captain will determine who will assume the responsibilities of the immediate supervisor. Immediate supervisors investigate Level 1 uses of force.

### ***Duty Captain***

The duty captain is the front-line executive, supervising all personnel performing duty within a patrol borough, during hours when commanding officers/executive officers are not present. Duty captains investigate Level 2 uses of force in the absence of the commanding officer/executive officer.

### ***Duty Chief***

The duty chief is the principal operations commander of the NYPD, when no other department executive of a higher rank is present, acting as a representative of the Chief of Department and responding to serious incidents within New York City, including police-involved shootings and deaths in police custody. The duty chief may assist in force investigations during hours when command and borough executives are not present.

### ***Borough/Bureau Investigations Units***

Investigations units, assigned to bureau and borough commands, investigate instances of non-criminal violations of department regulations and lesser misconduct, as well as domestic incidents and certain criminal incidents involving members of the NYPD. The investigations units may be called on to assist in Level 2 force investigations by a duty captain.

### ***First Deputy Commissioner***

The First Deputy Commissioner oversees the Force Investigation Division, the entity within the department responsible for investigating the most serious force incidents, and the Risk Management Bureau, which performs a number of roles with respect to use of force, including monitoring use of force data and the quality of force investigations. The Department Advocate's Office, which prosecutes administrative discipline cases, and the

Deputy Commissioner, Trials, which presides over the NYPD's internal discipline trials, also directly report to the First Deputy Commissioner.

The First Deputy Commissioner also chairs the Use of Force Review Board, which reviews all Level 3 and Level 4 uses of force, determines whether police actions were within policy, and makes disciplinary recommendations to the Police Commissioner when uses of force fall outside policy.

### ***Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB)***

IAB combats police corruption by analyzing corruption allegations and trends, and conducts comprehensive investigations that ensure the highest standards of integrity. IAB investigates all Level 3 use of force incidents.

### ***Force Investigation Division (FID)***

FID investigates all Level 4 incidents (i.e., incidents involving firearms discharges by members of the service and incidents in which subjects have died or are seriously injured and likely to die). FID reviews the tactics employed in each incident to derive tactical lessons learned and to make both general training recommendations and training recommendations specifically for the individual members of the service involved in discharge incidents.

### ***Risk Management Bureau (RMB)***

RMB works with the city's inspector general and other governmental agencies to collaboratively improve policing and community relations. RMB is responsible for ensuring the complete and proper implementation of court-ordered reforms. RMB also assesses compliance with NYPD policies, identifies and develops programs to minimize risk to the department, and provides oversight of the NYPD's performance monitoring programs. RMB sub-units include the Quality Assurance Division, the Risk Mitigation Division, and the Compliance Division. RMB and the First Deputy Commissioner's Office lead force review meetings every month with borough and bureau personnel. The purpose of these meetings is to assess compliance with use of force policy and ensure force investigations are thorough and timely.

### ***Deputy Commissioner, Department Advocate***

The Department Advocate's Office administratively prosecutes all employees of the New York City Police

Department for violations of the department's rules, regulations, and procedures, and makes recommendations to the First Deputy Commissioner concerning suspensions and restorations to duty of department personnel. Attorneys provide legal guidance to investigative units, analyze department investigations, draft charges and specifications, negotiate and submit case dispositions for the Police Commissioner's review, and litigate disciplinary matters before the Deputy Commissioner of Trials.

### ***Deputy Commissioner, Trials***

The Deputy Commissioner, Trials presides over the administrative trials of department disciplinary cases, and renders written findings of fact and recommendations to the Police Commissioner consistent with department rules, policies, and applicable statutes and case law.

### ***Use of Force Review Board***

The Use of Force Review Board is an oversight mechanism for maintaining the integrity of the department's force policy. Composed of executive staff members, the board reviews the most serious force cases and renders determinations regarding the actions of members of the department during force encounters.

### ***Training***

Department training serves as the foundation for the critical decision making by members of the service employ on a daily basis. Training curricula are evaluated and, if necessary, revised due to the analysis of use of force data, changes in city or state legislation, and enhancements in the tactical or technological field.

### ***Training Bureau***

The Training Bureau oversees NYPD training and educational programs, providing recruits, uniformed members, and civilians with the most up-to-date academic, tactical, and technological training available. In-service training for members of the service includes sessions on the latest tactics, de-escalation strategies, Crisis Intervention Team training, and changes in the law and police procedure, as well as ways to positively interact and collaborate with community members.

Additionally, all uniformed members of the service complete rigorous firearms training as recruits, and must re-qualify for the use of their service and off-duty weapons twice a year for the entirety of their careers. Members also receive specialized training when they are assigned to certain units, such as the Emergency Service Unit.

Department firearms training emphasizes that the principal goal of every member of the NYPD is to protect life, including the lives of bystanders, victims, subjects, and other members of the service. Yet, it is sometimes necessary to protect life by using deadly physical force.

To determine whether and how to use deadly force, members of the service rely on judgment, skill, and most importantly, training. Members of the NYPD are trained to use deadly physical force to "stop the threat," which means ending a subject's ability to threaten imminent death or serious physical injury. To accomplish this purpose in dynamic shooting situations, members are trained to shoot at the center mass of the subject, the largest target available. Arms and legs are smaller and less static, and therefore, less certain targets. Hitting a subject in these extremities is also far less likely to stop their potentially deadly actions. Members are trained to only use deadly physical force to protect themselves or others from imminent serious physical injury or death.

In 2020, use of force related training for recruits attending the Police Academy included academic lessons, physical training and tactical instruction. Academically, recruits are required to successfully complete the Use of Force chapter of the Academy's Law curriculum. This 9-hour chapter centers on the justifiable use of force as specified in the New York State Penal Law and in department policy. With a focus on circumstances requiring force, de-escalation, and approved force options, this chapter was revised in 2020 to include legal updates on medical attention requirements for arrested subjects, unlawful methods of restraint, and strangulation laws. Recruits apply these lessons in realistic situations during 27 hours of Scenario Based Training in order to evaluate and determine the proper selection of de-escalation techniques and any necessary force options. Consolidating existing legal issues and department policy with evolving best practices and tactics provides an optimal learning experience to recruits who, upon graduation, will likely serve in a patrol capacity which includes a high volume of public engagement and interaction.

The physical and tactical training curriculum that new recruits experienced in 2020 included several force-related courses of instruction. Among these were the Use of Force course and Use of Force Case Law, in which recruits were trained on use of force options under varying circumstances and provided with the ability to streamline use of force decision making, respectively. Consistent with existing law and department policy, recruits were trained and certified in the use of both firearms and less lethal weapons and received approximately 50 hours of physical training encompassing various force tactics including strikes, takedowns, defensive drills, handcuffing, and the Critical Decision Making Model.

As part of the department's committed focus on enhanced training for in-service members, several force-related courses of instruction were provided to members during in-service training in 2020. These include a tactical refresher course, initiated in response to legislative changes, highlighting force options, member conduct, medical attention requirements for arrested subjects, unlawful methods of restraint, the right to record, and strangulation laws. Additional in-service training related to force consisted of civil disorder training, certification and recertification of firearm

qualifications and less lethal weapon qualifications, supervisory instruction on force reporting requirements, and a mandatory department-wide video detailing the proper application of force permitted to be utilized by members of the service.



# **Firearms Discharges**



# Overview

Perhaps the most sudden, challenging, and potentially traumatic event that can transpire in an officer's career is a line of duty discharge of his or her firearm. Although discharge incidents are becoming increasingly rare, this was not always the case.

In 1971, when the department began to officially track the number of firearms discharge incidents, there was a total of 810 police firearms discharges. In the following year, that number increased to a record high 994 incidents and for the first five years (1971-1975) of official recordkeeping, the overall average was 689 discharge incidents per year.

By comparison, in 2020, the NYPD recorded 43 discharge incidents, which is not only a 17% decrease from 2019, but also represents the second lowest number of police firearms discharges in NYPD history. Additionally, the average of 50 incidents per year for the most recent five-year period (2016-2020) highlights a stark difference in policing from the initial years of recordkeeping and underscores the department's enhanced firearms policy, as well as a commitment to safety, restraint, and the value of human life.

Every firearm discharge incident, regardless of category, is thoroughly analyzed by the department to improve understanding, develop training, adapt policy, implement technology, and increase the safety of New York City. The discharge data in this report has been compiled from Preliminary Investigation Worksheets, medical examiner's reports, arrest and complaint reports, Force Investigation Division reports, Use of Force Review Board findings and recommendations, quarterly and annual publicly reported data tables, the NYPD Force Dashboard, and previous Annual Firearms Discharge Reports. While there is undeniable value in an analysis and discussion of police firearms discharges, the relatively small number of discharges in 2020 (43 overall discharge incidents, including 25 adversarial conflict discharges) limits the scope of conclusions that can be drawn, as well as any basis on which to forecast future trends.

Intentional firearm discharges by police that are deemed justifiable in a court of law are still reviewed by the NYPD for tactical deviations, procedural violations, and any factors that may suggest a need for policy or procedural modifications. If, upon review, a determination is made to impose discipline in a case, the discipline may not necessarily result from the actual discharge of the firearm, but from a violation of other department procedures.

All members who discharge their firearms are sent to a firearms tactical review course, regardless of the circumstances of the discharge.



Historical Snapshot, 2006-2020  
(figure 2)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Adversarial Conflict	59	45	49	47	33	36	45	40	35	33	37	23	17	25	25
Animal Attack	30	39	30	28	30	36	24	19	18	15	11	9	4	6	2
Unintentional Discharge	26	15	15	23	21	15	21	12	18	15	14	12	8	8	10
Mistaken Identity	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unauthorized Use of a Firearm	8	6	3	4	6	2	6	2	4	2	6	3	2	4	3
MOS Suicide/Attempted Suicide	3	6	8	3	2	3	9	8	4	2	4	5	4	9	3
<b>Total Discharges</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>43</b>

The NYPD classifies police firearms discharges using the following categories:

**Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict (ID-AC):**

When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm during a confrontation with a subject. There were 25 intentional discharges in adversarial conflict incidents in 2020.

**Intentional Discharge-Animal Attack (ID-AA):**

When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm to defend against an animal attack. There were two intentional discharge incidents in the course of animal attacks in 2020.

**Unintentional Discharge:**

When a member of the service unintentionally discharges a firearm. There were ten unintentional discharge incidents in 2020.

**Mistaken Identity:**


When a member of the service intentionally fires on another member of the service in the mistaken belief that the other member is a criminal subject. Mistaken identity cases do not include crossfires, when a member of the service accidentally strikes a fellow member of the service while firing at another subject. There were no cases of mistaken identity in 2020.

**Unauthorized Use of a Firearm:**


When a member of the service intentionally discharges a firearm outside the scope of his or her employment, or when another person illegally discharges a member’s firearm. There were six total unauthorized discharge incidents involving NYPD firearms in 2020, three of which were member suicides.

**Intentional Discharge–No Conflict:**


When a member of the service discharges a firearm to summon assistance. Due to the rarity of discharges to summon assistance —the last occurred in 2016, and was the only one of its kind in a decade— this category is usually excluded from the report. There were no discharges classified as Intentional Discharge–No Conflict in 2020.




**Adversarial Conflicts, 2011-2020**  
(figure 3)




**Animal Attacks, 2011-2020**  
(figure 4)



**Unintentional Discharges, 2011-2020**  
(figure 5)





**Total Discharges, 2011-2020**  
(figure 6)





**New York City Police Department  
Firearms Discharge Incidents  
1971-2020**  
*(figure 7)*



# Intentional Discharge-Adversarial Conflict

In 2020, 51 uniformed members of the service intentionally fired their weapons in an adversarial conflict. These 51 members represent about .14% of the NYPD's 35,385 uniformed members of the service in 2020 and a comparable percentage to discharge statistics for the most recent five-year period (2016-2020) when, with an average of roughly 36,000 uniformed members of the service, approximately .13% intentionally fired their weapons in adversarial conflicts.

Members of the service responded to more than 6.2 million calls for police service in 2020, a 3% decrease from 2019, and the first annual decrease in calls for service during the most recent five-year period. Calls involving weapons totaled 74,378 in 2020, a 15% increase from the previous year and the highest annual total recorded in the most recent five-years. 2020's arrest total, 140,411, a 34% decrease from the previous year, included 20,935 arrests for weapons possession. Of these arrests for weapons possession, 4,253 were gun arrests, a 29% increase from 2019, and the highest annual number of gun arrests in the most recent five-year period. Beyond arresting armed suspects, uniformed members of the service also had thousands of additional, potentially volatile interactions with the public. These include investigative encounters, vehicle stops, responding to calls for a person in crisis and safely escorting thousands of such persons to hospitals and care facilities. In the overwhelming majority of incidents in which uniformed members took armed subjects or emotionally disturbed persons into custody, they did not discharge their weapons.


In 2020, there were 25 intentional firearm discharge-adversarial conflict incidents (ID-AC), involving 51 uniformed members of the service who discharged their firearms. These conflicts involved 28 subjects. In nine different ID-AC incidents, subjects discharged firearms directly at members of the service. As a result of the ID-AC incidents occurring in 2020, 12 subjects were shot, of whom eight died.

The total number of uniformed members injured by gunfire in ID-AC exchanges has varied greatly over the 49 years that the department has tracked such data – from a high of 50 members shot and injured by subject gunfire in 1973, to a low of zero members shot and injured in 2009. In 2020, six members of the service were shot and injured by subject gunfire in ID-AC incidents, compared with four members shot and injured in 2019. No members of the service were shot and killed in the line of duty in 2020—something that last occurred in 2018 and, prior to that, in 2013.

## MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE

Of the 25 ID-AC's in 2020, there were no fatal injuries to any members of the service. However, eight members of the service—including six members shot by subject gunfire—were injured in five different ID-AC incidents. In 2020, the total number of members of the service who were shot and injured by subject gunfire was higher than that of subjects who were shot and injured by police gunfire.

Three members were injured in a single incident when a subject stabbed one member then subsequently shot two other members during an exchange of gunfire. In three separate ID-AC incidents, a total of four members were shot and injured in an exchange of gunfire with



armed subjects.

The last member injury occurred in another incident when, during a car stop, a member was pinned by the subject's vehicle against a police vehicle. The total of eight member injuries during ID-AC incidents in 2020 represents a 33% increase from 2019.


### SUBJECT DEATHS

While the total number of subjects killed by members of the service during adversarial exchanges varies from year to year, an average of nine subjects per year were shot and killed from 2016 to 2020. In 2020, eight subjects were killed by police firearms discharges during ID-AC incidents. The number of subjects shot and killed by police gunfire during ID-AC incidents in 2019 was 12; the 33.3% decrease to eight in 2020 marks the second lowest number of subjects killed during ID-AC's over the last five years and falls below the 20-year average of ten subjects shot and killed per year by police gunfire in New York City.

Of the eight subjects killed by police gunfire during ID-AC incidents in 2020, all eight possessed a weapon or dangerous instrument that appeared to be capable of causing death or serious physical injury. Five subjects possessed a firearm, two subjects possessed cutting instruments, and one subject possessed an imitation firearm (the eight ID-AC incidents in which subjects were killed are described in Appendix B).

**ID-AC Incidents Subject Injuries and Deaths, 2011-2020**

(figure 9)



### SUBJECT INJURIES

In 2020, the department recorded the lowest number of subjects shot and injured by police gunfire since discharge recordkeeping began in 1971. Four subjects were shot and injured by police, compared to 13 in 2019, and well below the last five-year average of 12 subjects shot and injured annually.

Of the four subjects shot and injured in 2020, each possessed some form of a weapon: two were armed with firearms, one was armed with both a firearm and a knife, and one was armed with a knife.

In the two incidents involving only firearms, one subject was shot and injured after pointing a firearm at the discharging member of the service and one subject was shot and injured after discharging a firearm at a group people. Both members were off-duty at the time of the respective incidents.

In the incident where the subject was armed with both a firearm and a knife, the subject was shot and injured after stabbing a member of the service in the neck and then discharging a firearm at several members, striking two officers.

During the incident involving a knife, the subject had menaced members of the service and a civilian with the knife before being shot and injured by responding officers.

### BYSTANDER INJURIES


There were no bystanders injured or killed either as a direct result of, or incidental to, police action during ID-AC incidents in 2020. While bystander injuries have declined each year since 2017, this marks the first year since 2008 during which no bystanders were injured or killed.

### OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

An actual or perceived weapon or dangerous instrument was involved in all 25 of the ID-AC incidents in 2020. In 18 incidents, the weapon or dangerous instrument was a firearm, 17 of which were loaded and capable of discharging live rounds. Of these 17 firearms, two were revolvers and 15 were semiautomatic pistols and in one of these incidents, the subject possessed both a knife and a semiautomatic firearm. In two incidents, the weapons possessed by ID-AC subjects were imitation firearms, a replica revolver and a pellet pistol. In one incident, the subject simulated a firearm by quickly removing their hand from their waistband, index and middle pointed downward, then secreting their hand behind their back while failing to immediately comply with the directions of the members of service on scene.


In three incidents, ID-AC subjects possessed cutting instruments, two knives and one machete. In one ID-AC incident, the subject operated a vehicle in a manner capable of causing serious physical injury to members of the service on the scene.

**Threat Type in ID-AC Incidents, 2020**  
(figure 10)




There were a total of 28 subjects involved in ID-AC incidents in 2020; 23 known subjects and five unknown subjects. Of the 23 known subjects, all were male and ranged in age from 18 to 55 with a median age of 32. Of all the known ID-AC subjects, 56.5% were between the ages of 21 and 39, 26.1% were aged 40 or over, and 17.4% were under 21 years of age. Otherwise stated, 13 subjects were between the ages of 21 and 39, six were aged 40 or over, and four were under 21 years of age.

**Gunfire in New York City, 2020**  
(figure 11)



**Race/Ethnicity of Known Criminal Shooting Suspects vs. Criminal Shooting Victims vs Known ID-AC Subjects, 2020**


(figure 12)



The race and ethnicity of the 23 known subjects was determined by eyewitness reports, the subject’s self-identification, existing government-issued documentation, racial/ethnic physical characteristics, medical examiner reports, and other available sources. Of the 23 known subjects involved in ID-AC incidents, 16 were Black, five were Hispanic, and two were White. Expressed as percentages, 69.6% were Black, 21.7% were Hispanic, and 8.7% were White. The racial and ethnic composition of the ID-AC subjects generally corresponds to the 794 criminal shooting suspects associated with the 1,531 criminal shooting incidents that occurred in New York City during 2020. Among the 794 identified criminal shooting suspects in New York City in 2020, approximately 69.3% were Black, 23.2% were Hispanic, and 1.3% were White. Among the 1,868 shooting victims in 2020, approximately 73.6% were Black, 22.4% were Hispanic, 1.9% were White, 1.7% were Asian, and 0.4% were unknown.

**Race/Ethnicity of Members in ID - AC Incidents, 2020**


(figure 13)



In 2020, 51 members of the service intentionally discharged their weapons during ID-AC incidents. Of these 51 members, 45, or 88.2% were male and five, or 9.8%, were female. The remaining 2% represents the undercover member of service involved in an ID-AC who, for the purpose of this report, will not be identified by sex, age, race, ethnic composition or any other defining manner. The uniformed staff of the NYPD, taken as an average over the course of 2020, was 18.5% female and 81.5% male. Of the members of the service involved in ID-AC incidents in 2020, 47.1 % were White, 23.5 % were Hispanic, 21.6% were Black, 5.9% were Asian and 2%, as previously detailed, will remain unidentified.

**Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents vs. Dept Staffing, 2020**


(figure 14)



Within the rank structure of the NYPD, members in the rank of police officer account for approximately two-thirds of the entire department. Members of the service in this rank, and those members with fewer years of service, are more likely to be serving in a patrol capacity. This assignment, whether through public interaction, during the response to calls for police service, taking enforcement action, or preserving the peace, has a high volume of engagement and interaction with the community. It also has an increased likelihood to encounter situations that may lead to adversarial conflicts.

**Rank of Members in ID-AC Incidents, 2011 - 2020**

(figure 15)



Of the 25 ID-AC's in 2020, approximately 68%, or 17, occurred with relation to a member's performance of patrol. Of the remaining eight ID-AC's, four occurred while the involved members were off-duty. Of the four off-duty ID-AC's, two occurred in the Bronx, one in Brooklyn, and one in Westchester. Three ID-AC's occurred in relation to an investigation and one ID-AC occurred within a precinct stationhouse. In the 17 patrol-related ID-AC's in 2020, 36 members discharged their firearms, or 69% of all discharging members in adversarial conflicts. Of these 36 members, 80% were in the rank of police officer and, of those, 83% had 10 years of service or less at the time of their discharge incident.


Among the 25 ID-AC's in 2020, approximately 76.5% of the members discharging their firearms—or 39 out of 51—were in the rank of police officer. This is consistent with historical trends over the past 10 years where members in the rank of police officer accounted for approximately 65% of the total uniformed staff and comprised between 55% and 86% of members who discharged their firearms in ID-AC's.

Detectives, who comprise approximately 15% of all uniformed staffing were approximately 11.8% of ID-AC discharging members in 2020, which is consistent with the approximate average of 12% over the past decade. Sergeants

usually represented approximately 13% of total uniformed staff over the past 10 years, and comprised between 7% and 21% of ID-AC-involved members during that same period. In 2020, sergeants were approximately 9.8% of discharging members in ID-AC's. There was one member in the rank of lieutenant who discharged a firearm in an ID-AC in 2020.

In 2020, of all the 51 members who discharged their firearms in an ID-AC, 39 members (76.5%) had 10 years or less of service at the time of their discharge. Thirty-five of these members were in the rank of police officer, two were in the rank of sergeant, and two were in the rank of detective.

Seventeen of the 25 ID-AC's in 2020 involved only members in the rank of police officer. Five ID-AC's included sergeants: three incidents involved a sergeant and one or more police officers, one involved a sergeant, a detective, and a police officer, and one incident only involved a sergeant. Two more ID-AC's involved detectives: one incident with multiple detectives and police officers and the other incident with a single detective. Lastly, one ID-AC included a member in the rank of lieutenant without any other involved members.




Fourteen adversarial conflicts in 2020, or 56%, involved a discharge by one member of the service and seven incidents involved two members. These two types of incidents represent 84% of all ID-AC's. Of the remaining occurrences, two incidents included three members, one involved seven members, and one ID-AC involved 10 members who discharged their firearms.

During 18 ID-AC's all participating members were attired in a uniform, in six ID-AC's all members were in plainclothes, and in one ID-AC, members were attired in both uniform and plainclothes. Of the members involved, 40 were attired in a uniform, 39 of whom were performing patrol-related functions. The other

member clad in a uniform was performing an authorized off-duty overtime assignment. The remaining 11 members, four of whom were off duty, were attired in plainclothes at the time of their ID-AC's. The plainclothes on-duty members included one sergeant, two police officers, and four detectives. Five of these members were performing investigative functions, and the remaining two members were serving in a patrol-related function.

Approximately 68.6%, 35 of 51, of the members who discharged their firearms during the 2020 ID-AC incidents were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau. Eight members were assigned to the Housing Bureau, six were assigned to the Detective Bureau, one was assigned to the Transit Bureau, and one was assigned to the Internal Affairs Bureau.


Twelve ID-AC incidents in 2020 occurred during the third platoon, between 3:31 p.m. and 11:30 p.m.; ten occurred during the first platoon, between 11:31 p.m. and 7:30 a.m.; and three took place on the second platoon, between 7:31 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. Twenty-four of the 25 adversarial conflicts in 2020 ( 96%) occurred within four of the five counties of New York City. Eight incidents each occurred in the Bronx and in Brooklyn, an increase for both geographic boroughs from 2019. Four incidents each occurred in Manhattan and Queens, a decrease for both geographic boroughs from the previous year. Additionally, one incident occurred in Yonkers, beyond the confines of New York City. Staten Island did not record an ID-AC in 2020, also a decrease from 2019.



ID-AC incidents occurred in 19 separate precincts throughout New York City, the same total as in 2019, and slightly below the annual average of approximately 20 precincts over the last five-years. In 2020, five different precincts each experienced two separate ID-AC's; the 9<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> Precincts in Manhattan, the 41<sup>st</sup> Precinct in the Bronx, and the 73<sup>rd</sup> and 77<sup>th</sup> Precincts in Brooklyn.

**ID-AC and Criminal Shooting Incidents by Geographic Borough, 2020**

(figure 18)



During the past five-year period (2016-2020), the highest number of ID-AC’s in any precinct during a single calendar year was three. This occurred five times in four different precincts; twice in Brooklyn’s 73<sup>rd</sup> Precinct (2016 and 2019), once apiece in the Bronx’s 43<sup>rd</sup> (2016) and 44<sup>th</sup> (2019) Precincts, and once in Brooklyn’s 67<sup>th</sup> Precinct (2017). Of all the ID-AC incidents over the past five years, the highest percentage, approximately 35.4%, occurred in Brooklyn followed by 27.6% in the Bronx, 16.5% in Queens, 13.4% in Manhattan and 3.2% in Staten Island. The remaining 3.9% occurred outside the confines of New York City.

Over the same time, twenty-seven precincts did not experience an ID-AC and 16 precincts experienced just a single incident. Of the precincts that recorded multiple ID-AC’s, the highest concentration of incidents occurred in the following precincts: the 73<sup>rd</sup> Precinct (eight), 67<sup>th</sup> Precinct (six), and 75<sup>th</sup> Precinct (five), all in Brooklyn, and the 40<sup>th</sup> Precinct (five) and 47<sup>th</sup> Precinct (five) in the Bronx. These five precincts account for nearly a quarter of ID-AC incidents within the confines of New York City’s five counties since 2016, and correlate strongly with criminal shooting incidents by geographic borough during that same period.

Adversarial conflict police firearms discharges tend to occur in areas of New York City that experience higher levels of gun violence. Since the 2007 Annual Firearms Discharge Report first mapped police and criminal shootings, the “Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. Police Adversarial Discharges” maps have demonstrated a generally consistent geographical correlation between police adversarial discharges and criminal gun violence. As shown on the map on page 26, the frequency and locations of ID-AC’s in 2020 are comparable to criminal gun activity and criminal shootings in New York City.


Uniformed members of the service discharged a total of 259 rounds during ID-AC incidents in 2020, a 9.4% decrease from 2019, and a return to the recent trend in the reduction of ID-AC discharges from 2016 through 2018. Although 259 rounds discharged during ID-AC’s in 2020 represents a decrease from the previous year, it is 26% higher than the 206 rounds averaged annually during the last five years. This increase is largely the result of four incidents that together accounted for 168 rounds discharged. These four incidents, while responsible for 64.9% of ID-AC rounds discharged, also account for four members of the service shot, one member stabbed, three subject fatalities, and three instances in which members were directly fired upon.






# Criminal Shooting Incidents vs. NYPD Intentional Discharges - Adversarial Conflicts, 2020

(figure 19)




During the majority of ID-AC incidents, 15 incidents in all, the total number of rounds discharged was between one and five. Accounting for a total of 35 discharges by 19 members of the service, these 15 incidents represent 60% of ID-AC's for the year and correspond closely with the pattern of ID-AC discharges during the past five-year period (2016-2020). During that time, ID-AC's involving between one and five rounds discharged amounted to 57%.

**Rounds Discharged per ID-AC Incident, 2020**  
(figure 20)



**Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AC Incidents, 2020**  
(figure 21)




## OBJECTIVE COMPLETION RATE

The “objective completion rate” is the means by which the department, when discussing ID-AC incidents, determines the effectiveness of a police firearms discharge. When a uniformed member properly and lawfully perceives a threat severe enough to require the use of a firearm and discharges a firearm properly and lawfully at a specific threat, the most relevant measure of success is whether the member ultimately stops the threat. This is the objective completion rate, and it is determined irrespective of the number of rounds discharged at a particular subject. The objective is considered to be completed when the actions of the subject, specifically those actions that threaten imminent serious physical injury or death are stopped by a member’s use of deadly physical force. The objective completion rate is used for statistical and informational purposes, and is not a factor considered in the investigation of individual incidents. The department does not calculate a “hit percentage” when describing an ID-AC incident, in part because the percentages are sometimes unknown (for example, in cases when a subject flees) and also because of the widely differing circumstances in individual incidents.

In 2020, uniformed members of the service, by discharging their firearms and striking at least one subject, successfully stopped the threat in 12 of 25 ID-AC incidents for an objective completion rate of 48%. This is a decrease of 48% from the previous year. The subjects in three incidents fled, were not apprehended and may have been struck by members’ bullets so the the objective completion rate for 2020 may be higher than reported.

**Objective Completion Rate, 2016 - 2020**  
(figure 22)




## SHOOTING TECHNIQUE

Standing, using a two-handed grip, and carefully aligning a firearm’s sights on the target are not always practical during an adversarial conflict incident. There are occasions when follow-up investigations are unable to determine the shooting grips and/or shooting stances used by discharging members of the service. Of the 51 members involved in ID-AC’s in 2020, ten were determined to have used a two-handed supported position, and one utilized a one-handed unsupported position. Post-shooting investigations also determined that 14 members involved in ID-AC incidents were in a standing position at the time of their firearms discharge. The investigations also determined the distance of 51 discharging members from their targets during ID-AC incidents. Sixteen members discharged their weapons at a distance of 15 feet or less from their target subjects, including five members who discharged their weapon from 5 feet or less. Thirty-five members were at a distance of more than 15 feet. While all uniformed members of the service are trained to discharge their

weapons at a target from as far away as 75 feet, these close-contact adversarial conflicts require split-second, life-and-death decisions by each discharging member of the service.


**ID-AC Distance to Target by Discharging Member, 2020**  
(figure 23)



# Intentional Discharges - Animal Attack

**A**mong the 6.2 million calls for service to the NYPD in 2020, thousands involved dogs and other animals. This report does not encompass every call for service concerning an animal or each animal incident involving a member of the service. Only instances involving police firearms discharges are discussed here.

**Rounds Discharged per ID-AA Incidents, 2020**  
(figure 24)



Department policy authorizes uniformed members of the service to intentionally discharge their firearms at a dog or other animal only to protect themselves or others from imminent physical injury and when there is no opportunity to retreat or other reasonable means to eliminate the threat. Members are equipped with less-lethal options that may counter an animal attack, including batons and OC spray, but these options may not be feasible or effective in every circumstance.

In 2020, the NYPD recorded two instances of intentional firearm discharges during animal attacks (ID-AA), a 66% decrease, compared to 2019 and a return to the longtime trend in the reduction of ID-AA occurrences. For eight years, from 2011 through 2018, the NYPD experienced a steady decline in ID-AAs, falling from 36 in 2011 to four in 2018. In 2019, ID-AAs increased slightly to six, though three occurred while members were off-duty. The two ID-AAs in 2020 involved on-duty members of the service and resulted in a canine's demise, represent the lowest total since the inception of this report and further underscores the department's commitment to restraint.


**Rounds Discharged per Member in ID-AA Incidents, 2020**  
(figure 25)



The first incident stemmed from an aggressive dog attacking two individuals who were present, but

uninvolved, at the scene of a police search for a subject who fled a vehicle stop. The other incident occurred when an aggressive dog that attacked another dog and an individual who tried to intervene. As members attempted to isolate and contain the dog, it aggressively advanced on the members of the service. During these ID-AAs, two members of the service, one in the rank of captain and one in the rank of sergeant, discharged a total of 13 rounds, one round more than in 2019. The number of discharging members represents a 66% decrease from the six discharging members the previous year. Of the two discharging members, one member discharged 3 rounds and one member discharged 10 rounds. Two dogs were killed as a result of these discharges, a 50% decrease from 2019.


**ID - AA Incidents by Platoon, 2020**  
(figure 26)





One incident occurred on the second platoon (between 0731 and 1530 hours), while the other incident occurred on the third platoon (between 1531 and 2330 hours). No ID-AA incidents in 2020 occurred during the first platoon (between 2331 and 0730 hours).

Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island did not record an ID-AA incident. One ID-AA in 2020 occurred in Brooklyn and one occurred in the Bronx.

**ID - AA Incidents by Borough, 2020**  
(figure 27)






# Unintentional Discharges

There were ten unintentional discharges in 2020, a 25% increase from 2019. While this represents the first rise in this category since 2014, it falls below the 13 unintentional discharges averaged annually during the past ten years. It also marks the first time since the inception of this report or its predecessor, the Annual Firearms Discharge Report (2007-2015), that there were no injuries to any member of the service, any bystander, or any subject as a result of an unintentional discharge. Each incident involved one member of the service discharging a single round and resulted in minor property damage only.

Seven of the unintentional discharges occurred while members were on-duty, five of which transpired inside of department facilities. One on-duty unintentional discharge occurred inside a secured locker area in a central booking facility and one occurred inside a secured room within a hospital. Of the three off-duty incidents, two occurred in the member's residence and one took place in the residence of another. Eight of the incidents involved members discharging their own firearm, one involved a member discharging the firearm of another member of the service, and one involved a firearm recovered from a perpetrator during an arrest. Four of the unintentional discharges occurred in Queens, two in Brooklyn, two in the Bronx, one in Staten Island, and one in Nassau County.

In 2020, of the ten members of the service who unintentionally discharged their weapons, two held the rank of sergeant, seven held the rank of police officer, and one held the rank of detective. Seven of the members were assigned to the Patrol Services Bureau, and one each was assigned to the Housing Bureau, the Detective Bureau, and to the Special Operations Division.


**Rank, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2020**  
(figure 28)



## Years of Service

Five of the members that unintentionally discharged their firearms in 2020 had less than five years of service with the department. Three members ranged between six to ten years, and two members had between eleven to fourteen years of service. The overall number ranged from less than one year to fourteen years of service.

**Years of Service, Unintentional Discharge vs. Department Staffing, 2020**  
(figure 29)



**Loading/Unloading**

Seven unintentional discharges in 2020 occurred while members were loading or unloading their firearms. Five incidents involved on-duty members, four of which occurred within department facilities, and one within a hospital’s secure room. The remaining two involved off-duty members within their own residence.

**Holstering**

Two members of the service, one on-duty and one off-duty, unintentionally discharged their firearms in 2020 while attempting to remove their firearms from their holsters.

**Handling**

One unintentional discharge in 2020 occurred from the handling of a firearm unrelated to loading/unloading or holstering. This took place as an on-duty member of the service mishandled their firearm as they attempted to remove it from a secured locker in central booking.




# Unauthorized Discharges

Six firearm discharges in 2020 were classified as unauthorized, a 54% decrease from the previous year and the lowest annual total when compared with the most recent five-year period (2016-2020). Three of these incidents were completed suicides by members of the service, a 66% decrease from the nine member suicides that occurred in 2019. Of the remaining three incidents, one involved a member of the service discharging a firearm and killing a subject during an off-duty dispute. That member was arrested and suspended from duty. Another involved an off-duty member who discharged a firearm at an unidentified subject who had stolen the member's personal vehicle. There were no reported injuries as the subject fled and remains un-apprehended. The member in that incident was suspended from duty. The last unauthorized discharge incident was the result of a non-member gaining access to a member's firearm and discharging one round in a completed suicide

## UMOS SUICIDES

Three members of the service, two females and one male, died by suicide using a firearm in 2020. All three held the rank of police officer. At the time of their respective incidents, two of the members had four years of service and one member had 12 years of service. All three incidents occurred while the members were off-duty, though one occurrence did take place in a department facility. The three member suicides that occurred in 2020 match 2016 for the lowest annual total during the most recent five-year period and also marks the first time during that period where female suicides by firearm outnumbered those committed by males.

UMOS Suicides by Firearm by Year, 2011-2020  
(figure 30)



## HEALTH AND WELLNESS

Throughout the course of their assigned duties, members of the service may encounter incidents that result in varying levels of emotional and psychological trauma. Recognizing the impact that these stressful and potentially traumatic events pose, the department actively encourages its members to seek assistance through both internal and external resources. Resources available within the department include the Employee Assistance Unit, the Counseling Services Unit, the Chaplain's Unit, the NYPD Helpline, Peer Support, the Early Intervention Program, and the Psychological Evaluation Unit. External resources include Police Officers Providing Peer Assistance (POPPA), Finest Care, the Police Self Support Group, NYC Well, Lifeline, and the Crisis Text Line.

In 2019, the Health and Wellness Section was formed to encourage and support both the physical and mental health of all members of the service. Among the resources offered by the Health and Wellness Section are free and confidential counseling for all uniformed members of the service provided through a partnership with New York Presbyterian Hospital, the Peer Support Program of more than 250 volunteer peer representatives citywide, the Critical Incident Stress Management Program to support members in the wake of a critical or traumatic incident, publicly available Health and Wellness social media pages, a nutritional needs phone application, and a Health and





Wellness phone application, both of which are available on all department smartphones. Additionally, the Health and Wellness Section continuously works to update department policy and training with an aim at improving the physical, mental, and emotional health of members of the service.

In 2020, amid the wide array of unprecedented challenges resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and civil unrest, the NYPD proactively adapted to undertake a virtual focus on well-being. Through the Health and Wellness Section, the department began offering webinars on topics such as grief support, fitness, nutrition, yoga, mindfulness, resiliency, finance, retirement planning, and even a virtual social hour to promote cohesion and morale. Recognizing that member wellness is foundational to every aspect of the NYPD, the department continues to assess the prevalence of, and factors that contribute to, stress and trauma of its members and remains dedicated to continuously strengthen and evolve member support services. Additionally, SPRING 3100, the official magazine of the NYPD, once again devoted an entire issue focused on the many physical and mental health resources available within the department. Along with useful strategies to maintain a healthy and balanced lifestyle, the publication also provided guidance on issues specific to members of the service and the importance of health, both on and off the job.



# Conducted Electrical Weapons

Conducted electrical weapons (CEWs) – also referred to as electronic control weapons or tasers – are a less-lethal use of force option for law enforcement personnel. CEWs, under NYPD policy, may be used to gain control of noncompliant subjects who are actively resisting, exhibiting active aggression, or to prevent subjects from physically injuring themselves or others. These less-lethal devices are intended to augment members’ existing force options and provide a greater margin of safety for both subjects and members in confrontational situations.


There are two separate modes in which a CEW can be deployed: “cartridge” mode and “drive-stun” mode. Cartridge mode, the primary method of deployment, qualifies as a level 1 force incident in department policy, while drive-stun mode, the far less utilized deployment method, would qualify as a level 2 force incident. While there is no national standard for law enforcement use of a CEW, NYPD policy is generally in line with the best practices recommended by nationally recognized independent bodies, including the Police Executive Research Forum, the National Institute of Justice, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

CEWs use replaceable cartridges containing compressed nitrogen to propel two small probes that are attached to the handheld unit by insulated conductive wires. The wires transmit short controlled pulses of electricity in five-second cycles that stimulate the skeletal muscles of the human body. These short electrical pulses affect the sensory and motor functions of the peripheral nervous system causing temporary incapacitation by preventing coordinated muscular action,

without affecting vital organs. Once the five-second cycle is complete, an immediate recovery occurs. CEWs collect and store data regarding each use for post-incident review.

In 2020, a total of 28,504 uniformed members of the service were trained and authorized to use CEWs, and 7,426 CEWs were deployed to personnel. This represents a 0.4% decrease from the 28,624 total members trained and authorized to employ CEWs in 2019, but is a 6.8% increase from the 6,954 CEWs deployed to personnel during that same time. The reduction in members trained in CEW usage (0.4%) was caused by an overall reduction of uniformed personnel in 2020 and to the numerous challenges that affected scheduled training and hiring opportunities, which would have resulted in a higher total of members certified for CEW usage. It is worth noting, however, that the number of members trained and authorized in 2020 is 159% higher than in 2016, the inception of this annual report, when only 10,979 uniformed members of the service were CEW-trained and authorized. Since 2016, the percentage of members

**2020 CEW Discharge Incidents, Event Type**  
(figure 31)



of the service trained and authorized in CEW usage has risen from approximately 30% to more than 80% of all members.

Deploying a CEW in cartridge mode is a force option that allows members of the service to engage non-compliant and/or aggressive subjects from a distance, providing members additional time to react and develop tactical solutions in situations that are often fast paced and violent. Additionally, CEWs often help members gain rapid control and compliance, thereby minimizing the likelihood of injury or fatal medical consequences for both members and subjects. However, when subjects present members of the service or others with an imminent threat of serious physical injury or death, utilizing a CEW may not be the suitable or reasonable option.

In 2020, there were 1,073 CEW discharge incidents, which included 1,294 individual discharges. Multiple discharges may occur during a single CEW discharge incident and there may be CEW discharges during incidents classified under higher levels of force, for example, in cases of firearms discharges when CEWs were also used. During 2020, CEW discharge incidents and individual discharges both saw a decrease, by 15.6% and 14.3% respectively, from the previous year. This decrease in CEW discharge incidents and individual discharges may be attributable to a focus on de-escalation tactics, a decrease in both calls for service and arrests, and a reduction in department staffing that resulted in a slight decline of members trained and authorized in CEW use in 2020.

The large majority of 2020's CEW discharge incidents, approximately 77%, occurred during situations when members were faced with crimes in progress or where members were attempting to subdue a violent emotionally disturbed person (EDP). This percentage correlates with the most recent five-year period (2016-2020) when approximately 78% of CEW discharge incidents were for arrests (which includes crimes in progress) or EDP

situations. Of the 1,073 CEW discharge incidents in 2020, 431 occurred during crime in progress situations, and 395 occurred while members were attempting to take violent EDPs into custody. The remaining CEW discharge incidents occurred in situations that included: vehicle stops, suspicious person stops, wanted subjects, past crime investigations, prisoners, and unintentional discharges.

Emotionally disturbed persons (EDPs), as defined by the NYPD Patrol Guide, are persons who appear to be mentally ill or temporarily deranged and are conducting themselves in a manner that a uniformed member of the service reasonably believes is likely to result in serious injury to themselves or others. Encounters with EDPs are often not arrest-related. Consistent with the New York State Mental Hygiene Law, department policy directs members to take an EDP into protective custody for the subject's safety and the safety of the public, and to ensure that proper medical and psychiatric evaluation can take place at a safe location.


Members of the service often do not know the emotional and/or psychological status of a subject upon first contact, but are trained to recognize situational and behavioral cues to properly respond to emotionally disturbed persons. Members are guided to utilize all necessary time and de-escalation tactics, along with only the reasonable amount of force necessary, in order to bring an emotionally disturbed person into custody. When verbal directions fail, and a subject exhibits active aggression, a CEW discharge is often one of the safer options for both the subject and members of the service. The 395 CEW discharge incidents during EDP encounters in 2020 constitute a fraction of a percent of the 140,418 calls for service classified as 10-54 "EDP" calls. In the vast majority of these assignments, members managed the incident without a need to resort to any level of force, let alone a CEW discharge.

## DEPLOYMENT MODE

**A** CEW can be deployed in two separate modes: "cartridge" mode and "drive-stun" mode. Cartridge mode, also referred to as probe mode, is the preferred method of discharge under NYPD policy. In cartridge mode, two metal probes are propelled by the CEW's cartridge toward a subject across an intervening space. This mode, utilized to provide adequate separation from the intended target, may cause neuromuscular incapacitation, and effectively immobilize a subject. Of the 1,073 CEW discharge incidents in 2020, 83.3% – 894 – were cartridge mode deployments. Since 2016, cartridge mode represents more than 86% of CEW deployments in discharge incidents citywide.

Conducted electrical weapon discharge incidents utilizing only drive-stun mode accounted for 128, approximately 12%, of all discharge incidents in 2020. In drive-stun mode, the CEW unit is brought into direct contact with the subject's body or clothing without a cartridge, or after a cartridge has been discharged. By itself, a drive-stun discharge does not achieve the immobilizing effects of probe deployment because it does not affect a subject's nervous system. Additionally, there may be circumstances where both cartridge and drive-stun mode are used in concert. In some instances, only one probe penetrates a subject or there is insufficient distance between probes and the use of a CEW in drive-stun mode is necessary to "complete the circuit" and achieve neuromuscular incapacitation. In 2020, both cartridge and drive-stun modes were utilized in 4.8% of CEW incidents.

**CEW Deployment Mode, 2020**  
(figure 32)




## EFFECTIVENESS

The goal of any application of force, CEW discharges included, is to safely gain control of violent, actively resistant, and/or aggressive subjects without the need for any further use of force. Traditionally, a CEW discharge was deemed “effective,” whether deployed in probe mode or drive-stun mode, if the discharge led to members rapidly gaining custody and control of the subject immediately after its use. In October 2019, the NYPD adopted and codified the following definition of CEW effectiveness in NYPD Patrol Guide 221-08: “Any immediate reaction, even if momentary, that causes a change in an actively aggressive subject’s or emotionally disturbed person’s physical actions and/or psychological behavior as the result of a pre-deployment verbal warning, activation, laser warning, warning arc, or discharge of a CEW.”

A comprehensive review of 2020 force data indicates that 703 CEW discharge incidents were categorized as effective in gaining rapid control of the target subject. Of the 1,073 discharge incidents, 1,018 were intentional. Of these intentional CEW discharge incidents, 69% were deemed effective.

**Effectiveness of CEW Discharges, 2020**  
(figure 33)




Ineffective discharge incidents were attributable to such situations as the probes failing to make adequate contact with the subject’s skin or clothing, the probes missing the subject entirely, a subject fighting through the pain, or the probes falling out. An ineffective discharge incident may have multiple, simultaneous causes.

## DISCHARGING PERSONNEL

Personnel in the rank of police officer and sergeant accounted for 92.8% of all individual CEW discharges (1,202 of 1,294) and were the discharging personnel in 994 of 1,073 (92.6%) CEW discharge incidents during that same period. Unlike members serving in investigative capacities, or higher ranking members of the service, police officers and sergeants assigned to patrol-related functions are much more likely to be involved in hostile and violent interactions and are more likely to be first on scene at incidents that may lead to CEW discharges. Accordingly, since 2017, personnel in the rank of police officer have been responsible for the highest proportion of both discharge incidents and individual discharges annually.

**CEW Discharges by Rank, 2020 (Total 1,294)**  
(figure 34)




## TIME AND PLACE OF DISCHARGES


Approximately 45.6% of CEW discharge incidents occurred during the third platoon (3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.) in 2020. Since 2017, this platoon has experienced the most frequent occurrence of CEW discharge incidents, averaging over 41% of incidents during that time span. The first and second platoons recorded similar numbers of CEW incidents, approximately 27.3% and 27.1% respectively, in 2020.

More discharge incidents typically occur in geographic boroughs where there are higher numbers of calls for service with Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx consistently among the top three boroughs in both of these categories. In 2020, the Bronx led New York City in CEW discharge incidents, accounting for 29.5% of all CEW discharge incidents. Brooklyn had slightly fewer with 28.8% of the city's CEW discharge incidents, followed by Manhattan (23.7%), Queens (12.9%), and Staten Island (5.1%). Since 2016, the Bronx has experienced the highest proportion of annual CEW discharge incidents four separate times. During that same span, Brooklyn, which led the city in 2018, and Manhattan have both consistently accounted for the other two of the top three boroughs with regard to CEW discharge incidents.

**CEW Discharges by Geographic Borough, 2020**  
(figure 35)




**CEW Discharges by Platoon, 2020**  
(figure 36)



**911 Calls for Service by Borough, 2020**  
(figure 37)

6.4 Million Calls for Service in 2020



# General Uses of Force



# General Uses of Force

Every member of the NYPD is responsible and accountable for the proper use of force. Under current New York State law, a member may use force to effect arrest, prevent escape, and protect life and property. Any force used by members of the NYPD must be in compliance with both state and federal law, as well as department policy. In all circumstances, any application or use of force by a member of the service must be the reasonable amount necessary to gain compliance. Members of the service seek to gain voluntary compliance, when appropriate and consistent with personal safety, in order to reduce or eliminate the necessity to use force. However, voluntary compliance is not always achievable and some interactions may result in the use of force.


Historically, NYPD use of force incidents were documented through paperwork such as Arrest Reports, Medical Treatment of Prisoner Forms, Aided Reports, and Line-of-Duty Injury Reports. Use of force data, while captured, did not reside in a centralized location nor did it adequately provide a comprehensive account of an incident. Recognizing this insufficiency, in June 2016, the department introduced the Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Report. The TRI Report sought to enhance accountability, better identify training deficiencies, and improve oversight by recording more complete data about the types of force used, the demographic information of individuals subjected to force, the members of the service who used force and/or were subjected to force, any injuries inflicted and/or sustained, and other circumstances surrounding use of force incidents.

The TRI Report has now become the primary manner by which NYPD personnel record use of force incidents, whether force was used by, or against, a member of the service. The TRI Report process is entirely digital, highly intuitive, and will continue to enhance the department's

goals of accountability and transparency. In 2020, 7,510 TRI Interaction Reports were completed, documenting 6,158 reportable use of force incidents. Of the completed TRI Reports, 1,352 were for incidents that, while reportable under department force policies, did not involve the use of force by members of the service. As an example, a subject in department custody assaulted by another subject in custody would generate a TRI Report but not be categorized as a use of force incident. Similarly, the suicide of a subject in police custody is reportable by a TRI Report, though not considered a use of force incident. Additionally, an instance where a subject assaults a member of the service, without any force utilized by a member of the NYPD, would also generate a TRI Report. While these incidents do not involve the use of force by members of the service, they still invoke a rigorous oversight mechanism that is governed by the department's force investigation policy.


Under the department's four level force classification rubric, 2020's force incidents consisted of 95.1% Level 1 uses of force, 3.1% Level 2 uses of force, 1.2% Level 3

**Threat, Resistance or Injury Reports, 2020**  
(figure 38)





**Force Reporting Levels, 2020**  
(figure 39)



uses of force and 0.6% Level 4 uses of force. In 2019, when the NYPD’s use of force policy was defined by three levels, force incidents comprised 94.4 % Level 1 uses of force, 3.9 % Level 2 uses of force, and 1.7% Level 3 uses of force.


Of the 6,158 force incidents in 2020, 78.3% 4,821 incidents, involved the minimum amount of physical force (i.e., forcible take-downs, hand strikes, and foot strikes) and 1,018 incidents, 16.5% of total reportable force incidents, were intentional CEW discharges.

The remaining force incidents by equipment or force option included: 134 uses of OC spray (2.2%), 81 uses of impact weapons (1.3%), 5 uses of mesh restraining blankets (0.08%) , 43 firearms discharges (0.7%), and 2 canine bites (0.03%). Every year since 2016, the initial year of this report, the NYPD has shown an annual

decrease in the cumulative amount of four specific less-lethal force incidents; impact weapons, mesh restraining blankets, OC spray, and canine bites. Also in 2020, for the first time over that same period, the department experienced a decrease in CEW incidents. Overall, in 2020, there were a total of 222 force incidents involving either impact weapons, mesh restraining blankets, OC spray, or canine bites. This is 44 incidents fewer than the 266 incidents of the same categories in 2019, 111 fewer than 333 incidents in 2018, and 296 fewer than the 518 incidents in 2017. From June to December 2016, there were a total of 396 force incidents in these categories. The NYPD began tracking the use of these force options in June 2016, after instituting its revised force policies and updated reporting system. Thus, the information for 2016 is limited to the last seven months of that year and not available for prior years.

In 2020, the use of less-lethal force options, including CEWs, decreased by 15.5%, representing 239 fewer incidents in these categories from 2019. Additionally, during 2020, the use of mesh restraining blankets fell by 66.6% compared to 2019, the use of OC spray fell by 17.8%, incidents of canine bites fell by 66.6%, and the use of impact weapons fell by 1.2% from the previous year.


**Type of Encounter in Which Police Used Force, 2020**  
(figure 40)



Of the total force incidents (6,158) recorded on TRI Reports, 48%, or 2,952 incidents, occurred during four arrest-related situations; crimes in progress, past crime investigations, wanted subject investigations, and violent prisoner interactions. Force was used in approximately 2.9% of total arrests (4,071 of 140,411) effected by members of the department in 2020. Combined with incidents involving emotionally disturbed persons, these arrest-related incidents accounted for approximately 70% of all NYPD uses of force. Force used during crowd control accounted for 4.3% of the total, while incidents involving vehicular summons enforcement and suspicious activity accounted for 2.7% and 1.2% respectively.


**Force Used During Arrests, 2020**

(figure 41)




**Total Arrests by Race, 2020**

(figure 42)



**Uniformed Members Using Force, 2020**


(figure 43)




The race and ethnicity of the uniformed members of the service using force in 2020 mirrors the racial/ethnic breakdown of uniformed staff in the department. The racial composition of the subjects of police force reflects the racial composition of the violent criminal population in the city, as measured by overall arrests, people who resist arrest, and information from crime victims describing assault suspects, robbery suspects, and shooting suspects.

**Violent Crime and Force Used to Effect Arrest, 2020**

(figure 44)




**Subjects of Force by Age/Race, 2020**  
(figure 45)




Approximately 66.9% of individuals subjected to police force were between the ages of 16 and 35. Of individuals subjected to force between the ages of 16 and 25, 56.3% were black, 31.7% were Hispanic, 6.4% were white, and the remainder were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the subjects between the ages of 26 and 35, 55.1% were Black, 30.6% were Hispanic, 9.1% were white, and the remainder were Asian or other ethnicities. Of the individuals subjected to force between the ages of 36 and 59, 53% were Black, 28.5% were Hispanic, 12.8% were White and the remainder were Asian or other ethnicities. Of subjects ages 60 and older, 42.4% were black, 23.2% were Hispanic, 27.2% were white, and the remainder were Asian or other ethnicities.

Brooklyn accounted for 28.6% of citywide uses of force, while the Bronx (25.5%) and Manhattan (24.3%) together accounted for approximately 49.8%. Queens (17.3%) and Staten Island (4.3%) accounted for the remaining 21.6% of force used in each geographic borough by members of the service. Citywide, uses of force occurred most often (44.5%) on the third platoon, from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., followed by 29.9% on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., and 25.6% occurring on the first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.


**Force Reporting by Geographic Borough**  
(figure 46)




**Force Reporting by Platoon, 2020**  
(figure 47)



**Force Reporting by Subject Race, 2020**  
(figure 48)



**Subjects of Force by Age, 2020**  
(figure 49)




### CIVILIAN FORCE COMPLAINTS

Force complaints received by the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) have been on the decline over the past decade, as evidenced by the 1,627 complaints recorded in 2020, compared to the 2,891 complaints received in 2011. There were 329 fewer force complaints to the CCRB in 2020 compared to 2019, resulting in a decrease of 16.8% force complaints. The number of force allegations substantiated by CCRB in 2020 was 56; this represents a decrease of 42.8% compared to the 98 substantiated allegations in 2019.

NYPD members, in the course of responding to the millions of calls for service that New York City experiences annually, come in direct contact with victims, witnesses, suspects, and other civilian bystanders. The overwhelming majority of these calls for service and other public interactions occur without any actual police use of force or complaints of unnecessary force. In 2020, NYPD personnel responded to more than 6.2 million calls for service, and only a fraction of a percent of those interactions resulted in force complaints against uniformed members of the service. The ratio of calls for service to force complaint cases in 2020 is approximately 3,817 to 1. The ratio of calls for service to substantiated allegations is about 110,905 to 1. The ratio of use of force incidents to substantiated force allegations is approximately 109 to 1.

**Historical CCRB Force Complaints vs. Substantiated Force Allegations, 2011 - 2020**  
(figure 50)




## FORCE USED AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE SERVICE

The danger inherent in police work is thoroughly understood by members of the service, as well as the realization that any event, encounter, or interaction may ultimately turn violent. Although voluntary compliance is always the goal, the efforts of NYPD personnel to achieve voluntary compliance are not always successful. Some encounters between uniformed members of the service and the public become contentious and ultimately violent, leading to injuries to both subjects and members of the service.

In 2020, there were 5,394 incidents in which subjects used force against members of the service. While incidents of force against members often occur during instances in which members use force, for analytical purposes, force used by members and force used against members are viewed independently of one another. The majority of force used against NYPD personnel took place during crime in progress situations (approximately 40%) and encounters with emotionally disturbed persons (25.2%). Additionally, 8.3% of incidents occurred during interactions with prisoners, and crowd control accounted for 4.9% of incidents of force used against members of the service. Physical force without weapons represented the vast majority (97.5%) of all force used against NYPD personnel. In the remaining 133 incidents of force used against members of the service, weapons were used or displayed by a subject.

**Force Used Against Members by Event Description, 2020**

(figure 51)



**Type of Force Used Against Members, 2020**


(figure 52)




Incidents where force was used against members of the service took place most often in the Bronx, where 28.5% of 2020's total incidents occurred. Manhattan (26.1%) and Brooklyn (23.8%) made up almost half of all incidents while Queens (17.3%) and Staten Island (4.3%) accounted for the remaining 21.6% of all occurrences. These percentages strongly correlate, and, in the case of Queens and Staten Island, precisely mirror, the geographic breakdown of members' use of force. The first platoon, from 11:31 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. accounted for almost half, 49.6%, of all incidents where force was used against members, followed by 25.7% of instances on the third platoon from 3:31 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., and the remaining 24.7% on the second platoon, from 7:31 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

Of the 7,858 subjects of police force in 2020, 7,636 individuals, approximately 97.2%, sustained no injuries or minor injuries. A total of 222 subjects sustained substantial or serious physical injuries. During the 5,394 incidents of force used against members of the service, 3,378 members of the NYPD sustained injuries, of which 259 injuries were deemed substantial or serious. Substantial injuries are generally those that require treatment at a hospital. Serious injuries are generally those that require admission to a hospital.


**Force Used Against Members by Platoon, 2020**  
(figure 53)



**Force Used Against Members by Geographic Borough, 2020**  
(figure 54)




**Use of Force Related Injuries (Subject vs. Members), 2020**  
(figure 55)



# Appendices





## APPENDIX A

### Force Incident Reporting

Immediate Supervisor responds to scene and determines level of force used. Immediate Supervisor then assesses the circumstances and determines whether event should be referred to a higher authority.

All reportable uses of force are investigated, including those determined to be within department guidelines.

#### LEVEL 1

**Use of:** hand strikes; foot strikes; forcible take downs;  
wrestling/grappling; O.C. spray;  
mesh restraining blanket; CEW (cartridge mode)  
OR  
**Type of Injury to non-MOS:** Physical Injury  
(unless consistent with use of higher level of force)



#### LEVEL 2

**Use of:** impact weapon strikes (any object); police canine bites; CEW (drive stun mode); any prohibited act (excluding the alleged or suspected use of a chokehold, those that result in a serious physical injury, or those related to a firearm discharge)  
OR  
Alleged/suspected excessive force (no injury/physical injury);  
Attempted prisoner suicide (excluding Serious Physical Injury)  
OR  
**Type of Injury to non-MOS:** Physical Injury consistent with use of Level 2 force;  
unconsciousness; loss of tooth; application of stitches/staples



#### LEVEL 3

**Use of:** force readily capable of causing death or serious injury,  
except firearm discharges  
OR  
Alleged or suspected use of a chokehold  
OR  
Alleged/suspected excessive force (serious physical injury); Attempted prisoner  
suicide ( Serious Physical Injury)  
OR  
**Type of Injury to non-MOS:** Serious Physical Injury



#### LEVEL 4

ALL police firearm discharges  
OR  
Any discharge of a UMOS's firearm fired by someone other than UMOS  
OR  
**Type of Injury to non-MOS:** Seriously injured, likely to die or death



**Member of Service:**  
completes Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Interaction Report

**Immediate Supervisor:**  
completes Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) Incident Report and closes incident unless further investigation is warranted



All reports and follow-up investigations are reviewed by reporting member's Commanding Officer.

**Member of Service:** completes TRI Interaction Report

**Duty Captain:** conducts investigation and completes TRI Incident Report

*Patrol Borough Investigations Unit* may assist in investigation



All reports and follow-up investigations are reviewed by reporting member's Commanding Officer.

**Member of Service:** completes TRI Interaction Report unless superseded by the investigative authority of Force Investigation Division

**Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB):** conducts investigation and completes TRI Incident Report



All reports generate an Internal Affairs Case. Follow-up investigations are reviewed by IAB investigators, supervisors and executives before being closed.

**Force Investigation Division (FID):** conducts investigation, completes TRI Interaction and Incident Reports



The NYPD's Use of Force Review Board reviews all cases for which a member of FID is the investigating supervisor. Additionally, any violations of force prohibitions at any level may be reviewed on a per case basis to determine whether, under the circumstance, the actions were reasonable and justified.

\*FID or IAB may respond to any force incident or subject injury and may assume responsibility of the investigation based on the circumstances of the incident.

**Subjects Killed During Intentional Discharge – Adversarial Conflict Incidents**

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are concluded.

***Incident 1 – 9th Precinct (Male/Black/37) – 01/09/2020***

On January 9, 2020, at approximately 0335 hours, officers were conducting patrol when they heard multiple gunshots. Upon arrival, the officers observed a male subject discharging a firearm at another person. The officers exited their vehicle, drew their firearms, and issued numerous verbal commands to the subject to get on the ground and drop the firearm. The subject did not comply and, while still holding a firearm, outstretched his arm in the officers' direction. In response, the officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject. The subject was removed to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A North American Arms .22 caliber revolver was recovered on scene. The victim shot by the subject was also transported to the hospital where he pronounced deceased. An additional North American Arms .22 caliber revolver was recovered in close proximity to the victim. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cotinine and ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 2 – 45th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/55) – 04/01/2020***

On April 1, 2020, at approximately 0358 hours, the subject called 911 to report a male armed with a knife, additionally stating there was blood on it, and provided a physical and clothing description matching his own. The subject further informed 911 that the male was possibly armed with a firearm. Officers responded and encountered the male subject holding a firearm in one hand and a knife in the other hand. Officers issued numerous commands to drop the weapons. The subject refused and pointed his firearm at one of the officers. In response, officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was transported to the hospital and was pronounced deceased on April 7. A powder cap-and-ball Navy revolver and a knife were recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of morphine and midazolam in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 3 – 26th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/44) – 05/20/2020***

On May 20, 2020, at approximately 1854 hours, officers responded to a 911 call of a person shot. Upon arrival, officers observed an unresponsive female lying on the floor and a male subject, armed with a knife, engaged in a physical struggle with another male. The subject raised the knife and attempted to stab the male. In response, one officer discharged his firearm, striking the subject. Both the male subject and female victim were pronounced deceased on scene. A Glock 19 semi-automatic handgun and a knife were recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 4 – 77th Precinct (Male/Black/34) – 06/02/2020***

On June 2, 2020, at approximately 2120 hours, officers responded to a ShotSpotter activation of eight rounds fired. Upon arrival, the officers observed a male subject with a firearm hiding behind a tree. Officers issued numerous verbal commands to drop the firearm. The subject ignored the commands and raised his hand while still in possession of the firearm. In response, officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject multiple times. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A 9mm Hi-Point semi-automatic handgun was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of phencyclidine in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 5 – 113th Precinct (Male/Black/24) – 10/08/2020***

On October 8, 2020, at approximately 1234 hours, officers located a male subject involved in a previous non-fatal shooting. As the officers attempted to apprehend the subject, he fled in a vehicle. After striking multiple vehicles, the subject exited the vehicle and continued to flee on foot before attempting, at gunpoint, to forcibly take possession of a parked vehicle occupied by two civilians. The pursuing officers arrived and established a perimeter around the subject as he held two firearms, one in each hand. Ignoring the officers' verbal commands to drop the firearms, the subject pointed both firearms in the direction of the officers and fired several rounds at them. In response, the officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject several times. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A Century Arms TP9SA 9mm semi-automatic handgun and a Smith & Wesson SD9 9mm handgun were recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 6 – 105th Precinct (Male/Black/41) – 11/24/2020***

On November 24, 2020, at approximately 1245 hours, officers accompanied an assault victim to her residence. Upon arrival, the officers, at the request of the victim, entered the residence and were inside the dwelling speaking with the victim when the male subject arrived. The subject walked through the front door holding a firearm in his hand and fired multiple rounds in the direction of the officers and the victim. In response, the officers returned fire, striking the subject several times. The subject was pronounced deceased at the scene. During the exchange of gunfire, one officer was struck in both hands and the other officer was struck in the leg. A Glock 22 .40 caliber semi-automatic handgun and a Smith & Wesson M&P Shield 9mm semi-automatic handgun were recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 7 – 26th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/52) – 12/13/2020***

On December 13, 2020, at approximately 1545 hours, officers in the vicinity of a holiday event at a house of worship responded to a male subject who, after stepping off a line to enter the location, drew two firearms from his jacket pocket, one in each hand, and began to fire. Responding officers ordered the subject to drop his firearms numerous times. The subject ignored the officers' commands and continued to discharge his firearms. In response, officers discharged their firearms, striking the subject one time. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A .380 caliber Jimenez Arms semi-automatic handgun and 9mm Taurus PT 111 G2 semi-automatic handgun were recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 8 – 73rd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/18) – 12/29/2020***

On December 29, 2020, at approximately 1814 hours, officers responded to a 911 call of a male armed with a knife, hitting vehicles and chasing people. Upon arrival, officers observed the subject with a machete in his hand, striking an occupied civilian vehicle. Disregarding the officers' numerous commands to drop the machete, the subject advanced towards the officers with the machete in his hand. In response, one officer discharged his firearm, striking the subject. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. A machete was recovered on scene. The toxicology report indicated the presence of LSD, THC, 11-OH-THC, THC-COOH, cocaine, and benzoylecgonine in the subject's system at the time of death.

**Other Death Investigations Conducted by the Force Investigation Division**

Disclaimer: In some cases, factual information is based on preliminary findings of ongoing investigations. Additional information may develop as the department's investigation progresses and/or related court or grand jury proceedings are concluded.

**Death in Custody**

Death in Custody incidents typically occur after the restraint of a particular subject. The term "in custody" refers to a subject whom officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present. In death in custody situations, subjects may be located anywhere, (e.g., at the scene of an incident, at a hospital, at a police facility, or in a courthouse awaiting arraignment), and death may occur due to intervening circumstances or actors beyond police control. Such intervening circumstances include: medical crises such as heart attacks or strokes; suicides; drug-related deaths from drugs taken or ingested prior to custody; and injuries inflicted before custody during accidents, or assaults by people other than involved parties. In 2020, there were 12 death in custody incidents.

***Incident 1 – Suicide/No Police Force Used – 19th Precinct (Male/Black/40) – 01/28/2020***

On May 5, 2019, the male subject intentionally set his vehicle on fire, resulting in the death of a 3-year old female chained in the backseat. Prior to the arrival of officers, the subject, who had been inside the vehicle, exited the vehicle as it was engulfed in flames and fled into an adjacent park. Responding Emergency Service Unit (ESU) officers conducted a search of the park and located the subject in a pond in chest level water. The subject, who suffered severe burns, was transported to the hospital by Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and subsequently transferred to another hospital where he remained, and was placed under arrest. On January 28, 2020, the subject succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased by the hospital staff. The subject's death certificate indicated that the cause of death was multiple complications of thermal burns involving approximately 75% of body surface area. The toxicology report was not done due to the subject's condition.

***Incident 2 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 71st Precinct (Male/Black/43) – 01/30/2020***

On December 6, 2019, a male subject complaining of chest pains was transported to the hospital by Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT). While inside the emergency room, the subject became increasingly agitated and physically assaulted a hospital security guard. Additional security staff responded and physically restrained the subject. The subject was subsequently sedated by medical staff, after which he suffered a cardiac episode. Officers responded and placed the subject under arrest for assault. The subject was transferred to a long-term care facility and was pronounced deceased by the facility's medical staff on January 30, 2020. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications of anoxic encephalopathy after cardiopulmonary arrest. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 3 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 40th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/78) – 02/29/2020***

On February 20, 2020, officers responded to a 911 call for a male having difficulty breathing. Upon arrival, the officers observed EMS performing life saving measures on the subject inside of their ambulance. The subject's condition stabilized and he was removed to the hospital where officers placed him into custody after a computer inquiry revealed two active arrest warrants. While hospitalized, the subject's medical condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased on February 29, 2020. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. The toxicology report indicated the presence of benzoylcocaine and fentanyl in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### ***Incident 4 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 106th Precinct (Male/White/58) – 04/30/2020***

On April 30, 2020, officers responded to a 911 call of a single-car motor vehicle accident and found a male subject unconscious in the driver's seat of the vehicle. New York City Fire Department (FDNY) members responded, removed the subject from the vehicle, and administered NARCAN. Responding EMS administered an additional dose of NARCAN and the subject then regained consciousness. After informing paramedics that he took heroin prior to operating his vehicle, the subject was placed into custody and transported to the hospital. Upon discharge from the hospital, the subject was transported to the precinct for arrest processing. While lodged inside a prisoner holding cell, the subject became unresponsive and officers began performing live saving measures. EMS arrived and pronounced the subject deceased at the location. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute fentanyl intoxication. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, 4-ANPP, norfentanyl, B-hydroxyfentanyl, alprazolam, and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### ***Incident 5 – Medical/Police Force Used – 109th Precinct (Male/White/29) – 06/21/2020***

On June 21, 2020, officers responded to a 911 call of a dispute involving a firearm. Upon arrival, officers made contact with a male subject, attired in a costume helmet and armbands, with a sword affixed to his waist. While the officers were attempting to establish a dialogue with the subject at the doorway of his apartment, the subject became combative with the officers and began banging on the storm door with his fists. Officers utilized a polycarbonate shield in an attempt to contain the subject inside the residence, but he forced his way out the door towards the officers and actively resisted their attempts to handcuff and place him in custody. In response, officers deployed their CEWs. Once in custody, the subject lost consciousness and was transported to the hospital where he was later pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was cardiac arrest due to dilated cardiomyopathy of undetermined etiology during physical restraint by police, including conducted electrical weapon use. The toxicology report indicated the presence of THC, 11-OH-THC, THC-COOH, and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### ***Incident 6 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 14th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/47) – 09/01/2020***

On September 1, 2020, an off-duty officer performing a paid-detail assignment requested the response of an additional police unit after encountering a male subject acting irrational. Upon the arrival of the additional officers, the subject was placed in handcuffs without incident. While being treated by EMS on scene, the subject became unresponsive and was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication by the combined effects of cocaine and ethanol with excited delirium. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, naloxone, THC, 11-OH-THC, THC-COOH, CBD, cocaine, benzoylecgonine, ethylbenzoylecgonine, and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### ***Incident 7 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 44th Precinct (Male/Hispanic/36) – 09/09/2020***

On September 9, 2020, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. The male subject was discovered lying unclothed on the stairwell landing of a residential building, conscious and apparently under the influence of narcotics. After being handcuffed by responding officers, the subject was transported by EMS to the hospital where he suffered a cardiac episode and was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was methamphetamine-induced delirium. The toxicology report indicated the presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine in the subject's system at the time of death.

#### ***Incident 8 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 71st Precinct (Male/White/27) – 10/16/2020***

On October 16, 2020, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person. Prior to the officers' arrival, CCTV captured the male subject shirtless, descending a staircase, and exiting a residential building. He remained outside for approximately ten minutes during which time he was observed leaning on a parked vehicle before subsequently falling backward. Responding officers found the subject conscious, lying on the street between two parked vehicles. After being handcuffed, the subject was transported by EMS to the hospital where he suffered a cardiac episode and was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute mixed drug intoxication, including bupropion and amantadine. The toxicology report indicated the presence of bupropion, hydroxybupropion, amantadine, hydroxyzine, and cetirizine in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 9 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 44th Precinct (Male/Asian/64) – 10/21/2020***

On October 21, 2020, the male subject was awaiting arraignment while in the custody of the NYC Department of Corrections at Bronx Central Booking when he experienced difficulty breathing and went into cardiac arrest. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 10 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 13th Precinct (Male/Black/52) – 10/29/2020***

On October 29, 2020, NYC Transit personnel reported an emotionally disturbed person aboard a train, urinating and defecating on himself, who refused to leave. Responding officers placed the male subject in handcuffs and he was transported to the hospital by EMS. While en route, the subject suffered a cardiac episode and was pronounced deceased at the hospital. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was acute intoxication by fentanyl and heroin. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl, 4-ANPP, B-hydroxyfentanyl, morphine, and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 11 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 66th Precinct (Male/White/20) – 11/05/2020***

On October 28, 2020, officers responded to a 911 call of an attempted robbery and arrested the male subject without incident. While lodged in the precinct detention cell, the subject was found unconscious and transported to the hospital where he was admitted. On November 5, 2020, the subject's medical condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was complications of acute mixed drug intoxication, including morphine and flubromazolam. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, norfentanyl, morphine, naloxone, flubromazolam, cotinine, and cannabinoids in the subject's system at the time of death.

***Incident 12 – Medical/No Police Force Used – 102nd Precinct (Male/Black/56) – 11/06/2020***

On November 5, 2020, officers responded to a 911 call of a burglary in progress and, after a brief foot pursuit, arrested a male subject who, as a result of his attempt to flee, had reopened stitches from a previous leg injury. He was lodged in a precinct detention cell, EMS was requested to transport the subject and the subject was transported to the hospital to treat the prior injury. On November 6, 2020, the subject's medical condition deteriorated and he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. The toxicology report indicated the presence of fentanyl, acetylfentanyl, norfentanyl, 4-ANPP, and morphine in the subject's system at the time of death.



## **Death Preceding Custody**

Death preceding custody incidents typically occur immediately before the intended restraint of a particular subject, after officers have either decided that there was probable cause to arrest or that restraint was necessary for the safety of the subject or other persons present, but had not, in fact, established control of the person. Five cases investigated by the Force Investigation Division in 2020 are categorized as death preceding custody. In three cases, the subjects were fleeing the police when the deaths occurred.

### ***Incident 1 – Fleeing Subject – 26th Precinct (Male/Black/13) – 03/14/2020***

On March 14, 2020, officers attempted to conduct a traffic stop on a male subject who, while operating a vehicle, disobeyed a steady red light. While fleeing from the officers, the subject opened the driver side door and attempted to exit as the vehicle remained in motion. The vehicle, with the subject no longer in control, struck three parked vehicles, overturned onto the driver's side, and landed atop the subject. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head. The toxicology report indicated that there was neither alcohol nor controlled substances in the subject's system at the time of death.

### ***Incident 2 – Suicide – 17th Precinct (Male/White/23) – 06/01/2020***

On June 1, 2020, officers responded to a 911 call of an emotionally disturbed person on a roof. Responding officers encountered the subject sitting on the ledge of the roof and attempted to establish a dialogue with him. ESU personnel arrived and further attempted to establish a dialogue with the subject. After approximately seven minutes of dialogue, the subject, while still in a seated position on the ledge, leaned his body forward and fell to the ground below. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was multiple injuries sustained due to a fall from height. At the request of the subject's family, a toxicology report was not conducted.

### ***Incident 3 – Fleeing Subject – 41st Precinct (Male/Hispanic/24) – 06/12/2020***

On June 12, 2020, officers attempted to conduct a traffic stop of the subject who, while operating a vehicle, disobeyed a stop sign. After the officers ceased their attempt to stop the subject, the subject continued to flee in the vehicle, disobeyed a steady red light and collided with a truck. The subject was pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol, THC, 11-OH-THC, THC-COOH, and cotinine in the subject's system at the time of death.

### ***Incident 4 – Suicide – 94th Precinct (Female/White/34) – 12/23/2020***

On December 23, 2020, officers conducting a wellness check knocked several times with no response from the subject. With the assistance of the building manager, the officers entered the apartment, located the subject in the bedroom, and attempted to speak to her. The subject appeared despondent and spoke incoherently, prompting the officers to request EMS. While awaiting the arrival of EMS, the subject asked for privacy in order to dress. After exiting the room, the officers heard a gunshot, reentered the bedroom, and observed the subject, a firearm in her hand, bleeding from the head. The subject was transported to the hospital where she was pronounced deceased on December 24, 2020. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was a gunshot wound of the head. The toxicology report indicated the presence of phenylpropanolamine in the subject's system at the time of death.

### ***Incident 5 – Fleeing Subject – 60th Precinct (Male/Black/25) – 12/26/2020***

On December 26, 2020, officers attempted to conduct a traffic stop of a subject operating a vehicle with tinted windows. As the subject fled in the vehicle, he struck a light pole and scaffolding. The subject was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the torso. The toxicology report indicated the presence of oxycodone, THC, 11-OH-THC, and THC-COOH in the subject's system at the time of death.

## **Death No Custody Contemplated**

Deceased persons sometimes were not taken into police custody nor did the police contemplate taking them into custody, and these cases are classified as death when no custody contemplated. Six cases investigated by the Force Investigation Division in 2020 was categorized as death when no custody contemplated.

### ***Incident 1 – Fleeing Vehicle – 123rd Precinct (Female/White/32) – 04/25/2020***

On April 25, 2020, officers were pursuing a stolen vehicle when it collided with another vehicle. A female occupant was ejected from the struck vehicle and pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma of the head, neck, torso, and left upper extremity.

### ***Incident 2 – Collision – 94th Precinct (Male/Black/37) – 07/25/2020***

On July 25, 2020, officers were responding to a 911 call of a male shot when their marked police vehicle collided with a motorcycle. The operator of the motorcycle was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force injuries of the head and torso. The toxicology report indicated the presence of midazolam and THC in the subject's system at the time of death.

### ***Incident 3 – Collision – 106th Precinct (Male/Black/41) – 09/05/2020***

On September 5, 2020, a marked police vehicle, with its emergency lights activated, was stopped on the Belt Parkway behind a disabled vehicle when it was struck by a motorcycle traveling at a high rate of speed. The operator of the motorcycle was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact trauma. The toxicology report indicated the presence of ethanol in the subject's system at the time of death.

### ***Incident 4 – Collision – 49th Precinct (Female/Hispanic/20) – 10/05/2020***

On October 5, 2020, an officer was responding to another officer's request for assistance when his marked police vehicle struck a pedestrian. The pedestrian, who was crossing the street in a marked crosswalk, was transported to the hospital where she was admitted and underwent surgery. On October 8, 2020, the pedestrian succumbed to her injuries and was pronounced deceased. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt force trauma.

### ***Incident 5 – Fleeing Vehicle – 23rd Precinct (Male/Hispanic/51) – 12/12/2020***

On December 12, 2020, officers had commenced and subsequently terminated the pursuit of a vehicle for a traffic infraction. As the vehicle continued to flee, it disobeyed a steady red light and struck a pedestrian crossing the street in a marked crosswalk. The pedestrian was subsequently pronounced deceased on the scene by EMS. According to the subject's death certificate, the cause of death was blunt impact injuries of the head, neck, torso, and extremities.

### ***Incident 6 – Fleeing Vehicle – 75th Precinct (Female/Black/51 and Female/Black/58) – 12/12/2020***

On December 12, 2020, officers commenced and subsequently terminated the pursuit of a vehicle for a traffic infraction. As the vehicle continued to flee, it collided with another vehicle. The operator and passenger of the struck vehicle were transported to the hospital where they were both pronounced deceased. According to their death certificates, the cause of death was blunt force injuries for both the operator and passenger.





**APPENDIX D**



**Firearm Discharge Incidents by Precinct/Location of Occurrence** (figure 57)


<i>Precinct/Location</i>	<i>Adversarial Conflict</i>	<i>Animal Attack</i>	<i>Unintentional</i>	<i>Unauthorized/Suicide</i>	<i>Total</i>
009 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
018 Precinct	0	0	0	1	1
026 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
040 Precinct	1	1	0	0	2
041 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
042 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
044 Precinct	0	0	2	0	2
045 Precinct	1	0	0	1	2
047 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
048 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
052 Precinct	1	0	0	1	2
063 Precinct	0	0	1	1	2
067 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
069 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
070 Precinct	1	1	0	0	2
073 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
075 Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
077 Precinct	2	0	0	0	2
079 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
101 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
102 Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
105 Precinct	1	0	1	0	2
109 Precinct	0	0	2	0	2
113 Precinct	1	0	0	0	1
114 Precinct	1	0	0	1	2
122 Precinct	0	0	1	0	1
Nassau County	0	0	1	1	2
Westchester County	1	0	0	0	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>43</b>



APPENDIX E











**APPENDIX F**

**2020 Use of Force Incidents by Members' Command** *(figure 63)*

<i>Command/Precinct</i>	<i>Firearm</i>	<i>Electrical Weapon</i>	<i>Impact Weapon</i>	<i>Police Canine</i>	<i>OC Spray</i>	<i>Restraining Mesh Blanket</i>	<i>Physical Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
001 PRECINCT	0	3	2	0	1	0	27	33
001 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
005 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
005 PRECINCT	0	7	1	0	0	0	8	16
005 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
006 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
006 PRECINCT	0	9	0	0	1	0	44	54
007 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	1	0	18	22
007 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
009 PRECINCT	3	18	0	0	1	0	41	63
010 PRECINCT	0	4	1	0	2	0	23	30
013 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
013 PRECINCT	1	4	0	0	0	0	32	37
014 PCT-MIDTOWN SO. PCT	0	13	0	0	2	0	39	54
017 PRECINCT	0	3	1	0	2	0	18	24
018 PCT-MIDTOWN NO. PCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	22	27
019 PRECINCT	0	9	0	0	0	0	43	52
020 DET SQUAD	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
020 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	13	24
023 PRECINCT	1	8	0	0	0	0	58	67
023 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
024 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	0	0	29	37
025 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
025 PRECINCT	0	23	0	0	0	0	45	68
026 PRECINCT	2	8	0	0	0	0	10	20
028 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
028 PRECINCT	0	20	3	0	0	0	41	64
030 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	0	0	26	31
032 PRECINCT	0	9	0	0	0	0	38	47
033 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	2	0	46	59
034 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
034 PRECINCT	0	16	1	0	0	0	56	73
034 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
040 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
040 PRECINCT	1	25	0	0	1	0	99	126
040 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
041 PRECINCT	1	10	0	0	2	0	32	45
041 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
042 PRECINCT	1	16	4	0	2	0	85	108
042 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

<i>Command/Precinct</i>	<i>Firearm</i>	<i>Electrical Weapon</i>	<i>Impact Weapon</i>	<i>Police Canine</i>	<i>OC Spray</i>	<i>Restraining Mesh Blanket</i>	<i>Physical Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
043 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
043 PRECINCT	0	18	0	0	0	0	69	87
043 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
044 PRECINCT	0	56	1	0	1	0	106	164
044 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
045 PRECINCT	1	11	0	0	1	0	35	48
046 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
046 PRECINCT	0	34	2	0	3	0	185	224
047 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
047 PRECINCT	1	38	0	0	1	0	145	185
047 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
048 PRECINCT	0	29	2	0	1	0	61	93
049 PRECINCT	0	5	1	0	0	0	39	45
049 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
050 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
050 PRECINCT	0	2	0	0	0	0	19	21
052 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
052 PRECINCT	0	40	2	0	2	0	68	112
052 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
060 PRECINCT	0	10	1	0	1	0	63	75
060 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
061 PRECINCT	0	5	1	0	0	0	46	52
061 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
062 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	21	27
062 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
063 PRECINCT	1	18	0	0	0	0	33	52
066 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	12	15
067 PRECINCT	1	23	1	0	4	0	77	106
068 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	31	37
069 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	1	33	40
070 PRECINCT	1	16	0	0	4	0	71	92
071 PRECINCT	0	5	2	0	1	0	42	50
071 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
072 PRECINCT	0	14	1	0	0	0	69	84
073 PRECINCT	3	36	0	0	3	0	69	111
075 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
075 PRECINCT	0	33	2	0	5	2	127	169
076 PRECINCT	0	2	0	0	0	0	16	18
077 PRECINCT	2	17	1	0	2	0	59	81
078 PRECINCT	0	0	0	0	2	0	15	17

<i>Command/Precinct</i>	<i>Firearm</i>	<i>Electrical Weapon</i>	<i>Impact Weapon</i>	<i>Police Canine</i>	<i>OC Spray</i>	<i>Restraining Mesh Blanket</i>	<i>Physical Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
079 PRECINCT	1	11	1	0	8	0	67	88
081 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
081 PRECINCT	0	14	4	0	0	0	44	62
083 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
083 PRECINCT	0	14	1	0	2	0	43	60
084 PRECINCT	0	1	0	0	1	0	21	23
088 PRECINCT	0	6	1	0	1	0	28	36
090 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
090 PRECINCT	0	12	0	0	0	0	37	49
094 DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
094 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	13	19
100 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	1	0	27	33
100TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
101 PRECINCT	1	12	1	0	0	0	62	76
101ST DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
102 PRECINCT	0	5	0	0	2	0	45	52
102 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
102ND DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
103 PRECINCT	0	11	1	0	0	0	158	170
103 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
104 PRECINCT	0	6	1	0	0	0	40	47
105 PRECINCT	1	14	0	0	0	0	62	77
106 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	3	0	37	48
107 PRECINCT	0	3	0	0	0	0	41	44
108 PRECINCT	0	2	0	0	0	0	23	25
109 PRECINCT	2	8	1	0	0	0	18	29
109 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
110 PRECINCT	0	10	1	0	0	0	78	89
110 SCHOOL SAFETY UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
111 PRECINCT	0	4	0	0	1	0	14	19
112 PRECINCT	1	2	0	0	0	0	19	22
113 PRECINCT	3	21	0	0	0	0	74	98
113TH DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
114 PRECINCT	0	8	0	0	1	0	82	91
115 PRECINCT	1	3	0	0	0	0	34	38
120 PRECINCT	0	20	2	0	0	0	88	110
121 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
121 PRECINCT	0	11	0	0	0	0	44	55
122 DETECTIVE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
122 PRECINCT	1	6	2	0	0	0	29	38

<i>Command/Precinct</i>	<i>Firearm</i>	<i>Electrical Weapon</i>	<i>Impact Weapon</i>	<i>Police Canine</i>	<i>OC Spray</i>	<i>Restraining Mesh Blanket</i>	<i>Physical Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
123 PRECINCT	0	6	0	0	0	0	10	16
ARSON AND EXPLOSION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
AUTO CRIME	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
AVIATION UNIT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
BKLYN SPECIAL VICTIMS SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
BROOKLYN COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CANINE TEAM	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	3
CENTRAL PARK PRECINCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
CHIEF CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OFFICE	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
CHIEF OF DEPT INV REVIEW SECT	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
CHIEF OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
COMMUNICATIONS DIV	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE INVEST SEC	0	0	0	0	1	0	7	8
CRITICAL RESPONSE COMMAND	0	1	0	0	1	0	5	7
DET BORO BRONX	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DET BORO BRONX OPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DET BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
DISORDER CONTROL UNIT	0	0	0	0	2	0	17	19
DRUG ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
EMER SERV SQ 01	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
EMER SERV SQ 02	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	4
EMER SERV SQ 03	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
EMER SERV SQ 04	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
EMER SERV SQ 05	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	3
EMER SERV SQ 06	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
EMER SERV SQ 07	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	4
EMER SERV SQ 08	0	1	0	0	0	1	2	4
EMER SERV SQ 09	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
EMER SERV SQ 10	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	4
EMER SERV UNIT	0	3	0	0	0	1	5	9
FINANCIAL CRIMES TASK FORCE	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
FIREARMS & TACTICS SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
FORCE INVESTIGATION DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
GANG SQUAD BRONX	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
GANG SQUAD BROOKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
GANG SQUAD MANHATTAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
GANG SQUAD MANHATTAN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

<i>Command/Precinct</i>	<i>Firearm</i>	<i>Electrical Weapon</i>	<i>Impact Weapon</i>	<i>Police Canine</i>	<i>OC Spray</i>	<i>Restraining Mesh Blanket</i>	<i>Physical Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
GANG SQUAD QUEENS SOUTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
GANG SQUAD STATEN ISLAND	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
GRAND LARCENY DIVISION	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4
GUN VIOL SUPP DIV Z2 (MAN,BX)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
HARBOR UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HB BROOKLYN RESPONSE TEAM	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 2	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	3
HIGHWAY UNIT NO 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
HIGHWAY UNIT NO.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HOMELESS OUT & SHLTR SEC DIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
HOMELESS OUTREACH UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HOUSING BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
HOUSING PSA 1	0	4	0	0	1	0	14	19
HOUSING PSA 2	1	7	0	0	0	0	34	42
HOUSING PSA 3	0	7	1	0	2	0	27	37
HOUSING PSA 4	0	5	0	0	1	0	20	26
HOUSING PSA 5	0	10	1	0	2	0	37	50
HOUSING PSA 6	0	4	0	0	0	0	27	31
HOUSING PSA 7	3	7	2	0	5	0	50	67
HOUSING PSA 8	0	2	1	0	0	0	34	37
HOUSING PSA 9	1	7	0	0	1	0	16	25
INTEL-CRIMINAL INTEL SECTION	0	4	1	0	3	0	33	41
LEGAL BUREAU	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
MAJOR CASE SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MAN COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
MAN/BX SS ZONE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MTN DET SQUAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NARC BORO BRONX	1	1	0	0	0	0	25	27
NARC BORO BROOKLYN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	19
NARC BORO BROOKLYN SOUTH	0	0	0	0	1	0	11	12
NARC BORO MANHATTAN NORTH	0	1	2	0	0	0	25	28
NARC BORO QUEENS NORTH	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	5
NARC BORO QUEENS SOUTH	0	1	0	0	0	0	11	12
NARC BORO STATEN ISLAND	0	1	0	0	0	0	8	9
OFFICE CHIEF SPECIAL OPER	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
OTHER	1	0	5	0	1	0	19	26
PATROL BORO BKLYN NORTH	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
PATROL BORO BRONX	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	4
PATROL BORO MAN NORTH	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

<i>Command/Precinct</i>	<i>Firearm</i>	<i>Electrical Weapon</i>	<i>Impact Weapon</i>	<i>Police Canine</i>	<i>OC Spray</i>	<i>Restraining Mesh Blanket</i>	<i>Physical Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
PATROL BORO MAN SOUTH	0	1	1	0	0	0	12	14
PATROL BORO STATEN ISLAND	0	6	0	0	4	0	8	18
PBBN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PBBN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBBS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
PBBS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PBBX SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
PBBX SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PBMN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PBMN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PBMS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
PBQN SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PBQN SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PBQS SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PBQS SPECIALIZED UNITS	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
PBSI SCHOOL SAFETY	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
PROPERTY CLERK DIV	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
PSB MOVIE AND T.V. UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
QNS COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
RECRUIT TRAINING SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
SCHOOL SAFETY DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
SPECIAL VICTIMS DIV ZONE 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STATEN ISLAND COURT SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 1 MANHATTAN	0	3	2	0	2	0	42	49
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 2 BRONX	0	2	5	0	3	0	35	45
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 3 BROOKLYN	0	1	3	0	5	0	38	47
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 4 QUEENS	0	1	1	0	0	0	27	29
STRATEGIC RESP GRP 5 SI	0	1	2	0	0	0	11	14
STRATEGIC RESPONSE GROUP	0	2	0	0	1	0	14	17
TAXI UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TB ANTI TERRORISM UNIT	0	0	0	0	2	0	24	26
TB CITYWIDE VANDALS TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
TRANSIT BORO BKLN TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
TRANSIT BORO BROOKLYN	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BORO BX/QNS TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BORO MANH TASK FORCE	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
TRANSIT BUR. CRIME ANALYSIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 1	1	1	0	0	0	0	16	18
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 11	0	10	2	0	2	0	27	41

<i>Command/Precinct</i>	<i>Firearm</i>	<i>Electrical Weapon</i>	<i>Impact Weapon</i>	<i>Police Canine</i>	<i>OC Spray</i>	<i>Restraining Mesh Blanket</i>	<i>Physical Force</i>	<i>Total</i>
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 12	0	2	0	0	0	0	35	37
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 2	0	1	1	0	3	0	26	31
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 20	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	5
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 23	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 3	0	3	0	0	1	0	23	27
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 30	0	3	0	0	5	0	15	23
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 32	0	8	0	0	2	0	24	34
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 33	0	0	1	0	4	0	25	30
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 34	0	1	0	0	0	0	10	11
TRANSIT BUREAU DISTRICT 4	1	11	0	0	4	0	36	52
TRANSPORTATION BUREAU	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB BROOKLYN TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB CITYWIDE TRAFFIC T/F	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB MANHATTAN SUMMONS ENF SEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
TRB MANHATTAN TOW POUND UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB QUEENS TRAFFIC ENF UNIT	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
TRB SOUTH INTERSECTION CONTROL	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
TRB TRAFF SPECIAL OPS SECTION	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIV ZONE 2	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
VICE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
WARRANT SECTION	0	23	0	0	1	0	35	59
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>42*</b>	<b>1,073</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4,821</b>	<b>6,158</b>

\*This figure does not include the unauthorized discharge incident when a non-member of the service utilized a member's firearm in a completed suicide. The discharge is not attributed to a member of the service, therefore, there can be no member command designation. The incident is, however, included in the yearly discharge total and covered in the Unauthorized Discharge section.





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